bienvenidos!

I'm theory.of.teoria@gmail.com and I work with batch ML and real-time ML models
this site is ground zero for glimpses of knowledge I've jotted down
onto napkin-math notes from various .

this information is deployed to github using a prototype devops process (hence the poor styling and organization).

Currently learning how to pronounce Reza Negarestani, Kojin Karatani, and Quentin Meillassoux ("kantah may-a-soo"). And also learning/memorizing all the stuff below and watching the maelstrom of information slowly becomeing into what I hope is an educational game/app.


❤-dbl


bookmarks:
searchtree for "dasein mitsein"
(AGI) political compasses
Cartesian Ghosts
Philosophy by language/nations:
filosofos.htm Philosophie.htm
Russell's paradox shows that every set theory that contains an unrestricted comprehension principle leads to contradictions. The paradox had already been discovered independently in 1899 by the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo. However, Zermelo did not publish the idea, which remained known only to David Hilbert, Edmund Husserl, and other academics at the University of Göttingen. At the end of the 1890s, Georg Cantor – considered the founder of modern set theory – had already realized that his theory would lead to a contradiction, as he told Hilbert and Richard Dedekind by letter. Because restricting comprehension avoided Russell's paradox, several mathematicians including Zermelo, Fraenkel, and Gödel considered it the most important axiom of set theory
A category is some collection of objects and morphisms. Whatever that collection is, it can’t be a set (at least not in the ZFC sense) because of Russell’s paradox, or else it would not be possible to talk about a category whose objects are sets. At a foundational level, that collection is usually defined as a class, which is kind of like one step up from a set: a class contains sets, but a class never contains another class (so you don’t have to worry about the class of all classes). In an alternate terminology, all sets are said to be classes, and a class which is not a set is called a proper class. A category whose collections of objects and morphisms are both sets is called a small category, and if at least one of them is a proper class, it is called a large category. An intermediate level, which comes up quite frequently, is a locally small category. A locally small category is a category where, for every two objects X and Y , the class of morphisms from X to Y is a set. The category S e t , whose objects are sets and whose morphisms are functions, is an important instance of a large category (because its class of objects is not a set, precisely because Russell’s paradox dictates that there is no set of all sets), but which is locally small (for any pre-chosen sets X and Y , you can construct the set of functions from X to Y ; it’s the subset of P ( X × Y ) ). One interesting category is the category of small categories, written C a t , whose objects are small categories and whose morphisms are functors between them. Russell’s paradox is not an issue here, because C a t itself is a large category, so is not one of its own objects. Occasionally referred to is C A T , the category of large categories, but discussing C A T requires a foundation accounting for collections of classes, in which case C A T is not a large category, but a “very-large” category. As such, none of these categories contain themselves as objects. https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-category-in-math-and-why-does-the-category-of-sets-not-violate-Russells-paradox

For a lot of the 19th and early 20th centuries, mathematicians were working with all sorts of different abstract mathematical structures. People interested in highly abstract geometric spaces might work with "topological spaces"; those interested in symmetries of objects might work with "groups"; those interested in arithmetic-like structures where you can add, subtract, and multiply objects (whether those objects are integers, matrices, or whatever) might work with "rings"; those interested in how structures are ordered (like the integers by the < relation, or sets by the "subset of" relation) might work with "preorders". In each case, it was found that one of the best ways of understanding these structures was to study certain functions between them: you can learn a lot about topological spaces by looking at the continuous functions between those spaces. So we end up with a sort of list of structures like this:

Structure abstracts... deals with...
Set arbitrary collections of objects functions
Topological space geometric spaces continuous functions
Group symmetry group homomorphisms
Ring arithmetic ring homomorphisms
Preorder ordering order-preserving functions
Vector space vectors linear transformations

Category theory started with the observation that this "study of functions" is not just coincidence. It looks at what each of these "categories" of object (set, group, ring, etc.) has in common, and what this says about each of those structures. You might not think there would be much in common between a geometric space, an arbitrary set of objects, and a collection of vectors, but category theory lets us see the underlying abstractions and make connections between them. It's a very powerful way of looking at all the branches of mathematics at once and getting results about many or all of them.

Another interesting point about category theory is that it can serve as a foundation of mathematics. Basically, any mathematical statement in any field of mathematics developed so far can be rewritten as a (possibly very technical and complicated) statement of category theory. It's not the only possible foundation - and actually, set theory is still considered the "default" foundation - but this shows how powerful and expressive category theory can be.

Category vs Group vs Set vs Type theory

searchtree
FeatureSet theoryCategory theoryGroup theoryType theory
DataSetsObjectsGroupsTypes
RelationsRelations between setsMorphism between objectsGroup homomorphismType constructor
AxiomsThe axiom of extensionality, the axiom of pairing, the axiom of power set, and the axiom of choiceThe axiom of category, the axiom of composition, the axiom of identity, and the axiom of unitThe axiom of group, the axiom of homomorphism, and the axiom of inverseThe axiom of type, the axiom of constructor, and the axiom of substitution
ApplicationsMathematics, computer science, logic, and statisticsMathematics, computer science, and physicsMathematics, computer science, and physicsProgramming languages, logic, and mathematics
StructuresSets, elements, functionsObjects, arrowsAlgebraic structures (Groups, group elements, group operations)Types, terms, functions
Pronounhood Outhwitting
Outhwitting 101: Reckoning with Pronounhood-ness w Bourdieuian classification theory
(?-miento?, etc..aka Prounoun-Suffix Philosophy, "the quality of being <PROUNOUN>"
inspired by Anglish, Martin Buber's "The Ego-It to I-It, I-It to I-suchness, and I-suchness to I-thou" and Schelling's "Etwas=somethingness-excess, implying a 'thatness' with a specific dynamism"
inspired by Anglish, Martin Buber/OG Rose's "The Ego-It to I-It, I-It to I-suchness, and I-suchness to I-thou" and Schelling/Chris Satoor's "Etwas=somethingness-excess, implying a 'thatness' with a specific dynamism"
𝓣MOITHOUGHT𝓣:

# meta:

* What are "Collisions"? They are polysemous words w contradictions whose properties seem to coalesce around two pronounhood signifiers


copy(toTabDelimited(Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll("tr")).map(o=>Array.from(o.querySelectorAll("td")).map(oo=>oo.innerText.split("\n")[0]))))

* My reductionist bs: Suchness - Immediate Universal, Multiplicative Philosophy ; Whatness - Mediated Universal, Negative Philosophy ; Thisness - Immediate Particular, Divisional Philosophy ; Thatness - Mediated Particular, Positive Philosophy
* old junknotes from #LIT.REDDIT: - 𝓣quiddity / haecceity || whatness essence / thisness essence𝓣- The novel achieved a remarkable verisimilitude by capturing the haecceity and quiddity of each character's experiences, grounding the narrative in a deep sense of facticity. ;;; ipseity vs egoicty? ;;; quiddity = haecceity (HACK-see-uh-tee) = essence = whatness = thisness https://www.reddit.com/r/CriticalTheory/comments/179qqnc/manuel_delanda_a_thousand_years_of_nonlinear/k58olj3/
* search "nescioquid, quid vs quod"
* Peut-on soutenir que, dans les périodes de vive désorientation des sociétés / ¿Podemos sostener que, en períodos de grave desorientación de las sociedades [...]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Qx-YM_v91Mg
* whatness and thisness are sundering, thusness and thatness are yoking
* Outhwitters / Reckoners
* I don't understand the difference between ipseidad and eseidad at all - These terms are complementary but focus on different aspects of being: one on self-identity (ipseidad) and the other on ontological existence (eseidad).
* why is it easier to distinguish whatness vs suchness vs thisness vs thatness in English/German/Latin/Spanish than it is in Mandarin/Japanese/Arabic? Are there any langauges that differentiate between the four? Is my focus on the four completely arbitrary in nature? - moiresponse: idk but talidade's "Ver tambem" section eloquently combines tattva with haecceidade with quididade, so I'm not the first to combine talidade w haecceidade w quididade ""Tality" became a term used by Xavier Zubiri to define the intrinsic qualified content: "The physical reality of the essence in the order of suchness is that according to which the thing is 'this' and not the 'other', that is, it is the way in which the real thing is 'constructed' as 'such'", but that the suchness of the essence is greater and beyond the immanent thing: "by its own suchness, the essence has a transcendental function "
https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talidade
* did Plato ever use "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι" for whatness or "τόδε τι" for thatness?
* Can I describe suchness as the "metaversal / multiversal" ("multiplicative philosophy", my own term), whatness as "the mediated universal" aka universal (negative philosophy), thisness as the "immediate particular" ('moiverse" my own term, "divisional philosophy" also my own term, split subject, Diesheit), and thatness as the "mediated particular" ("positive philosophy", pluriversal aka El Pluriverso)?
* So I don't know if you will see this but I've spent a lot of time thinking about this, pulling together notes from a lot of your interviews and from others. But the four most common terms I come across are "whatness", "thatness", "thisness", and "suchness", all from various traditions. Is it fair to break them down into a political compass" where the two axes are immediate/mediated and universal/particular?
https://old.reddit.com/r/GermanIdealism/comments/1d8pjsh/four_ways_to_periodize_schellings_writings_walter/
* Why is "whatness" known as both Was and Daß in German? - its not, its my own misunderstanding of reading an article
* quiddity v quoddity v haecceity
https://theoryoftheory.github.io/searchtree.htm?search=%22quiddity%22%20%22quoddity%22%20%22haecceity%22
* BRITNEY: how can something be positive if it emphasizes "un"knowable depths? Isn't that negative BY DEFINITION?
* schizo/creative: Diesheit = divide, suchness = multiplying, therefore in addition to negative philosophy and positive philosophy i am coining divisional philosophy (thisnes) and multiplicative philosophy (suchness)
* ChatGPT PromptEngineering: Please arrange 4 columns for the following four concepts, and can you make 4 rows for english, latin, spanish, and german that translates and elaboratings each of these concepts (citing any relevant authors such as Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Schelling, etc)? (1) WHATNESS - quid, Schelling's 'Daß' and negative philosophy (2) THISNESS - haecceidad, aecceidad (3) SUCHNESS tathata, sosein (4) THATNESS - quod, Schelling's 'Daß' and "positive philosophy"
* Why has Whatness ("Quiddity") and Thisness ("Haecceity") been explored philosophically and have (retroactively) been given latin roots, but Suchness and Thatness do not have latin roots? But Suchness and Thatness do have Sanskrit roots ("Tathata" and "Tattva"), and do not have Sanskirt equivalent? Am I wrong and there are latin and sankrit equivalent of all four words?
# OTHER PRONOUN COMBINATIONS
* FOR-ITSELF / Erlebnis - The For-Itself (erlebnis) and the Being of Possibilities
https://www.instagram.com/p/C55pWY3Opo4/
* #TOPOST - Aquinas be like: my pronouns are Quiddity/Haecceity
* #TOPOST TimeEnergy = TimelyAvel? https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
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metaversal / multiversal / multiplicative philosophy
confucian/buddhist
sinologists

* Why Theravada/Mahayana? - In a Mahayana context, suchness is just a synonym of emptiness., While also used in Theravada, it is a significant concept in Mahayana Buddhism
universal (negentropic) / negative philosophy
christian/muslim
moiverse (divided subject) / divisional philosophy
christian
pluriversal (entropic) / positive philosophy
hindu/jainist/sikh (and like maybe buddhist yogacara)
Indologists: Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, George Feuerstein

# Here's all the (eastern) ideologies who are hoarding tattvas according to another LLM. do you mind fact-checking and providing more information about other tattva-hoarders that you are aware of? Thanks:

# Tattvas/THATNESSES - Purvamimamsans 16, Vaishnavism-Pancaratrans 24-25, Vaishnavism-Vaikhanasas 5, Jainists 7/9, (Kashmir) Shaiviss 36, Shakta Tantra 51, Sankhya 25, Lokayata 4, Saktananda 64, Advaita Vedanta 6, Sikh 5
* tattvas vs dharmas and padarthas and yoginis?

* Pūrva Mīmāṃsā - 16 Tattvas (sometimes implied) Though primarily focused on ritual and dharma, Mīmāṃsā outlines tattvas related to the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇas) and the tools required for ritual action. These tattvas are less cosmological and more epistemological.
* Vaishnavism-Pancaratrans - 24-25 tattvas - Generally recognizes 24 to 25 tattvas. These tattvas include principles related to Vishnu and his manifestations, individual souls, and material nature.
* Vaishnavism-Vaikhanasas - 5 tattvas - Typically acknowledges 5 tattvas known as the Suddha tattvas. These include Vishnu-tattva, Lakshmi-tattva, and other divine principles.
* Jainists - 7/9 tattvas - Lists 7 fundamental tattvas: Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā, and Moksha. Sometimes expanded to 9 by including Punya (Merit) and Pāpa (Demerit)
* (Kashmir) Shaivists - 36 tattvas ; Both Shaivists and Kashmir Shaivist traditions recognize 36 tattvas. Kashmir Shaivism - 36 Tattvas Expanding on classical Shaivism, Kashmir Shaivism offers one of the most elaborate tattva systems. These 36 tattvas span three tiers: Śuddha (Pure): Transcendental tattvas like Śiva, Śakti, and Sadāśiva. Śuddhāśuddha (Pure-Impure): Tattvas mediating between the divine and material worlds, like Māyā and Kalā. Aśuddha (Impure): Material tattvas like the five elements (earth, water, fire, air, ether) and the senses.
* Shakta Tantra - 51 Tattvas (in some traditions) Many Shakta systems adopt and expand Shaiva tattvas, adding layers that emphasize Śakti (divine energy) and its manifestations. Includes subtle distinctions within Māyā and additional tattvas representing divine feminine principles
* Sāṅkhya-sunkcostists - 25 tattvas ;;; Sāṃkhya-Yoga Variants - 28 Tattvas (in some schools) While classical Sāṃkhya has 25 tattvas, certain later interpretations, particularly those aligned with Yoga traditions, expand the list to include additional principles like the five powers of action (karmendriyas) and five subtle perceptions.
* Lokayata/Carvaka (Indian Materialism) - 4 tattvas
* Sāktānanda Tradition (Esoteric South Indian Lineages) - 64 Tattvas - A rare tantric classification that aligns tattvas with the 64 yoginīs, emphasizing divine emanations of Śakti.
* Advaita Vedānta - 6 Tattvas (sometimes 3-5) In non-dualist Vedānta, tattvas are pared down to the essentials: Brahman: Ultimate reality. Māyā: Illusory appearance of duality. Jīva: Individual self. Ishvara: Brahman conditioned by Māyā. Jagat: The world, understood as illusory.
* Sikh Philosophy - 5 Tattvas (Pañc Bhoota) Sikhism doesn’t heavily systematize tattvas but references the five elements (earth, water, fire, air, and ether) as metaphors for human qualities and spiritual evolution.

# non-tattva tattvas (yogacara's 100 dharmas, the nyaya-vaisesika's 7 padarthas)
* Buddhist Yogācāra (Cittamātra) - 100 Dharmas. The dharmas of Yogācāra function similarly to tattvas but emphasize mental and experiential phenomena: Form (rūpa): 11 types. Mind (citta): 8 types. Mental Factors (caitasika): 51 types. Unconditioned (asaṃskṛta): 6 types. Miscellaneous factors (cittaviprayukta): 24 types.
* Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika - 7 Padārthas (similar to tattvas) While not explicitly called "tattvas," Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika outlines 7 categories of reality (padārthas): Dravya (Substance), Guṇa (Quality), Karma (Action), Sāmānya (Universal), Viśeṣa (Particularity), Samavāya (Inherence), and Abhāva (Non-existence).
..
pronoun✖suchness/thusness➖whatness➗thisness➕thatness (presque-rien)||whichness⬛bothness oneness threeness fourness nothingness^muchness👤selfness, selfhood, is-ness, being-ness, is-hood
vs whoness?


* why Whoness? - https://old.reddit.com/r/Pluriverse/comments/1gz5eyq/classical_liberalism_has_neglected_the/
*
*
*
🪞thingness, thinghoodherenesstherenesswherenesswhynesshownessaboutnessnownessisness
is-ness
beingness
whonessitness
whoXavier Zubiri, Juan Arnau, José Ferrater Mora, Reiner Schürmann, Rolf Schönberger, Kūkai, Fazang, Xuanzang, Dogen, Martin Buber, Mead, Daniel Dennett, OG Rose, CS Peirce, Ian Baptiste

# Cultural: none

* Why Xavier Zubiri? - "Tality" became a term used by Xavier Zubiri to define the intrinsic qualified content: "The physical reality of the essence in the order of suchness is that according to which the thing is 'this' and not the 'other', that is, it is the way in which the real thing is 'constructed' as 'such'", but that the suchness of the essence is greater and beyond the immanent thing: "by its own suchness, the essence has a transcendental function "
https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talidade
* Why Juan Arnau? See "asidad".
* Why José Ferrater Mora? - Aparece en el Diccionario de Filosofía de José Ferrater Mora. En la entrada "tal/talidad" pone: Lo que caracteriza todo "ser tal" puede llamarse "talidad". Zubiri ha indicado que si "la esencia es aquello que hace que lo real sea 'tal' como es", la esencia será esencia por lo pronto "en el orden de la talidad" (Sobre la esencia, 1962, pág. 357). Ahora bien, la talidad no es, según Zubiri, una determinación categorial en el sentido corriente. No puede serlo, porque lo que caracteriza formalmente la esencia de una cosa son sus notas en cuanto "notas-de", y estas "notas-de" son a la vez el "contenidode". Este "contenido-de" es, dice Zubiri, "la talidad de las notas". Las notas "talifican", lo cual no quiere decir determinar un sujeto por tal nota, sino "conferir tal contenido a un sistema por ser 'nota-de'"
* Why Reiner Schürmann? nach vielen Gesprächen mit Juden, Christen, Mohammedanern hier […] werde ich mehr monotheist [sic], Eckhart- und Heideggeranhänger, Hoffender auf die Erfahrung Gottes, als über das Sosein Christi spekulierender christlicher Prediger;;;Schurmann was a protoge of Arendt -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reiner_Sch%C3%BCrmann;;;
* Why Rolf Schönberger? Die Transformation des klassischen Seinsverständnisses.pdf - Denn erst der Gedanke einer restlosen Angewiesenheit, einer totalen Kontingenz des Wirklichen als Wirklichen macht die Frage nach der Seinsart eines derart Seienden vordringlich und die nach dem absoluten Sein plausibel. In den berühmt gewordenen Stellen bei Piaton4 und Aristoteles5 ist doch stets vorausgesetzt, daß es angesichts eines ewigen kosmischen Substrats zwar einen Grund für das Sosein des Kosmos gibt und geben muß; sein Dasein aber wird gar nicht problematisch: „Le premier principe de tout l'etre, tel que Piaton et Aristote Pont concu, explique integralement pourquoi l'univers est ce qu'il est, mais non pourquoi il est."6 Bezeichnenderweise wird deshalb erst im christlichen Raum die Frage nach dem Sein im absoluten Sinne gestellt; zum erstenmal wohl bei Augustinus: quid est esse, et non esse?7 Im Mittelalter wird die Frage öfters wiederholt, dann aber schon als Frage nach einer Wortbedeutung: quid ipsum esse significat videamus.8 Der Impuls, der vom christlichen;;;Die Axiomenschrift, 112; „Liegt hier der Anfang der Auseinandersetzung um die scharfe Trennung von Dasein und Sosein? Ihr Ursprung beruhte dann auf einem Mangel an gründlichem Nachdenken.";;;Whitehead, Science and the modern world, 1953 p. 216: „We conceive actuality as an essential relation to an unfathomable possibility." Process and Reality, Camb. 1929 p. 61: „It belongs to the nature of every ,being' that it is a potential for every ,becoming'." K. Jaspers, Philosophischer Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung, München 1963 p. 118: „Existenz ist nicht Sosein, sondern Seinkönnen, das heißt: ich bin nicht Existenz, sondern mögliche Existenz." Heidegger, SuZ, GA II, 51 sq.: „Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit." (cf. p. 191). Die neuzeitliche Utopienliteratur steht wohl ebenso unter dieser Voraussetzung wie die Bildung widerspruchsfreier Hypothesen in der Wissenschaft, die erst nachträglich einem Text im Experiment unterworfen werden. Beiden gemeinsam scheint die Abwertung der Gegenwart; Bloch, Experimentum Mundi, GA XV, 143 sq.: „Möglichkeit ist ein eigener riesiger Seinsmodus rund ums vorhandene Wirkliche und vor allem ihm voraus, voller noch nie so gehabte Potential-Inhalte, relativ steuerbarer." Der „Primat der Praxis" impliziert — zumindest aus aristotelischer Perspektive — ebenfalls den Primat der Möglichkeit (cf. E. Vollrath, Substanz, 93). Dies scheint allmählich alle Lebensbereiche durchdrungen zu haben und auf diese Weise gerade atmosphärisch geworden zu sein: R. Spaemann, Einsprüche, 17: „Funktionalisierung ist das Signum des Zeitalters: Primat der Möglichkeit vor der Wirklichkeit, Bestimmung der Wirklichkeit als Grenzfall des Möglichen und als Durchgangsstadium für Realisierung von Möglichkeiten." Philos. Essays, p. 15. Eine Beschreibung der Hypothetisierung findet sich in: R. Spaemann, Überzeugungen in einer hypothetischen Zivilisation, in: Abschied von Utopia? ed. O. Schütz, Styria 1977, 311 sq.;;;Die in verschiedene Textgruppen gegliederten Aussagen haben einen bedeutenden Teil der Scotus-Interpreten veranlaßt, das scotische Seinsverständnis als ein im Prinzip essentialistisches zu charakterisieren.80 Dagegen wurde von verschiedener Seite eingewandt, solche Etikettierungen setzten eine bestimmte Ontologie schon voraus, nämlich die thomasische.81 Aber das Modell der Wesenserkenntnis ist doch unverkennbar; daß „die Wesenheit .. . gegenüber dem Dasein einen gewissen Vorrang" 8 2 habe, der Seinsbegriff des Scotus also „das reine unbestimmte Sosein" „in seiner radikalsten Fassung als reines Quid" 8 3 darstelle, entbehrt durchaus nicht seiner textlichen Grundlage;;;Thomas v. Aquin begegnet diesem Problem mit dem Versuch, die Unselbständigkeit der essentia zu zeigen. Sie umfaßt zwar ein Form- und ein Materie-Moment, aber daraus ergibt sich noch keine Realität, weil sie sonst immer schon wirklich wäre; erst durch das Aktuierungsprinzip des esse wird ein konkretes ens konstituiert. Damit kann sowohl die Einheit dieses concretum gezeigt werden, denn die es bestimmenden Komponenten verhalten sich wie actus und potentia, als auch eine universelle Struktur angegeben werden, die über die Kontingenzbedingungen materieller Dinge hinausgeht. Das Form-Element bekommt dadurch — anders als bei Piaton und Aristoteles — einen Aspekt der Potentialität, nämlich im Verhältnis zum esse, und kommt auch im Verursachungsprozeß nur für das Sosein auf. Der Grund des Daseins aller Dinge kann nicht widerspruchsfrei als in ihnen selbst liegend gedacht werden. Daraus ergibt sich nicht allein die Möglichkeit, einer Metaphysik von Kontingenzprinzipien einen theologischen Abschluß zu geben, sondern auch diejenige, die darin gedachte Differenz zu denken: Das Anderssein von Sein und Wesen führt auf eine Instanz, in der Sein und Wesen koinzidieren, die mithin eine einzige, notwendige etc. ist.;;;Sosein 83, 86;;;E. Fromm, Haben oder Sein, 1976 p. 30: „Eckhart und der Buddhismus sind in Wirklichkeit nur zwei Dialekte der gleichen Sprache." cf. M. Nambara, Die Idee des absoluten Nichts in der deutschen Mystik und ihre Entsprechungen im Buddhismus, in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6 (1960), 143 — 277; R. Schürmann, Meister Eckhart, mystic and philosopher, London 1978; weitere Belege bei B. Welte, Meister Eckhart, 105 n. 32, der selbst des öfteren „Analogien aus dem Bereich des Zen-Buddhismus" aufzuweisen sucht, obwohl er die Einbindung in die augustinische und aristotelische Tradition („Meister Eckhart als Aristoteliker"), zumal die Rückbindung an Thomas von Aquin wieder stark machen möchte.
* Why Kūkai - Immediately and in this body realize Dharma and suchness. [..] Buddhahood Immediately and in This Body [..] The 大日経疏 says "The sounds, letters and suchness of each of the samādhi-gates of the tathāgatas are [...] the original grounds of the tathāgatas, the dharmakāya. Because dharmakāya provides these to all sentient beings everywhere, through unimpeded sovereign power these sounds and letters of suchness are given adhiṣṭhāna. Therefore, these sounds and letters are the body of the adhiṣṭhāna of all the tathāgatas. https://old.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/z9pbzw/great_compassion_mantra_whats_the_point_of_there/
* Fazang According to Fazang's commentary on Mahayana Awakening of Faith, all phenomena (dharmas) arise from a single ultimate source, the "nature" or "One Mind".[52] This is variously described as Suchness, the tathagatagarbha (the womb of tathagatas), buddha-nature, or just "nature". This nature is the ontological source and basis of all things, which is prior to any objects or conscious subjects.[52] This doctrine which states that all dharmas arise from the buddha-nature has been termed "nature-origination" (xingqi), and the term derives from chapter 32 of the Avatamsaka Sutra, titled Nature Origination of the Jewel King Tathagata (Baowang rulai xingqi pin, Skt. Tathâgatotpatti-sambhava-nirdesa-sûtra).[51][58] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazang
* Why Xuanzang - Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (literally, "fully accomplished", "perfected", "consummated"): This is the true nature of things, the experience of Suchness or Thatness (Tathātā) discovered in meditation unaffected by conceptualization, causality, or duality. It is defined as "the complete absence, in the dependent nature, of objects – that is, the objects of the conceptualized nature" (see Mahāyānasaṃgraha, 2:4).[76] What this refers to is that empty non-dual experience which has been stripped of the duality of the constructed nature through yogic praxis. According to Williams, this is "what has to be known for enlightenment" and Siderits defines it as "just pure seeing without any attempt at conceptualization or interpretation. Now this is also empty, but only of itself as an interpretation. That is, this mode of cognition is devoid of all concepts, and so is empty of being of the nature of the perfected. About it nothing can be said or thought, it is just pure immediacy." According to Xuanzang, this nature has the "absence of any existential nature of ultimate meaning" (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā) since it is "completely free from any clinging to entirely imagined speculations about its identity or purpose. Because of this, it is conventionally said that it does not exist. However, it is also not entirely without a real existence." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yogachara
* Why Dogen - Dogen - On the topic, Dōgen writes that, “If you wish to attain suchness, you should practice suchness without delay” (Abe 2007, 3). Philosopher Dogen famously expresses this idea in the Genjokoan (“Manifesting Suchness”), where he writes about the nature of firewood: Firewood becomes ash; it can ...
* Why Martin Buber - see OG Rose, see German sosein
* Buber and Mead - For Zen, whether or not there is a divine Absolute in some sense, the wonderful suchness, thusness, or thisness of things as they are is indefeasible https://www.jstor.org/stable/4610835
* Why Daniel Dennett - intentionality” (the “aboutness” of thoughts) or “qualia” (the “thusnesses” of experience Dennett obituary | Philosophy books | The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/books/2024/apr/21/daniel-dennett-obituary
* Why OG Rose - * Tathātā (tadata) Ego-It to I-it, I-it to I-suchness, I-suchness to I-You/I-Thou...K and Nietzsche can help us get from Ego-It (OGRose's "I-Object"?) to I-it (Buber), but then you have to bifurcate, Heidegger can help us get from I-it to I-suchness, and from I-suchness to I-you, overlays with Hegel's movement in Phenomenology of Spirit. How does one integrate with Otherness to radical degree Hegel is talking about? ;;; an "I" can't get to a "Thou" if the "I" has never acknowledged their ego as a split subject (a constantly contradictory self-relating negativity) https://old.reddit.com/r/redscarepod/comments/1gsxanh/how_do_i_stop_being_awful/lxhzlef/
* Why CS Peirce - * an ICON (vs index symbol) = suchness? CS Peirce: For a pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents whatever it may represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of suchness only
* Why Ian Baptiste? - "qualitative researcher" - https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/professor/401157 One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for quality are nature or whatness. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality? Put differently, can I assert that a thing exists if I have absolutely no perception of what it is? In philosophical jargon: is it possible to separate my ontology of a thing from my epistemology of it? https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002
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Edith Stein / Jean Hering, Karol Lenart, Nabokov/Durrell, Dietrich, James Joyce, Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Avicenna, Tindall's "Aquinas vs Scotus (Dedalus v Hopkins)", Heidegger, Jonathan Schaffer, Schelling/Jankélévitch's, Peirce

# Cultural: Fred Astaire, Fontaines D.C.


* Edith Stein "individuated essences that are related but distinct from the larger essence of human being, this is what she wants to capture thru the discussion of Scotus and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, so you get essence in Thomas and Husserl, then you get ?sensiality? sensuality / Wesenheit of this particular thing, its teh addition of this layer that allows not only the reality of particular things and the knowledge of them to be made possible for her, but also extends the doctrine of it, you get the double-doctrine of essence, the essence of a radical particularity is possible. In the End, she gives you an epistemology, an epistemology form, of essences or ideas, this is how the mind works, she adapts various Husserlian and Thomistic categories to show they are doing similar things. 55:17 Where Thomas and Husserl might not follow her is into this essential particularity, essentiality. Scotus probably would. There is a diff but it lies on a larger Scholastic debate. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pALheS40phA&t=53m30s ;;; Edith Stein uses Jean Hering's famous distinction between essences ( Wesen ) and essentialities ( Wesenheiten ) as part of her argument for a distinction among three types of being: actual being, mental being, and essential being. This account of being is both one of Stein's creative contributions to metaphysical discussions and part of what moves her thought in more Scotist, rather than Thomist, directions. This paper will look briefly at the friendship between Hering and Stein and then articulate the role of Hering's work in enabling Stein to develop her distinctive metaphysical vision in Finite and Eternal Being . https://www.quodlibet.it/toc/31
* R-quidditism / I-quidditism - "However, there is no consensus among I-quidditists about the proper metaphysical status of quiddities." - On the Lewisian Principle of Recombination and Quidditism by Karol Lenart
https://philarchive.org/archive/LENOTL ;;; note how Karol Lenart and Jonathan Schaffer are not only obsessed with quiddities but also with David Lewis. ;;; https://x.com/TeoriaDeTeoria/status/1867713831696577010
* Nabokov/Durrell - Quiddity - (philosophy) The essence or inherent nature of a person or thing. 1822, October, Charles Lamb, The Old Actors, published in London Magazine, section on “Mr. Munden” (ebook (http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10343)): A tub of butter, contemplated by him, amounts to a Platonic idea. He understands a leg of mutton in its quiddity. He stands wondering, amid the commonplace materials of life, like primæval man, with the sun and stars about him. 1962, Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire: My vision reeked with truth. It had the tone, The quiddity and quaintness of its own Reality. 1978, Lawrence Durrell, Livia, Faber & Faber 1992 (Avignon Quintet), p. 352: He represented my quiddity I suppose – the part which, thanks to you, has converted a black pessimism about life into a belief in cosmic absurdity. www.markfoster.net/dcf/quiddity.pdf
* Why Dietrich? - Of course quiddity presupposes ens and esse; without its existence there could be no determination of a thing. According to Dietrich quiddity is properly defined as the formal determination of a being, giving it its specific intrinsic character by means of which it can also be known. Strictly speaking, therefore, quiddity is found only in composite beings since it implies a formal aspect of a being. Unlike Aquinas Dietrich will not allow quiddity to designate the whole composite, even if the designation is understood to be abstract. Strictly speaking, therefore, quiddity is not applied to simple beings. Maurer suggests that the reason for this is Dietrich’s adhering closely to Aristotle who in the seventh book of the Metaphysics maintains that predication with respect to quiddity must be of another thing, hence of a composite, because it answers the question why “this” of “that”? There must be a “that” in order meaningfully to ask the question “why this?” In everything having a quiddity it is thus necessary that there be a distinction between the quiddity and that which possesses the quiddity. One consequence of Dietrich’s metaphysics of quiddity is that God and what the medievals call the “intelligences” do not have quiddities since they are simple beings. Aquinas on the other hand insisted that for God essentia, esse and quiditas are identical while for all creatures the esse is other than the quiddity or the essence. Indeed, this is how Aquinas distinguishes a creature from the creator. The essence of the creator alone is the same as his act of existing. But, besides the arguments Dietrich has raised against Thomas concerning the lack of such identity in creatures Dietrich finds that Aquinas’ system fails to properly account for intelligences because as simple beings there is nothing that distinguishes their essence from their act of existing—nothing except their being creatures. But to introduce creaturehood as the distinguishing feature is to render useless the importance of defining creatures in terms of the lack of identity of their essence and their act of existing. This is not a problem for Dietrich. For him some creatures are composite, some not, but in both simple and composite beings esse is the same as essentia. What remains problematic is the distinction of simple and composite creatures in terms of quiddity. To solve this problem Dietrich turns to the traditional Christian Neoplatonic notion of the hierarchy of being. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dietrich-freiberg/
* Why James Joyce? - Washeit - James Joyce — 'Horseness is the whatness of allhorse. "Pferdheit ist die Washeit des Allpferds." J. Joyce, Ulysses; also why Stephen Dedalus? He's thomistic, See Aquinas.
* Why Aristotle - First, let’s look at what Aristotle means by form and matter. What Aristotle means by “form” is not at all what Plato means by “Form.” We’ll capitalize Plato’s Form but not Aristotle’s form because Aristotle does not see the form of an object as being a higher archetype. It is simply something in objects in the world. Aristotle’s form is the answer to the question, “What is it?” It is the answer to what constitutes an object’s essence or “whatness.” What is it? It’s a tree. But what is a tree? A tree is defined by a distinct set of qualities that make it a tree and not something else. This set of qualities is its form. It’s perhaps easier to see when we talk about a human-made object like a drinking glass. It’s form is cylindrical, about seven centimeters in diameter and twelve centimeters tall; with a solid, closed bottom; and an open top, that is used to drink beverages. Every object has a form, its “whatness,” but, Aristotle says, every object is also made of matter, its “thisness.” The drinking glass is made of matter, specifically glass, and more specifically, this particular hunk of glass. I can hold it and say “this is made of glass,” indicating its “thisness.” Another object may have some of these qualities, the same shape, perhaps, but if that object’s matter was something flimsy or soluble, it can’t be used as a drinking glass. It still has a “thisness,” but its “whatness” is not the form and essence of a drinking glass.
* Why Ibn Sina - A.-M. Goichon, The distinction of essence and existence according to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)
* Why Avicenna - his Theory of 'the pure quiddity';;; * according to Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity” (māhiyya) or “thingness” (šayʾiyya) of the thing. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/
* Why Aquinas? Quid sit vs Quod sit - Where in the Summa Theologia does Aquinas speak directly about the distinction between Quid sit (what it is) and Quod sit (that it is) or essence and existence? "Summa theologiae 1a, 3, Prologue and 1a, qu, 2, a., 2, 2" - this is from Carabine, the unknown god I happen to be reading.
https://x.com/aufgehenderRest/status/1828521445556646051 ;;; William York Tindall? - Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844 – 1889) was an English poet and Jesuit priest. William York Tindall has commented, referring to Stephen Dedalus's aesthetic theory in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, "Radiance is epiphany [and] Stephen’s radiance or showing forth is not unlike the 'inscape' of Gerard Manley Hopkins, which may be defined as the essence or individuality of a thing that shines out from it; but whereas Stephen’s radiance is Thomistic quidditas or whatness, Hopkins’s inscape resembles the haecceitas or thisness of Duns Scotus. . . . [They] are alike in centering upon the object".[29] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphany_(literature) ;;;
* What does it mean to say that Dasein’s being is an issue for it? It is easiest to compare this stance to its opposite: indifference. The being of a lump of granite is a matter of indifference for the lump of granite. We can launch it into the center of the Sun to be vaporized into hydrogen, and this would be just one more thing that has happened to it. Not so with us. However, we should not anthropomorphize Dasein any more than the lump of granite. That Dasein’s being is an issue for it, not a matter of indifference, is evinced by its (our) protestations immediately before being fired into the Sun, but it is not fully exhausted by them. Dasein’s being being an issue for it is not merely a survival instinct, or an affective preference for life over death. What makes it an issue is the peculiar way in which Dasein is vis-à-vis its “whatness”, that is, its essence. 1.1b On Essence and Existence If I were to ask you “what is a house?” we could talk about the necessary and sufficient conditions and properties that form the essence of “houseness”, the “whatness” of a house, and eventually finish. It’s not even necessary that the thing we discuss in this way exist currently. For example, I could ask you “what is a perfect house?” and the subsequent properties and conditions we settle upon and write upon a napkin may not be instantiated anywhere in the world currently. This introduces an order of rank: the “whatness” of things, their essence, can be seen to exist happily prior to the thing’s existence, such that if we were to stumble across a really existing “perfect house” we can then say “That’s it!” [..] The “person” example works in the same way, as does any response you could give, any simple ascription of a “whatness” onto your being. This is why Descartes misses Dasein when he thinks himself as “a thinking substance”. Dasein’s being is not answerable to a whatness, to an essence, that precedes it, but, rather, its essence lies in its existence, through which it makes various choices about what its whatness is and will be, not by contemplating, but by realizing them through living: “The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.” (Heidegger, 2008, p.33) In other words, Dasein chooses what it will be, and this is its essence. Or, more accurately, it is its possibilities, which open it up onto the future, and its activity of choosing, and doing, one or the other as ways of being. https://epochemagazine.org/09/what-is-dasein/
* Why Schaffer? - * QUIDDISTIC KNOWLEDGE by Jonathan Schaffer
https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/quiddity.pdf ;;; Why Sydney Shoemaker, David Lewis and Jonathan Schaffer? - Could like charges attract? In general, is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker (1980, 1998), on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis (forthcoming), swallowing the conclusion that, ‘‘we are irremediably ignorant about the identities of the fundamental properties’’. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. That is, I shall argue that properties have intrinsic natures, or quiddities; and that we can know the quiddities. https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/quiddity.pdf
* Why Schelling - The theme of the ineffability of reality is also linked to Jankélévitch's interest in Schelling's late philosophy, the subject of his doctoral thesis. From Schelling, the French philosopher derives in particular the distinction between the “ Quid ” or “quiddity” (in Schelling “ das Was ”, “the what”) and the “ Quod ” or “quoddity” (in Schelling “ das Dass ”, “the That”). While the first term indicates the conceptualizable and therefore expressible essence of a thing, the second means the very existence of the thing, the “fact that” it is, a fact that is absolutely gratuitous and without foundation, as it cannot be traced back to an “ontic” cause. In other words, it is the awareness of the fact that when we conceptually define a thing, in reality we necessarily define it in function of what it is not, or in relation to something other than itself; while the unique and unrepeatable singularity of that same thing, to indicate which Jankélévitch coined the Latin expressions "semelfactivity" and "ipseity", remains precluded from conceptual analysis. Bergson, moreover, also claimed to experience at every instant "the continuous creation of unpredictable novelty that seems to be realised in the universe", and defined intuition as "the sympathy through which one transports oneself inside an object to coincide with what it has of unique and, consequently, inexpressible" [5] . https://aduevoci.org/2022/05/13/filosofia-e-musica-in-vladimir-jankelevitch-prima-parte/
* Why Peirce? See ICONS:WHATNESS::INDICES::HOWNESS::SYMBOLS:WHYNESS
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* Why Fred Astaire? - Fred Astaire - The Whichness of Whatness https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr10nwEZORk
* Why Fontaines D.C.? - Fontaines D.C. - Horseness is the Whatness

# C-Listers
* Why Deb? Deborah Smith's "Quid Quidditism Est?
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# WAT?
* Should I include Leibniz? He wrote about Quoddität but he meant Quiddität (wat?!) - * Why Leibniz? - Das Prinzip taucht 1668 in Leibniz in der Confessio naturae auf , wo Leibniz behauptet, der Mechanismus müsse erklärt werden. Das Prinzip wird zuerst in Theoria motus abstracti (1671) geklärt . Die Zusammensetzung der Bewegung gehorcht nicht nur dem Axiom "das Ganze ist größer als der Teil", sondern auch dem Prinzip der ausreichenden Vernunft, das die Konsequenzen hat: Wir müssen uns so wenig wie möglich ändern, wir müssen die Umgebung zwischen Gegensätzen wählen, wir müssen Kompensieren Sie jede Subtraktion durch eine Addition. In einem kleinen Aufsatz mit dem Titel Aufsatz über die Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und über die Freiheit des Menschen bezeichnet Leibniz Gott als den endgültigen Ursprung aller Dinge, den Grund, warum etwas eher existiert als nichts (Quoddität) und somit eher existiert als anders (Ecceity) ). Nach Leibniz ist das Prinzip der ausreichenden Vernunft neben dem Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit eines der "zwei großen Prinzipien unserer Argumentation" . Es ist im lateinischen Ausdruck nihil est sine ratione zusammengefasst („nichts ist ohne Grund“). Die gleiche Formulierung dieses Prinzips erscheint später mehr oder weniger auch in Leibniz in den Prinzipien der Natur und Gnade, die in der Vernunft (§7) und in der Monadologie (§32) begründet sind. Das Prinzip der hinreichenden Vernunft kann in Leibniz nicht auf das Prinzip der notwendigen Vernunft reduziert werden. Das Prinzip der hinreichenden Vernunft ist mit dem Prinzip verbunden, dass jedes Prädikat dem Subjekt innewohnt ( Praedicatum inest subjecto ). Es würde sogar daraus fließen, denn wenn es eine Wahrheit ohne Grund gäbe, dann hätten wir einen Satz, dessen Subjekt das Prädikat nicht enthält, was absurd ist. Dass es einen ausreichenden Grund für die Existenz von allem gibt, bedeutet nicht, dass das menschliche Verständnis jedes Mal Zugang dazu hat ( Essays in Theodicy , I, §44). Im Gegenteil, für alles, was menschliches Handeln und „ zufällige Wahrheiten “ oder „Tatsachenwahrheiten“ („bestimmte“, aber nicht „notwendige“ Wahrheiten, vgl. § 13 Diskurs über Metaphysik ) betrifft , ist es wichtig, dies zu nutzen Prinzip; Dies ist ein Begriff, der auftaucht, wenn Leibniz das Problem zukünftiger Kontingente diskutiert und sich damit dem Fatalismus widersetzt : Nur das göttliche Verständnis kann ausreichende Gründe kennen. Diese Einschränkung unseres Verständnisses erklärt, warum die Welt uns unfair oder absurd erscheinen kann, obwohl sie die " beste aller möglichen Welten " https://enzyklopadie.de/Principe_de_raison_suffisante
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Lee Braver, Simondon, Aristotle, Tindall's "Aquinas vs Scotus (Dedalus v Hopkins)", Adam Roberts, Amélie-Marie Goichon, Robert Matthews Adams, David Kaplan

# Cultural - see thatness
* "Esta Si" - Chimbala, Chucky73, and Dowba Montana
* Projecto Uno - Tiburon "alli esta"


* Why Lee Braver? He talks about thisness in "Same Thing"?
* Gilbert Simondon - ecceitas Ce terme (du latin scolastique ecceitas, dérivé de l'adverbe latin ecce : voici, voilà, signifie littéralement la « ceci-ité » ou « thisness » en anglais) provient de la philosophie scolastique. Jean Duns Scot1 est le philosophe qui a le plus développé cette notion. Le terme a été repris au XXe siècle par diverses traditions, comme l'existentialisme et l'épistémologie (Gilbert Simondon2), en référence au Dasein allemand de Heidegger. Dans cette perspective, l'eccéité se rapproche alors éventuellement du sens suivant : être-là (dans le monde). Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari, dans Mille Plateaux, p. 318, remarquent : « Il arrive qu'on écrive « eccéité », en dérivant le mot de ecce, voici. C'est une erreur, puisque Duns Scot crée le mot et le concept à partir de haec, « cette chose ». Mais c'est une erreur féconde, parce qu'elle suggère un mode d'individuation qui ne se confond précisément pas avec celui d'une chose ou d'un sujet. » La tradition analytique s'y intéresse aussi, et le définit par le processus d'émergence progressive de l'individu par l'individuation3,4. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eccéité
* Why Aristotle? τόδε τι "There thisness, along with separateness, was invoked to exclude matter as a candidate for (primary) substance. In Z.3 'τόδε τι' occurs only once, at 1029a27–8, ..." https://academic.oup.com/book/9501/chapter/156479482 The expression tode ti, commonly translated as ‘a this’, plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Drawing lightly on theories of demonstratives in contemporary linguistics, I discuss the expression, its extension and the interpretation of its philosophical role in Aristotle and Plato. I pay particular attention to the questions whether matter or nonsubstantial individuals fall under the extension of the expression.
https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/anph.2019.0004
* Why Duns Scotus? he talks about thisness in John Duns Scotus, Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation: "Since haec is the Latin term for "this," Scotus and his disciples came to refer to this positive additive that individuates an individual's nature or distinctive qualities as that individual's unique or proper "haecceity" (haecceitas). Haecceity or "thisness" has a twofold function: (1) it makes each individual unique and incapable of duplication, even by an omnipotent God; and (2) it differentiates it radically and ultimately from each and every other individual, whether it be of the same or a specially different type." ;;; Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844 – 1889) was an English poet and Jesuit priest. William York Tindall has commented, referring to Stephen Dedalus's aesthetic theory in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, "Radiance is epiphany [and] Stephen’s radiance or showing forth is not unlike the 'inscape' of Gerard Manley Hopkins, which may be defined as the essence or individuality of a thing that shines out from it; but whereas Stephen’s radiance is Thomistic quidditas or whatness, Hopkins’s inscape resembles the haecceitas or thisness of Duns Scotus. . . . [They] are alike in centering upon the object".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphany_(literature) Scotus and Haecceitas, Aquinas and Esse: A Comparative Study by James B. Reichmann, S.J. Abstract This study compares the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on the issue of being and individuality. Its primary aim is to contrast Scotus’s individuating principle, haecceitas, with Aquinas’s actualizing principle, esse, attending both to their rather striking similarities as well as to their significant differences. The article’s conclusion is that, while Scotus’s crowning principle, haecceitas, is the unique entity internal to each thing, rendering the nature complete and singular as nature, Aquinas’s crowning principle, esse, actualizes the nature without individualizing it. This is not to imply that Scotus overlooked the importance of a thing’s being, any more than Aquinas overlooked the importance of a being’s singularity. It does mean, however, that the primal integrating focus and the resulting philosophical synthesis of these two seminal thinkers of the Middle Ages did significantly differ. The conclusion of the paper might be stated thus: what most distinguishes their respective philosophies is that, while Scotus’s primary concern was with the existing *individual*, Aquinas’s was with the *existing* individual.
* Why Adam Roberts? - "The This" by Adam Roberts - https://bsky.app/profile/mariettarosetta.bsky.social/post/3lb2hegdfpc2h
* Why Amélie-Marie Goichon? - le ‘je’ existant of Amélie-Marie Goichon
* Robert Matthews Adams - 'Time and Thisness", 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity", "Actualism and Thisness" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Merrihew_Adams
* Gerard Manley Hopkins - see Duns Scotus
* David Kaplan - Haecceitism holds that we can meaningfully speak of a thing in itself—without reference either explicit, implicit, vague, or precise to individuating concepts (other than being this thing), defining qualities, essential attributes, or any other of the paraphernalia that enable us to distinguish one thing from another. https://old.reddit.com/r/wikipedia/comments/2auu1i/haecceity_is_a_person_or_objects_thisness_the/
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# TRASH?
* Why Heidegger? He talks about thisness in ???
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Ian Baptiste, Houlgate/Bowie, Narayan Sahu, Grover Cleveland Smith, Kenneth Burke, Ronchi, Bultmann, Jung/Hauer, J Campbell, Heidegger/CornelioFarbro/KevinWhite, Digby, Schelling/Jankélévitch, Georg Feuernstein, Anglish, MM Burley, Xavier Tilliette, Maritain/Etienne Gilson, Tyler Tritton

# Cultural: nipponia electronica, Kula Shaker, Sakamoto

* Ian Baptiste - "qualitative researcher" - https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/professor/401157 One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for quality are nature or whatness. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality? Put differently, can I assert that a thing exists if I have absolutely no perception of what it is? In philosophical jargon: is it possible to separate my ontology of a thing from my epistemology of it? https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002
* Stephen Houlgate / Andrew Bowie - IN HIS PROVOCATIVE AND HIGHLY READABLE BOOK, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, Andrew Bowie argues that “Schelling... helps define key structures in modern philosophy by revealing the flaws in Hegel in ways which help set the agenda for philosophy even today.” The claim that Schelling’s critique of Hegel has exercised considerable influence on subsequent generations of philosophers is undeniably true. Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, and Engels all heard Schelling lecture in the years after Hegel’s death in 1831 and were receptive to his critique of the Hegelian system. Furthermore, many leading twentieth-century continental philosophers, including especially Heidegger and Habermas, studied Schelling closely and have taken up positions vis-à-vis Hegel which are recognizably Schellingian in origin and which have influenced other philosophers in turn. Schelling’s critique of Hegel is thus by no means merely of local interest to students of German idealism, but is of interest to all students of the continental tradition in post-Kantian philosophy for the simple reason that his critique is one of the most important sources of that very tradition.
https://philpapers.org/rec/HOUSCO In drawing attention to the indebtedness of Kant and Fichte to Descartes, I do not mean to suggest that either of them simply repeats the Cartesian program. My point is rather that critical idealism is inconceivable without the prior flourishing of Cartesianism; criticism is embedded in the philosophical tradition that Descartes initiated. This is not in the least to say that Kant and Fichte did not strike out in original directions, but it is to say something about from where they departed when they took these paths. For example, Fichte's account of consciousness radicalizes the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity--something you would not learn from reading any of Fichte's many self-characterizations. In Descartes, the cogito uncovers the self-certainty of the thinking subject on the basis of its self-transparency. In Fichte, this self-transparency of consciousness becomes the result of the original act of self-positing, and the self's certainty extends not only to its own existence and the content of its "presentations," but to the original act itself. Descartes asserts the substantial being of the subject on the basis of its existence, without further analysis. Fichte discovers the ground of the self s existence, exposing Descartes' implied and illicit inference from the "THATNESS" of existence to the quiddity of substantial being. Fichte grounds the self-transparency of consciousness that Descartes treats as a primitive fact, thereby explaining what Descartes assumed. The fruits of Fichte's critical appropriation of Descartes can be seen clearly in the later historical commentaries on Descartes by Hegel and Schelling. What one cannot do is imagine that Fichte could have written the early sections of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo without positing the Cartesian tradition (including, of course, Kant's theory of consciousness). "Fichte, Kant's legacy and the meaning of modern philosophy.." The Free Library. 1997 Philosophy Education Society, Inc
* Why Narayan S. Sahu There are many beautiful things and many good things. Socrates distinguishes the two kinds in asking us to define one shape underlying each manifold, which designates the "what it is" of the units in the manifold. (8) This identification is possible because predialectical perception distinguishes between individuals and the kinds of individuals, or between the one and the many. The "whatness" of unity is the measure of the "thatness" of many. This "whatness" is called by Socrates an Idea. Etymologically, this word both revealing and ambiguous, means literally "look", and thus refers to the primary appearance of heterogeneity in bodies. On the other hand, we cannot literally see a "what", and many "thats" are neither bodies nor modifications of bodies, for example, numbers, geometrical forms, the virtues, theoretical definitions. The word "Ideas", as a term, designating "whatness" cannot be reduced to the look of a corporeal that. It calls our attention to a third distinction, between two kinds of perception or what we call seeing and thinking.
* Why Grover Cleveland Smith? - GCS on TS Eliot: The lesson of the "Narcissus" and of "Tradition and the Individual Talent" that poetry escapes personality so as to create surrogate personality (or impersonality), with the poetry still bound to its creator, prevails throughout Eliot's work. Every poem, every dramatic piece, mirrors it. The absence of any literal representation of multiple personality syndrome does not mean that that morbid disorder should be considered a ghost that isn't there. In clinical horrors it would disappoint the searcher for as concrete an example as "Suppressed Complex" provides of the simpler case of hysterical dissociation. It must however be accorded recognition not as the ghost that isn't there but as the ghost that is. Most of all, The Waste Land invokes it. The Notes of Eliot to that poem declare that its whole cast of characters is united in the "spectator" Tiresias; all the men are one and all the women one, the sexes being said to "meet" in the containing personage. Many readers of The Waste Land evade this conundrum by dismissing it; and obviously for many its psychological basis has proved an encumbrance. There was nothing to require it in the "plan" developed from Jessie L. Weston's From Ritual to Romance to combine the characters (as in Alice in Wonderland) into a card pack, namely the Tarot; that was a decorative device of little importance to the described psychological structure with its biographical chronicle of a botched Grail quest through a modern domain of moral devastation. The essential device to make the parts of the poem cohere was that of the spectator, of his consciousness through time as the mythic arena of events with all their layers of allusion and resonance. This device implies the multiplicity of his selfhood in several ways--chiefly his successive stages of development and, what is more to the present purpose, the conflicting shadow-play of the populated external world that has purportedly entered into his selfhood, their "THATNESS" which is his "THISNESS." For all of this, the disorder of personality dissociation, especially in the acute, multiple form, has the value merely of a ghostly metaphor. Several other models were operative, in particular from idealist and Oriental philosophies. The Waste Land employed as much synthesis with its conceptual as with its material sources. The concepts have always sheltered themselves behind the images. The idea of the multiplex self, normal or pathological, has many sources; the psychiatrists' daunting revelations from their specialty in soul-sickness take a significant place among the others.
* Why Kenneth Burke? Roads and riddles? Western major power metaphors of nonviolent - Metaphors bring out the "thisness of a that and the thatness of a this"; they tell us something about one character as considered from the point of view of ... It brings out the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this Kenneth Burke This chapter offers several dictionary definitions of metonymies, all of which arrive at the same thought: metonymies involve descriptive or analytic name-changes that illustrate the prior meanings of the things signified, much like an analogy, in addition to being guarantors of facticity or fact-like-ness. Facticity is described as a state of appearance and resemblance that implies a rhetorical effect. Despite the differences, the chapter argues that metonymy and metaphor can both be used as instruments for the interpretation of tensions in culture change and within particular texts.
https://academic.oup.com/fordham-scholarship-online/book/20537/chapter-abstract/179772615?redirectedFrom=fulltext
* Why Rocco Ronchi? - pure "thatness" (the quodditas) of happiness, and yet I am unable to give its proper name. - via ".I do not remember: philosophy and oblivion"
* Bultmann argued that all that matters is the "thatness," not the "whatness" of Jesus,[a] i.e. only that Jesus existed, preached, and died by crucifixion matters, not what happened throughout his life
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Bultmann * Rudolf Karl Bultmann (German: [ˈbʊltman]; 20 August 1884 – 30 July 1976) was a German Lutheran theologian and professor of the New Testament at the University of Marburg. He was one of the major figures of early-20th-century biblical studies. A prominent critic of liberal theology, Bultmann instead argued for an existentialist interpretation of the New Testament. His hermeneutical approach to the New Testament led him to be a proponent of dialectical theology. Bultmann is known for his belief that the historical analysis of the New Testament is both futile and unnecessary, given that the earliest Christian literature showed little interest in specific locations. Bultmann argued that all that matters is the "thatness," not the "whatness" of Jesus, i.e. only that Jesus existed, preached, and died by crucifixion matters, not what happened throughout his life. Bultmann relied on demythologization, an approach interpreting the mythological elements in the New Testament existentially. Bultmann contended that only faith in the kerygma, or proclamation, of the New Testament was necessary for Christian faith, not any particular facts regarding the historical Jesus. (en) https://dbpedia.org/page/Rudolf_Bultmann https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Bultmann
* Why Joseph Campbell -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thou_art_that
* Why Carl Jung/Jakob Wilhelm Hauer? via The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga - Then a second question: “Is there a psychological equivalent to the tattva,10 and the saôskvra?”11 Well, the tattva, being the essence of things, is psychologically again a sÖküma aspect of things. The term libido, or energy, is a good example of a tattva. It is not a substance but an ab- straction. Energy is not to be observed in nature; it does not exist. What exists in nature is natural force, like a waterfall, or a light, or a fire, or a chemical process. There we apply the term energy, but energy in itself does not exist, despite the fact that you can buy it at the electrical works. But that is merely a metaphorical energy. Energy proper is an abstrac- tion of a physical force, a certain amount of intensity. It is a concept of the natural forces in their sÖküma aspect, where they are no longer man- ifestations but tattva, essence, abstraction. You see the Eastern mind is concretistic—when it arrives at a conclusion or builds up an abstraction, the latter is already a substance; it is almost visible or audible—one can almost touch it. Whereas with us this process is rather spurious, as when a concept like energy becomes fairly well known, so that any workman speaks of it. Then naturally people assume that this energy must be something one can put into a bottle—one can buy it and sell it, so it must be something tangible. There that concretistic quality of the Eastern mind comes in with us. For in reality energy is not substantial: it is a conformity of things, say, or the intensity of various physical or material processes. In the East, when anybody speaks of tattva, they conceive of it as already in existence, and, mind you, a complete existence—as if a tattva really could become visible to them. I don’t know whether anybody has had a vision of tattva, but that might be, for they can visualize any concept, no matter how abstract. So the tattva, which is a concrete thing in the East, has with us a sÖküma aspect—it is an abstraction, an idea. The concept of energy is a very suitable example, but there are of course other ideas of the sort, such as the principles of gravity, or the idea of an atom, or of electrons—these are the equivalents of tattvas. In psychology, as I say, it would be libido, which is also a concept. Hauer translated tattva “literally as thatness, or in German Dasheit. Thatness means that hidden power in the whole universe which has a certain tendency to create and move in a specific way—that and that” (HS, 31).
* Why Heidegger - Being [Sein] is found in thatness and whatness, reality, the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence [Dasein], and in the "there is" ["es gibt"]. In which being is the meaning of being to be found; from which being is the disclosure of being to get its start? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does a certain being have priority in the elaboration in the elaboration of the question of being? Which is the exemplary being [Seiende] and in what sense does it have priority?
https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/10a157v/i_have_a_question_about_dennis_j_schmidtsjoan/ ;;; Kevin White / Heidegger / Fabro - via "Act and fact: on a disputed question in recent Thomistic metaphysics." Thomism seems to be different in every one of its proponents who is thinking authentically on the philosophical level.--Joseph Owens (1) I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION to a question that has arisen in Thomistic metaphysics in recent decades, in a thread of discussion winding through remarks in three articles published in The Review of Metaphysics. The discussion began in 1974, when Cornelio Fabro said, not for the first time, that there is, according to Aquinas, a difference between "esse as act" and "existence which is the fact of being." (2) In 1976, Joseph Owens said, in response to Fabro's distinction, that, for Aquinas, it is the same existence (esse) that is conceptualized both as an "actuality" and as a fact. (3) In 1989, John F. Wippel, differing from Owens, said that there is a distinction in Aquinas's writings between "esse as facticity" and "esse as intrinsic actus essendi." (4) As may be seen, there are variations in the way in which these authors describe the distinction, whether to affirm or deny it. But Owens and Wippel evidently consider themselves to be concerned with the same question, the question raised by Fabro's claim. It is a question that would seem to be of no small importance for understanding what Aquinas means by esse, or to be. Perhaps, then, it will be useful to bring the differences between these interpreters on the question into sharper focus. Fabro returns to his distinction between act of being and fact of existence in historical discussions at the beginning and at the end of his other major work on participation, Partecipazione e causalita secondo s. Tommaso d'Aquino (1960). (15) This work opens with a brief Heideggerian history of metaphysics. Husserl--as Fabro does not say here--had distinguished two senses of truth: the usual sense of it as correctness of a judgment; and, underlying this "truth of correctness," a deeper sense of truth as actuality, a "truth of being" or "truth of disclosure." (16) Applying this distinction to the history of philosophy, Heidegger had described a long decline in the understanding of truth, from "the original essence of truth, aletheia (unconcealment)" to the understanding of truth as mere correctness. (17) Fabro paraphrases Heidegger's account of this decline, summing it up as a substitution of act by fact. (18) Quoting Heidegger, he says that that a thing exists, or that a thing is such or such, is what we usually call a fact, "a charming but deceitful word," one in which the very notion of truth, in its original sense, is compromised. (19) Along with Heidegger, then, Fabro insists on what we might call the THATNESS of facts. When he gives examples of enuntiabilia, however, Aquinas speaks as if the word refers to states of affairs. Two of his examples are that God foretold through the prophets that a virgin would give birth (virginem parituram, with esse understood), and that it was known by God that Christ would die (Christum esse moriturum). (34) The grammatical form of these accusative plus infinitive phrases is called oratio infinitiva, standard scholastic examples being Socratem currere and Socratem cucurisse, "that Socrates is running," and "that Socrates has run." (35) The oratio infinitiva is the Latin way of presenting facts in their THATNESS, so to speak. When Aquinas says that God knows enuntiabilia, he means, not just that God knows all statements that we form, or even all true statements that we could form, but that he knows the esse or to be, the objective correlative or state of affairs, signified by every true statement we could form, along with the temporal aspect of each such esse or to be that is conditioned by time. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Act+and+fact%3A+on+a+disputed+question+in+recent+Thomistic+metaphysics.-a0394231965
* Why Digby? - 1640s (in Sir Kenelm Digby's "Observations vpon Religio medici"),OED's earliest evidence for thatness is from 1643, in the writing of Kenelm Digby, natural philosopher and courtier In the same sentence with thisness.
* Why Schelling? - thatness/ese-idad
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KjhoaEcZ1s&t=1h31m00s "being precedes essence", Schelling was the first to say this, why is there something rather than nothing? ;;; via "SCHELLING'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC.." The Free Library. 1999 Philosophy Education Society, Inc - According to Schelling, existence as such--which falls outside thought, precedes thought, can be explained through no prior ground or concept, and so is groundlessly necessary--is what Hegel fails to acknowledge. Hegel also fails to bring before the mind the existence or thatness of particular, contingent, created things in nature. This is because for Hegel the object of thought is to be found nowhere but within thought itself. In other words, Hegel fails to recognize (in thought) or bring before the mind (through Vorstellung) the very that of necessary or contingent existence, because his philosophy is geared wholly to determining what can be conceived.(37) The first thing to note when evaluating Schelling's critique of Hegel is that Schelling starts from an assumption about thought which he does not justify and which Hegel himself does not share. As we have seen, Schelling contends that thought through itself only understands what is conceivable and possible--what something would be, were it to exist. From within thought, therefore, we can only comprehend the concept of a thing, in which the thing's possibility is conceived. We cannot bring before the mind the very existence of the thing itself, its very thatness. For that, Schelling says, we need Vorstellung. Even in the case of existence as such (also called pure actuality or being itself), which is understood to be not just possible but necessary, thought can only entertain the concept of such existence and can never bring the thatness of such existence before the mind by itself. This is why Schelling thinks that thought must cooperate with Vorstellung and become ecstatic, if it is to discover anything positive about being itself or existence as such. If thought remains within the realm of what can or must be conceived, it can never come to know being itself; it thus has to direct its attention outward, to what is vorgestellt and so other than itself, in order to learn what being or existence actually entails. Being itself is thus understood by Schelling to be an absolute outside of thought, to be absolutely independent of thought and prior to it.(56) Hegel fails to think of this outside, according to Schelling, because he thinks that what is conceivable is all that there is. He simply understands being as the concept and so fails to think of, or to bring before the mind through Vorstellung, the sheer that of being and existing. The problem with Schelling's criticism is that Hegel does not share the assumption from which Schelling starts. Specifically, Hegel does not accept Schelling's view that thought can only arrive through itself at what is conceivable and possible (or at what is merely thought to be necessary and actual). He thus does not accept that being as such has to be thought of as exceeding the reach of thought. In Hegel's view, thought through itself is already the consciousness or intuition of being and existing. It is within itself not just the thought of what being hypothetically would be (or of what it must be), but the direct awareness of existence itself, the direct awareness that there is. Hegel accepts Schelling's claim against Fichte that being is not merely there for consciousness, but that it exists prior to consciousness. In that sense, Hegel agrees with Schelling that being is independent of thought. But he insists against Schelling that thought is directly aware from within itself of the very thatness of being. Indeed, for Hegel, thought is precisely this awareness of being from the very beginning. It is the awareness that there is and must be existence as such, and it is the awareness of particular, contingent things as existing.(57) The principal difference between Hegel and Schelling is thus that Hegel understands thought to be a form of intellectual intuition, whereas Schelling understands thought to be primarily discursive. Like Kant, Schelling takes thought to be essentially the discursive activity of judgment (Urteilen) or of forming propositions.(62) This is the main reason why Schelling believes that thought's fundamental role is to determine via the use of predicates (or concepts) what it is to be something. It is also the main reason why he believes that thought, in its activity of determining, cannot bring before the mind existence, whether necessary or contingent. The act of determining something in a proposition is the act of attributing a predicate (or concept) to a subject and thereby saying of X what X is. But Schelling is well aware of Kant's claim in the Critique of Pure Reason, that "`being' (Sein) is obviously not a real predicate, ... is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing."(63) Being, for Kant, as for Schelling, is thus not part of what something is; it is not a possible characteristic of a thing which can be stated in a predicate. The being of a thing is, as Kant puts it, simply the positing of that things--"die Position eines Dinges."(64) In stating what something is, we thus do not think that it is, but merely what it would be, if it were to exist--a point Kant famously deployed against the ontological argument and repeated by Schelling.(65) For Schelling, therefore, to the extent that thought determines in propositions what it is to be X, it can never bring before the mind the very thatness of existing. To think of actual existence--whether necessary or contingent--thought must suspend its activity of determining and conceiving in propositions, and simply posit existence as something outside itself--"als ein absolutes Au?ersich setzen."(66) Of course, even when it does that, thought does not actually intuit existence itself; it only thinks of existence itself. That is to say, it posits existence as something that can be encountered directly not by thought itself but only by Vorstellung. (44) SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60. For Schelling, existence as such--dos Seiende selbst or the pure Da?--is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer thatness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Da? freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Da? thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Da? reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Uberseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
* Why Jankélévitch? - Vladimir Jankélévitch says Quoddity is the “thatness” of something, its indescribable and contingent existence as a specific fact. ... quoddity from any and all quidditive reduction." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Jankélévitch https://academic.oup.com/chicago-scholarship-online/book/20049/chapter-abstract/179019328?redirectedFrom=fulltext Chapter 3 explores the principal theme of Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music: a fidelity to music’s inconsistency based in the a priori rejection of any kind of Versprachlichung (Wittgenstinian, Adornian, or otherwise). That is, if Bloch’s and Adorno’s conceptions of music’s ineffability were based in its vague shadowing of linguistic structure, Jankélévitch’s is based in its qualitative refusal of it. The first half of chapter 3 links Jankélévitch’s views of music with his enduring philosophical commitments: to Bergson, to the aporetic experience of the vanishing now, to key aspects of his moral philosophy, and to the metaphysical dynamism of the instant. The second half explains how Jankélévitch develops what I call a “speculative multiplicity” of philosophies of music that are united by their deliberate refusal of any kind of language-like character in music. It concludes by arguing that Jankélévitch’s philosophy is best described not as “antidialectical” but rather as practicing an “unwoven” dialectic that retains an attentive ethics to musical forms while dramatically slackening the criteria one would use to specify them.
* Why Feuerstein? - George Feuernstein (NOT Reuven Feuerstein) - Feuerstein defines tattva as 'thatness' - tattva
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva "The yogic art of dying, Kundalini yoga, and the Balinese pitra yadnya. www.thefreelibrary.com (6) Feuerstein (2000:305) defines 'tattva' as 'thatness', 'Reality; also, a category of cosmic existence'. (7) The serpent power is extensively used by Pott.."
* Why Anglish? - Thatness
https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
* MM Burley's tattra-abhyäsa ("sustained practice of thatness")
* Xavier Tilliette - Tyler Tritten says Xavier Tilliette says facticity=quoddity, essence=quiddity
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjugkH_QipE&t=16m45s
* Why Maritain/Etienne Gilson? See French la quoddite
* Why Tyler Tritton? - "Schelling's Doctrine of the Potencies: The Unity of Thinking and Being"
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* Why nipponia electronica's 坂本龍一 B-2 UNIT「thatness and thereness」(コピー)- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70_Nf7d1oXU
* Kula Shaker's
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva_(song)
* Why Ryuichi Sakamoto thatness and thereness (2019 Remastering) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ls8-6GWh7Vg
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Fred Astaire

* Why Fred Astaire? - Fred Astaire - The Whichness of Whatness https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr10nwEZORk
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bothness: sameness, duality
oneness: Avicenna, La Marr Jurelle Bruce
nothingness: Eckhart:
threeness:


# ONENESS
* Why Avicenna? - see oneness
* Why Bruce - La Marr Jurelle Bruce "Radical compassion is not an appeal to an idyllic oneness where difference is blithely effaced. Nor is it a smug projection of oneself into the position of another, thereby displacing that other. Lacan proposes that e­ very subject entering the Symbolic Order undergoes a violent rupture from a primordial feeling of oneness From the mouths of ­these conformists, the words crazy nigger might sound like an invective. What I want to emphasize is that black vernacular cultures recognized and theorized the po­liti­cal resonance of craziness, deploying the term crazy nigger to describe agents of rebellion. At the dawn of the twentieth c­ entury, black studies trailblazer William Edward Burghardt Du Bois also theorized a sort of racialized madness. In his 1903 tome The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois famously describes “double consciousness”: “one ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”83 Double consciousness entails internecine “warring” in mind that might resemble the psychic unruliness and crisis I call phenomenal madness. Whereas the condition is often regarded as an existential affliction and impairment, I want to emphasize that it is also an endowment. Double consciousness grants black Americans a perceptual aptitude and epistemic access unavailable to their white counter­parts. To live with this split subjectivity is to behold the spectacular scene of Amer­i­ca’s black-­white racial drama while also privy to the backstage content of black life, full of complex socioracial phenomena concealed from white gazes." hold and nourish seeds, or e­ lse a colossal breach in the cosmos, fit to hold the ­whole galaxy steady. It might be a pit collapsing into nothingness and then a wellspring brimming to infinity.21 This big black hole collects and emits strangeness, won­der, vio­lence, terror, splendor, care, love, and truth, mixed with madness, which I have tried to impart to you. For believing this truth, Fanon foretells that I must be mad. If ­you’ve made it this far, and if ­you’ve found some truth down ­here, with me, then maybe ­you’re mad, too. Now let go. 19 Natasha Trethewey, “Calling His C ­ hildren Home,” Callaloo 19, no. 2 (1996): 351. 20 Frank Ocean, “Wither,” Endless (New York: Def Jam, 2016). 21 My references to “Nothingness” and “Infinity” are inspired by a poignant passage in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks. Unfurling a phenomenology of existential turmoil amid antiblackness, Fanon writes, “I feel my soul as vast as the world, truly as deep as the deepest of rivers; my chest has the power to expand to infinity. I was made to give and they prescribe for me the humility of the cripple. When I opened my eyes yesterday, I saw the sky in total revulsion. I tried to get up but the eviscerated silence surged ­toward me with para­lyzed wings. Not responsible for my acts, at the crossroads between Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep” (119).

# NOTHINGNESS
* Why Laurelle? - (Non-)One Other name for unilaterality, form of suspension or invalidation which, no longer arising from Being but from the One, is a mode of the One’s being-foreclosed, either real and not effectuated (”uni-laterality”), or transcendental and effectuated by the occasion of philosophical “nothingness” (”unilaterality”). It testifies to the primacy of (real) foreclosure over (philosophical) negation. https://monoskop.org/images/2/2b/Laruelle_Francois_Dictionary_of_Non-Philosophy.pdf
* Why Eckhart? - Wenn Sein entweder der Ursache oder dem Verursachten48 zukommt, so daß die andere Seite des Seinsmonopols Gottes ein „nihilisme creaturel"49 ist und umgekehrt Sein als Schöpfung zu denken heißt, Gott als seinsloses intelligere denken, dann scheint bei Eckhart — wenn auch in anderer Weise als bei Heinrich von Gent — Analogie der Name für Äquivokation geworden zu sein. Die für die Analogielehre des 13. Jahrhunderts typische Formel „per prius et per posterius" findet sich denn auch bei Eckhart fast nicht. 5 0 Die transgenerischen Relationen zwischen Substanz und Akzidens wären ohnehin, wie gezeigt, kein Anwendungsfeld dafür. „Eckhart destroys the concept of an analogy by deficient similarity and limitation: if being is God, then things are what they are entirely in God and by God; outside of God they are nothingness .. ." 5 1 Zwar werden alle reinen Vollkommenheiten und Transzendentalien von Gott ausgesagt, aber dort müssen sie nach der Hermeneutik einer strengen theologia negativa interpretiert werden. F. Brunner kann deshalb sagen: „Pour saint Thomas, l'analogie est principalement un moyen de dire quelque chose de Dieu; eile est, pour Maitre Eckhart, un moyen de dire quelque chose des creatures."52 Moses Maimonides ist nicht nur einer der wichtigsten Vertre https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11553976.pdf
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OG Rose

* why OG Rose? - * og rose bothness - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1tknnKw3cI Episode #79: Sanduni Mudiyanse on Nihilation - "we're used to opposites but really often its a bothness at the very same time";;;og rose bothness2 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fO-VaKSuoR8 Episode #71: Chetan Anand and Meditations on Hegel, Gödel, and More" - Godel's Incomplete should always have I in parentheses, (I)ncompleteness, bothness, ?it's not unfinishable?, the complete and incomplete are indivisible
* Joe Scarborough - I've looked at Clouds/Love from both sides now https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkwofrSDkkQ
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who? everyone in excess traumas and enjoyments of life lol

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https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?search=muchness
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Levinas/Jankélévitch, Satoor

* So Near, So Far: Emmanuel Levinas and Vladimir Jankélévitch https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/11/922 Similarly, love, Eros, is this “I-know-not-what” that vanishes as soon as our mind—“Psyche”—imagines it knows its nature or its “quid”. Freedom is—like Pascal’s God—what one can only have a “half-gnosis” (“demi-gnose”) of: concealed as regards its nature, it is patently apparent with respect to its “there is”, meaning its existence. What is unthinkable and ineffable in time, love, God, or freedom is their “ipseity”—what makes a thing or a being itself and not something else, or to use Jankélévitch’s definition in Philosophie première: “Ipseity is as much myself as the “himself” of the other” (Jankélévitch 1986b, p. 263). 3. From Metaphysics to Ethics In his homage to Jankélévitch, Levinas stated that he had a concept of ethics as first philosophy. The identity between ethics and first philosophy does not appear explicitly in Jankélévitch’s works. That said, their titles eloquently express the priority he gave to morality from the beginning of his philosophical journey. In Le Paradoxe de la morale, his last work, he persists in considering “moral philosophy” as “the first problem of philosophy”. In his eyes, “the moral problematic plays with regard to the other problems the role of an a priori” (Jankélévitch 1989b, pp. 7–8). This is true, in particular, for critical speculation, which the moral problematic both “preempts” and “encompasses”. Jankélévitch and Levinas thus shared the idea that ethics is neither a normative system, nor a branch of the “philosophical tree”, even if it is the highest one, but “first philosophy”. The search for a middle way is also profoundly foreign to them. For Jankélévitch, love “expects from me not a platonic response, but an act: I am personally concerned, urgently challenged by the drastic urgency of a request in which my whole life is immediately and passionately involved” (Jankélévitch 1989b, p. 40). As for Levinas, “to live for you” is “to live for you to the point of dying”, to the point of dying for the other, and in her place. For Jankélévitch, morality is an extreme requirement that manifests itself in this principle stated in 1949, in Traité des vertus and reiterated in Le paradoxe de la morale: “Everyone has rights except me”: “we do not have rights, it is always the other who has rights”. One finds in Jankélévitch’s and Levinas’ works many other texts which testify to their common concern for ethics. In his 1959 article on “Bergson and Judaism” (Jankélévitch 1989a), Jankélévitch contrasted philautia, or the Greek notion of self-love—Aristotle’s “mirror-friend” and alter ego—with the Biblical commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself. The selfish Ego is “that adipose figure who says I, Me, We others (“nous autres”), who intercepts the Sun and the song of the larks” (Jankélévitch 1986b, pp. 201–2). When in his 20s, Jankélévitch made fun somewhat ironically of one of his friends who poured out stories of his vacation without ever asking him what was new: “How horrible they are—these people who are mesmerized by their own egos, by their trips, their health, their examinations, their interesting Selves and their precious innards” (Jankélévitch 1995, p. 104).3 By contrast to egotism, love of one’s neighbor is where “the ego is in a sense enucleated of its own ego” (Jankélévitch 1989a, p. 282). Likewise, Levinas talked in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence about the “denucleation” of the Self responsible for the Other (Levinas 1998, p. 64). Ipseity and Otherness Levinas and Jankélévitch both taught about the wonder of a glance that is no longer turned toward the Self but toward the Other. However, there are significant differences between them. They consist in the distance separating a morality of ipseity from an ethics of Otherness (Hansel 2012, pp. 95–97). In 1939, in an article entitled “On Ipseity”4, Jankélévitch based his moral philosophy on the absolute oneness of the individual—an argument which he implemented after the War in his virulent rejection of any prescription of Nazi war crimes. Ipseity is “the pure and incomparable fact of our existence as a person” (Jankélévitch 1994, p. 179). To grasp this fact of being, or the “quiddity” in its purity, amounts to considering it independently of its “quiddity”—of the contents with which one fills it, or of the affiliations by which one ordinarily defines a person. Ipseity must be envisioned in itself, and not in terms of “this” or “that”. The distance between Levinas and Jankélévitch—between the ethics of the Other and the morality of ipseity—can be found in their analyses of responsibility (Hansel 2017). At first glance, Jankélévitch appeared to place his ethics under the heading of love, a term which Levinas always used with circumspection. However, this love can be related, because of its radicality, to the infinite responsibility for the Other. For Jankélévitch, as for Levinas, responsibility is total, absolute, and asymmetric: “I only have duties without rights, the Other only has rights without duties” (Jankélévitch 1989b, p. 162).
* Why Satoor - #CRAVING 28:20 - spirit as ipseity not egoity (before we didn't have an understanding we just had a 28:50 blind drive, craving). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGm8MeaNdfA&t=28m20s spirit as ipseity not egoity (blind drive, craving)..move away from self will into middle area of will of the ground and will of the self
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Heidegger, Avicenna, Ilya??

* Why Heidegger? - thinghood - That is to say, the person becomes a thing, like any other thing, whether that be a physical, mental or spiritual thing. Accordingly, Heidegger wants to go beneath these dichotomies to capture the peculiarity of human existence that precedes and encompasses both and all, not fitting easily into the category of thinghood. This “going beneath” is also motivated by the simple fact that questioning the Sum, the being that exists prior to the Cartesian Ego that it takes part in has not even been attempted before. Dasein is his road to this.
https://epochemagazine.org/09/what-is-dasein/
* according to Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity” (māhiyya) or “thingness” (šayʾiyya) of the thing. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/
* thinghood2 - For example, in post-structuralism and Guattarian semiology, the convergence of the conceptual and the sensual/material was implemented through providing one plane of representation for the signifier and the signified. And this was done through a mere dismissal of any semiological incongruence between them: so that the combining of a thing and a sign could take place performatively and not semantically, i.e., without their semantic fusion and overlapping. In dialectical logic, conversely, a thing has to acquire a noumenal dimension too, i.e., it must be generalised in the mode of a ‘notion’ as well; and, vice versa, the notion (noumen) should have the opportunity to be embedded and revealed in reality, activity and thinghood.¶¶This is central to Ilyenkov’s argument: when a notion is abstracted from things, then things become abstract too. Interpenetration is indispensable therefore, simply because a thing without notion, without generalisation, without being reflected how it is reflected, has no proper being. As such, the interpenetration of concept and thing is necessary to surpass such abstraction. Interpenetration between thing and notion can only be implemented by dialectical procedure. Thus, generalisation is a mode of abstraction in which a notion is never torn from reality or thinghood, but maintains a bond with it.¶¶The paradox of unifying mind and matter by means of dialectical procedure is to be found in the fact that only dis-identifying othering can thus lead to generalisation. One can unify and converge thing and concept not by virtue of identification of one with another, but by virtue of each identity being other than itself – the thing being other than itself in its noumenal aspect, and the notion being other than itself in its material concretisation. It is such constant self-resigning othering that entails positing both thing and concept in general terms. the philosophical disability of reason Evald Ilyenkov’s critique of machinic intelligence Keti Chukhrov https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-philosophical-disability-of-reason
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Anglish, Bundists

* Why Anglish? Because methinksforsooth - This has been very helpful for me, thank you. properly tying the Latin and Anglish is helping me fill lots of gaps in my head on some of these primordial concepts which are used by lots of theorists Outhwitters / Reckoners. I come back to this page at least once a week lol. Agree on giving credit to whoever translated Dasein with atwist / hereness. https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
* Why Bundists? - "Daheit" "doikayt" ;;; Mark Edelman? Bundisten Doykait/Doikejt/Daheit vs Dortheit or דאָיקײט
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Heidegger, Doikayt

* Why Doikayt? - HERENESS/DOIKAYT and the "thereness" of the Zionist movement, which posited the necessity of an independent Jewish polity in its ancestral homeland
* Why Heidegger? - Disclosedness is fundamentally to be interpreted by what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “spatiality”, its “thereness”. But what does he mean by Dasein’s “thereness”? Heidegger states, “The fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the ‘there’, the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding.” From this passage, we can see that through mood and understanding, the “there” is closely related to “Being-in-the-World”. But what is the world? The world, for Heidegger, is a “referential totality which constitutes significance.” What this means is that the world is a unity of referential relationships, and things in the world are constituted by these relational relations. This constitutes their readiness-to-hand. Thus, when Heidegger says that Dasein is “Being-in-the-world”, he means that Dasein’s being is essentially relational, and this relationality constitutes the “thereness” of Dasein, i.e. it finds itself in a world of referential relations, but not as something present at-hand; rather as something which is constituted by these referential relationships precisely because it is constituted by the world. In other words, Dasein, as well as all entities, is to be understood relationally. It is its “there” precisely because it is relational. It is with this understanding of the “thereness” of Dasein that we can proceed to investigate “thereness” as disclosedness, and to do this, we must understand the two fundamental existentialia, i.e. constituent elements of the ontological structure, of disclosedness: mood (states-of-mind) and understanding
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Al-Rida

* Why Al-Rida? - * WHERENESS - The (unbeliever/zindiq) said, "Then let me know, how is He and where is He?" Al-Rida answered, "Surely the opinion thou hast adopted is mistaken. He determined the 'where', and He was, when there was no 'where'; and He fashioned the 'how', and He was, when there was no 'how'. So He is not known through 'howness' or 'whereness.'"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Rida
Peirce

* Why Peirce? - Time and Space as Representations of Decision-Making - The Foursome, the framework for knowledge, has two representations. Idealists consider the observer's perspective, their questions, and consider Why most important and dismiss Whether as irrelevant. Materialists think in terms of answers, the observed's point of view, and so for them Whether is most real and they would eliminate Why. Kant understandably tried to straddle both points of view. The semiotician Peirce distinguished three kinds of signs. Icons leverage Whatness, indices leverage Howness and symbols leverage Whyness, but we should additionally consider the Whetherness of the signified thing itself.
www.ms.lt/derlius/TimeAndSpace.pdf ICONS:WHATNESS::INDICES::HOWNESS::SYMBOLS:WHYNESS
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Al-Rida, Peirce

* why Al-Rida? HOWNESS - The (unbeliever/zindiq) said, "Then let me know, how is He and where is He?" Al-Rida answered, "Surely the opinion thou hast adopted is mistaken. He determined the 'where', and He was, when there was no 'where'; and He fashioned the 'how', and He was, when there was no 'how'. So He is not known through 'howness' or 'whereness.'" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Rida
* Why Peirce? - Time and Space as Representations of Decision-Making - The Foursome, the framework for knowledge, has two representations. Idealists consider the observer's perspective, their questions, and consider Why most important and dismiss Whether as irrelevant. Materialists think in terms of answers, the observed's point of view, and so for them Whether is most real and they would eliminate Why. Kant understandably tried to straddle both points of view. The semiotician Peirce distinguished three kinds of signs. Icons leverage Whatness, indices leverage Howness and symbols leverage Whyness, but we should additionally consider the Whetherness of the signified thing itself. www.ms.lt/derlius/TimeAndSpace.pdf ICONS:WHATNESS::INDICES::HOWNESS::SYMBOLS:WHYNESS
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# Daniel Dennett

* why DD? - * ABOUTNESS - intentionality” (the “aboutness” of thoughts) or “qualia” (the “thusnesses” of experience Dennett obituary | Philosophy books | The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/books/2024/apr/21/daniel-dennett-obituary
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Joscha Bach

* Joscha Bach says consciousness creates this bubble of "nowness" - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZl4zom3q2g&t=622s
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Sartre, OG Rose, Ricardo Alcocer Urueta, David Chai, Kellogg and Bourland

* Why Satre - Existentialism was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre's endorsement of Martin Heidegger's statement that for human beings "existence precedes essence." In as much as "essence" is a cornerstone of all metaphysical philosophy and of Rationalism, Sartre's statement was a repudiation of the philosophical system that had come before him (and, in particular, that of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger). Instead of "is-ness" generating "actuality," he argued that existence and actuality come first, and the essence is derived afterward. For Kierkegaard, it is the individual person who is the supreme moral entity, and the personal, subjective aspects of human life that are the most important; also, for Kierkegaard all of this had religious implications. via Muhammad Kamal's
www.markfoster.net/dcf/quiddity.pdf
* Why OG Rose? - "the encounter with suchness [..] is-ness tends to be a category for David Hume, like there's a real worry that if you define things acc to is-ness, that goes in tbhe direction of the philosphical ascent (philosophical thinking that can turn tyrranical), and then there's the suchness of the quality",
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=koOBJD_NOCk&t=18m20s ;;; Korzybski believed that where identification was present and “is-ness” allowed to spread like a virus, “a study and understanding of man” would be impossible, meaning we would fail in our most important duty, and the loss of sanity would be proof that we were so failing. We could say that Korzybski emphasizes “time” because temporality as fundamental almost by definition means “is-ness” (A/A) cannot be fundamental, but instead something like “becoming” must be (A/B), for time is profoundly a matter of change. Where temporality is stressed, it will be unlikely that we fully “define” humans according to a stable “is-ness,” precisely because time entails change. And definitions like symbolic schemas are very important to Korzybski, noting that humans used to think a lightning strike was an act of God, and that this definition had a large impact on how they reacted to this event. [..] Korzybski believed that ‘the problems of order and extension are of paramount structural importance for sanity and our lives,’ and the only way we could address this problem was by taking “time-binding” seriously, which would mean we had to hunt down “is-ness” and rid it from ourselves in all areas (a move from Understanding to Reason in Hegel). MOINOTES: Also see E-Prime? https://ogrose.substack.com/p/the-map-is-indestructible-part-ii https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VP97WG8IuaA https://old.reddit.com/r/OGRose/comments/1hhdl56/the_map_is_indestructible_part_ii_korzybski/ ;;; We might think of ‘[t]he relation, raindrops: rainbow, [as] a picture or analogy, not an instance, of the relation, particles: representation,’ which is to say that we experience analogies and “pictures” of relations, which are not reducible to relata (“entities relating”).⁰¹ All of this makes “participation” essential, which suggests why “idolatry” is so problematic for Barfield, for ‘the practice of idolatry [creates an] impulse […] to destroy, not merely that which participation may become, but participation itself’ (at which “hard materialism” today might have succeeded).⁰² Unfortunately, aligning with Hume’s warnings against “autonomous rationality” (another idolatry), we have uncritically and as A/A (not as A/B, as Hegel understood was needed for this step) taken ‘the last and greatest step in idolatry which we call the scientific revolution’ (Vico weeps).
* Why Urueta? - is-ness - "126 «Concediendo la tesis de Graham, según la cual ‘en árabe no hay una palabra adecuada’ que combine las funciones existencial y copulativa, el hecho sigue siendo que los escritores árabes, incluyendo a al-Fārābī y a los traductores de las obras griegas, idearon modos parafrásticos en torno a los rasgos de la lengua que estaban utilizando y usaron sus propios recursos para crear términos como ‘esosidad’ [thatness] (ʾannīya), ‘quididad’ [whatness] (māhiyya), ‘esdad’ [isness] (huwiyya), facilitando el trabajo de los escolásticos que escribieron en latín, por tender las bases para desarrollar una terminología flexible» (L. E. Goodman, Avicena, p. 104). «Es posible que Ustāth [un contemporáneo y compañero de Al-Kindī (801-873)] haya sido el creador de algunos de los neologismos que disgustaban a los puristas de la lengua árabe y encantaban a los secuaces del nuevo estilo. Creemos que las palabras annīya y huwiyya fueron acuñadas por él» (S. F. Afnan, El pensamiento de Avicena, p. 23). «Pero ¿cuál es el significado exacto del término ‘esencia’, al cual Avicena a veces reemplaza por la palabra ‘realidad’ (haqīqa) y otras veces, por el término ‘ello mismo’ (dhāt)? La esencia es la aserción que se da como respuesta a la cuestión “¿qué es?” [mā huwa / τὸ τί ἐστιν]» (S. F. Afnan, El pensamiento de Avicena, p. 155). Hay un listado de palabras que traducen las expresiones aristotélicas que designan de alguna manera lo que es en A.-M. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’apres Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne), pp. 29-30." LO QUE ES Y LA EXCLUSIÓN. LA CONCEPCIÓN ARISTOTÉLICA DE LO REAL Y SU TRASFONDO HISTÓRICO TESIS QUE PARA OPTAR POR EL GRADO DE DOCTOR EN FILOSOFÍA PRESENTA RICARDO ALCOCER URUETA https://ru.dgb.unam.mx/bitstream/20.500.14330/TES01000774285/3/0774285.pdf
* Why David Chai
https://www.phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/web/academic/chai-david/ "ziran = nature = self-so-ness", "is-ness", What is more, it is because of the pervasive quality of nothingness that Dao acts as the source of becoming in which ontological nothingness is the in-between-ness of coming-into-being and the source of all returning. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/65462/1/Chai_David_201206_PhD_thesis.pdf
* Why Kellogg and Bourland? - Bourland and other advocates also suggest that use of E-Prime leads to a less dogmatic style of language that reduces the possibility of misunderstanding or conflict.[9][10] Kellogg and Bourland describe misuse of the verb to be as creating a "deity mode of speech", allowing "even the most ignorant to transform their opinions magically into god-like pronouncements on the nature of things" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-Prime#:~:text=Not%20to%20be%20confused%20with,while%20others%20doubt%20its%20utility.
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Fremdheit

* Why Fremdheit? - Whoness? - The Social Ontology of Whoness by Michael Eldred Fremdheit as opposed to das Eigene; alterity as opposed to ownness https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=etd https://old.reddit.com/r/Pluriverse/comments/1gz5eyq/classical_liberalism_has_neglected_the/

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* ITNESS? add itness? - "itness" Joel Lande & Denis Feeney's How Literatures Begin - A Global History - Love the word “itness” https://x.com/MockClay/status/1447877153736077315/quotes
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polysemity#COLLISIONS:
* SUCHNESS=WHATNESS - because of Ian Baptiste says QUALITY=NATURE=WHATNESS (and then proceeds to say WHATNESS is all equal to FACTICITY=THATNESS) - "qualitative researcher" - https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/professor/401157 One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for QUALITY are nature or WHATNESS. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality? Put differently, can I assert that a thing exists if I have absolutely no perception of what it is? In philosophical jargon: is it possible to separate my ontology of a thing from my epistemology of it? https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002
* SUCHNESS=talità=quiddità=WHATNESS? https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tathātā
* SUCHNESS=THISNESS!=WHATNESS - Sometimes suchness=thisness because of plato.stanford.edu and Buber/Mead: “thisness” (a haecceitas, from the Latin haec, meaning “this”) as opposed to a “whatness” (a quidditas, from the Latin quid, meaning “what”) – akin to what are sometimes known in recent philosophy as “suchnesses.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/
* SUCHNESS=точность=TAKOVOST=TATTVA=THATNESS - Хауэр переводил tattva «буквально как «таковость», или по-немецки Dasheit. Таковость означает скрытую силу во всей вселенной, которая имеет определенную склонность к сотворению и движению особым образом – то и это» http://flibusta.site/b/436352/read
* SUCHNESS=WHICHNESS: I think the #Arabic terms were inspired at least by #Greek ποιότης 'quality', literally 'suchness' or 'WHICHNESS'. Note that quality itself is a #Latin calque of the Greek word too! Arabic mahiyyah 'whatness, essence' was also calqued into Medieval Latin: https://twitter.com/bnuyaminim/status/1103286141313257474
* SUCHNESS=QUALIA=QUALITY=HOWNESS? - #MOITHOUGHT/#COLLISION - to me, when someone asks "how", they are asking about the quality, so isn't Howness = Quality?
* SUCHNESS=WHATNESS? - One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for quality are nature or whatness. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality? https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002
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* WHATNESS=THATNESS - where?
* WHATNESS=esse, SUCHNESS=essentia (acc to Balthasar and Schrijver?) - être-tel v être-là, Sosein vs Dasein - As Schrijver says, "Viewed in this manner, the notions of esse (Dasein, etre-la) and essentia (Sosein, etre-tel) https://www.academia.edu/35673246/Trinitarian_Analogia_Entis_in_Hans_Urs_von_Balthasar
* WHATNESS=THISNESS=WHATNESS because sometimes ECCEITY=QUIDDITY - Ecceity is sometimes considered synonymous with quiddity , but a subtle difference exists. Quiddity concerns the common essence of a group, which is classically expressible by a definition ("a bench is an artifact for sitting on"). Ecceity, on the other hand, is elusive by a definition and presupposes a principle of individuation that is difficult to grasp ("this bench is the one on which we kissed"). [ref. needed] https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eccéité
* WHATNESS=THISNESS because polysemy - QUIDDITY=τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι=THE-WHAT-IT-WAS-TO-BE=τὸ τί ἐστι=THE-WHAT-IT-IS=HAECCEITY Essence (Latin: essentia) is a polysemic term, used in philosophy and theology as a designation for the property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. Essence is contrasted with accident: a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. The concept originates rigorously with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato), [1] who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, [2] literally meaning "the what it was to be" and corresponding to the scholastic term quiddity) or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti (τὸ τί ἐστι, [3] literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia (English "essence") to represent the whole expression. For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of essence is closely linked to that of definition (ὁρισμός horismos). [4] In the history of Western philosophy, essence has often served as a vehicle for doctrines that tend to individuate different forms of existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties; in this logical meaning, the concept has given a strong theoretical and common-sense basis to the whole family of logical theories based on the "possible worlds" analogy set up by Leibniz and developed in the intensional logic from Carnap to Kripke, which was later challenged by "extensionalist" philosophers such as Quine. www.markfoster.net/dcf/quiddity.pdf
* WHATNESS=PARTICULAR? - whatness is ontic according to the l'ouisa wikipedia page, but whatness is a mediated universal - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ousia? CHATGPT- Ontic refers to particular or individual instances of being, while ontological refers to universal aspects of being. Whatness can be ontologically universal (as essence) but may also be ontically instantiated in particular cases (as the essence of a particular thing). The term mediated universal works well for whatness because it refers to a universal essence that is understood or apprehended through the mediation of our cognition or language. So, while ontic = particular and ontological = universal is a useful heuristic, in the case of whatness, we are dealing with ontologically universal aspects of being that can be mediated by our conceptual understanding.
* WHATNESS=THINGNESS - Avicenna has a theory of 'the pure quiddity': according to Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity” (māhiyya) or “thingness” (šayʾiyya) of the thing. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/
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* THISNESS=SUCHNESS - Mandarin-Buddhism blends the two via impermanence and emptiness (anicca and sunyata) - East Asian languages like Mandarin and Japanese are influenced by Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, which don't always conceptualize the world in the same categorical way as Western metaphysical thought. For example, Taoism often embraces an idea of the unity of opposites (such as yin and yang) and impermanence, which might make rigid distinctions like those in Western philosophy less emphasized. Buddhist traditions (particularly in Mandarin) focus on ideas of impermanence (anicca) and emptiness (śūnyatā), where distinctions between "suchness" (tathatā) and "thisness" (haecceitas) are sometimes blurred into an interdependent and fluid view of reality.
* THISNESS=WHATNESS because sometimes ECCEITY=QUIDDITY - Ecceity is sometimes considered synonymous with quiddity , but a subtle difference exists. Quiddity concerns the common essence of a group, which is classically expressible by a definition ("a bench is an artifact for sitting on"). Ecceity, on the other hand, is elusive by a definition and presupposes a principle of individuation that is difficult to grasp ("this bench is the one on which we kissed"). [ref. needed] https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eccéité
* THISNESS=HAEC=THATNESS? - And, to reaffirm the connection between Simmel, Schutzian Phenomenology and, through Schutz, to Garfinkel’s haeccity (“just thatness”)
https://www.academia.edu/3037063/Glossing_the_Ghost_Simmel_Schutz_and_Garfinkel
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* THATNESS=SUCHNESS because in portuguesa TATTVA=TALIDADE=TATHATA - https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva
https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talidade#Tathātā
* THATNESS=SUCHNESS because of Ian Baptiste - "qualitative researcher" - https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/professor/401157 One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for quality are nature or whatness. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality? Put differently, can I assert that a thing exists if I have absolutely no perception of what it is? In philosophical jargon: is it possible to separate my ontology of a thing from my epistemology of it? https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002
* THATNESS!=IPSEITY!=THISNESS - thatness is definitely not ipseity - Ipseity must be envisioned in itself, and not in terms of “this” or “that”
* WHATNESS=THATNESS because svabhāva/svarūpa is sometimes tattvata ;;; THATNESS=QUIDDITY=WHATNESS Sāṃkhya philosophy uses a system of 25 tattvas while Shaivism recognizes 36 [ 4 ] [ 5 ] . « Tattva (n) [ 6 ] : the “being of that”, essence, the nature of such (being described); “quiddity”, reality, truth; principle; “category”, elementary principle; the twenty-five principles, or categories, enumerated by the Darśana Sāṃkhya (or the twenty-six of the Darśana Yoga); the thirty-six principles of Ś ivaism. In the meaning of “truth” it is opposed to mata (subjective truth, personal opinion, individual belief) as it expresses an irrefutable “objective truth”, of Universal Character.» https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva
* THATNESS=SOMETHINGNESS according to Schelling's Etwas
* THATNESS=WHICHNESS because by M Gallope · 2012 · Cited by 53 — In Latin, quid and quod both function to introduce a subordinate clause. “Quid” means. “what.” By contrast, “quod” means “which” or “the one that.” Page 23 ... https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jams.2012.65.1.215
* THATNESS=THISNESS because quod=existence - The theme of Otherness appeared in the presentation on “Judaism as an internal problem” Jankélévitch (1984a) that Jankélévitch gave in 1957, during the first colloquium of French-speaking Jewish intellectuals. It was also at the center of the discussion that he subsequently engaged with such outstanding French intellectuals as the philosophers Jean Wahl and Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, the poet Edmond Fleg and, of course, Levinas. At the risk of disappointing some of his interlocutors, namely, Levinas and Fleg—who would have liked a slightly more substantial definition, Jankélévitch described his own Jewishness as an “I-know-what”, a metaphysical and ontological given, unknowable as to its nature—its “quid”—but unquestionable as to its existence—its “quod”. Jankélévitch also mentioned the “existential complication” represented by the “constitutional otherness of the Jews”, that “additional exponent of otherness which resides in the fact that it escapes all definition”. https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/11/922
* WHATNESS=THATNESS=SUCHNESS? ChatGPT: Does "コト性" (kotosei) mean both quoddity and quiddity The term コト性 (kotosei) in Japanese is nuanced and depends heavily on context. It derives from コト (koto, which broadly means "thing," "event," or "fact") combined with 性 (sei, meaning "nature" or "character"). As quiddity: In some philosophical contexts, コト性 could align with quiddity (the essence or "whatness" of a thing) because it relates to the essential "nature" of a phenomenon or object. As quoddity: コト性 might also resemble quoddity (the "thatness" or existence of a particular thing) if used to emphasize the specificity or particular existence of an event or phenomenon. Key Considerations: Japanese philosophical vocabulary often overlaps concepts, and terms like コト性 lack direct one-to-one equivalents with Western metaphysical terms. Philosophical works in Japanese, particularly within Buddhist or phenomenological contexts, may imbue コト性 with meanings closer to suchness (tathātā) or the experiential "nature" of things, which can incorporate elements of both quiddity and quoddity depending on the discussion. If you're exploring this term in a specific philosophical tradition or text, providing more context could help clarify its intended usage. In Japanese philosophy and discussions, "コト性" (kotosei) might be used to explore the essence or the specific nature of something, depending on the context. It can encompass both the broader concept of quiddity and the more specific notion of quoddity, depending on how it is interpreted and discussed.
* Tattva is UNIVERSAL, not PARTICULAR: Tattva (n) [ 6 ] : the “being of that”, essence, the nature of such (being described); “quiddity”, reality, truth; principle; “category”, elementary principle; the twenty-five principles, or categories, enumerated by the Darśana Sāṃkhya (or the twenty-six of the Darśana Yoga); the thirty-six principles of Ś ivaism. In the meaning of “truth” it is opposed to mata (subjective truth, personal opinion, individual belief) as it expresses an irrefutable “objective truth”, of Universal Character. https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva
* THATNESS=QUOD=QUOT=daily? - Le Pain Quotidien, quotidian?
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#COLLISIONS

* SUCHNESS=WHICHNESS: I think the #Arabic terms were inspired at least by #Greek ποιότης 'quality', literally 'suchness' or 'WHICHNESS'. Note that quality itself is a #Latin calque of the Greek word too! Arabic mahiyyah 'whatness, essence' was also calqued into Medieval Latin: https://twitter.com/bnuyaminim/status/1103286141313257474
# COLLISIONS
See ITNESS
#COLLISIONS

* ISNESS=SUCHESS? - because its Japanese translation "ziran" repeats in both. (moithoughts: Also ZIRAN=NATURE=ESSENCE? (thus WHATNESS=ZIRAN?))
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#COLLISIONS
* Does ETWAS=SOMETHINGNESS=ITNESS=THINGNESS? Where did I read that Etwas = Somethingness?
mcluhanized

idipsum / mediatus = immediate/mediated in latin?
immediate universal
geometric embedded
mediated universal
algebraic extended
immediate particular
geometric embodied
mediated particular
algebraic enacted


# ChatGPT - If thisness vs thatness both imply a particular, what single word can I use to modify the word particular to distinguish between the two?
Direct particular vs. Mediated particular
Immediate particular vs. Distant particular
Subjective particular vs. Objective particular
Embedded particular vs. External particular
Present particular vs. Referent particular
Proximal particular vs. Distal particular
Local particular vs. Contextual particular
Intrinsic particular vs. Extrinsic particular
Immanent particular vs. Transcendent particular
Tangible particular vs. Abstract particular
Focal particular vs. Peripheral particular
Concrete particular vs. Relational particular
Instant particular vs. Deferred particular
Singular particular vs. Representative particular
Personal particular vs. Comparative particular
Primary particular vs. Secondary particular
Active particular vs. Passive particular
Explicit particular vs. Implicit particular
Present-time particular vs. Past-time particular
Immediate-now particular vs. Future-reaching particular
.cartesianquantity, pluri-, multi-egoity, ipseity...
anglocizedquality, as-it-is-ness, being-so
* Essence = Being, Wist, Aweseness (OE awesnis), Edwist (OE edwist), Wesing/Awesing (OE weosung/áweosung)Haecceity/Ecceity = Thisness;Quoddity = Thatness;Quintessence, Quiddity = Whatness;Quality = Suchness;Quantity = Muchness
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essence, quid, quiddity, quidditative, quintessence, "infinite potency of thought AOT that which has being"

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tertium_quids - "third whats" (this is in anglocized section because the plural is anglicized as the actual latin plural would be "tertia quaedam")
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esse, existence, haecceity, ecceity, haecceitism

* esse vs inter-esse? is there an inter-essentia also?
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facticity, quoddity, quod, quodditative, "that which has being AOT infinite potency of thought"
* Jankélévitch v Satoor - also thatness maybe means "being" (Satoor) and "contingent existence" (Jankélévitch) #moithought
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* Why facticity? because of Ian Baptiste - aka possibility One of the most vexing questions surrounding the issue of reality is the distinction between the facticity and quality of a thing. Facticity asserts that a thing exists in some form. Quality tells us in what form the thing exists. Other terms for facticity are possibility or thatness. Other terms for quality are nature or whatness. An important question to consider is this: Is it possible to separate the facticity of a thing from its quality?
https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/917/2002 ;;; Positive philosophy does not begin in idea, essence, whatness, and possibility, as does Descartes, but in facticity, existence, thatness, and reality - Sean McGrath's The Ecstatic Realism of the Late Schelling
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oneness

3.5 Ontology and Henology (Being and Oneness)
Clearly then, not only Avicenna’s ontology but also his henology should be understood in the light of the distinction between being and thing: the existent and the one are both primary indefinable concepts (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 30, 3–4) and necessary concomitants of a thing (if a thing is, it is one), but being a thing is different from existing and being one: in itself the quiddity of a thing is neither existent nor one. Indeed, even unity is an attribute or a concomitant added to quiddity as it exists (Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 200, 13–201, 3; 201, 8–13). So, while for Aristotle “being” and “one” are coextensive—being one is a per se attribute of being—(they are not identical in meaning, although Aristotle presents this possibility: Metaph. 1003b25), for Avicenna being and one are per se attributes of a thing, so that being and one are coextensive, although not identical in meaning, and this is so whenever we can speak of a “thing” (Druart 2001; Wisnovsky 2003a, esp. 158–60) i.e., always excepting the Principle. Consequently there is the difficulty of conceiving “one” as both univocal and transcendental: being and being one coincide only because they are both said of every category and do not indicate a substance (Ilāhiyyāt, III, 2, 103, 7–9). Unity—which is an accident in the category of quantity—is indivisibility; it is said in terms of priority and posteriority—with a certain ambiguity or modulation (bi-l-taškīk)—of several things (Ilāhiyyāt, III, 2, 97, 4–5; 99, 13–14; but cf. Averroes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 39–42; Menn 2013) and cannot coincide with being because otherwise multiplicity could not be (unity and multiplicity—which derives from unity—cannot be opposite: Ilāhiyyāt, III, 3, 104, 6–7; 6, 129, 11–130, 7).
...
latin/greek

suchness = ποιότης
whatness = τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, θεία ουσία
thisness = τόδε τι
thatness = ἐκείνος

qualitas / ποιόν, ποιότης, poiótēs (NOT poíēma/poiéō)
* Quale pro quali? nescioqual?
* ποιόν, poion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle)
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quid, quidditas, "quid sit", quidditativus / τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, θεία ουσία
* Quid pro quo, nescioquid,
* The aim of Schelling´s positive philosophy is to think the existence (the "quod") and not the essence (the "quid") as negative philosophy had done. That is the reason why he speaks about the "Daß" of God and not about the "Was" (the essence) of God. For Hegel, the Absolute´s necessity is contained in the concept.
* Was (whatness/quiddity/essence)
https://www.academia.edu/2000984/The_Unity_of_Thinking_and_Being_Schellings_Doctrine_of_the_Potencies
* In contemporary analytic metaphysics, Lewis' characterization of qudditism and haecceitism seems apt. Quidditism is to properties as haecceitism is to individuals. See Deborah Smith's "Quid Quidditism Est?", which seems to give more detailed background.
https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/ml1d5m/whats_the_difference_between_quidity_and_haeceity/
* Gabriel Marcel x Vladimir Jankelevitch - "quididativa e da efetividade quodidativa." https://www.academia.edu/112937802/O_tempo_da_esperança_em_Gabriel_Marcel_e_Vladimir_Jankélévitch
* 1822, October, Charles Lamb, The Old Actors, published in London Magazine, section on “Mr. Munden” (ebook): A tub of butter, contemplated by him, amounts to a Platonic idea. He understands a leg of mutton in its quiddity. He stands wondering, amid the commonplace materials of life, like primæval man, with the sun and stars about him. 1962, Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire: My vision reeked with truth. It had the tone, The quiddity and quaintness of its own Reality. 1978, Lawrence Durrell, Livia, Faber & Faber 1992 (Avignon Quintet), p. 352: He represented my quiddity I suppose – the part which, thanks to you, has converted a black pessimism about life into a belief in cosmic absurdity.
https://www.wordsense.eu/quiddity/
* Der Begriff quidditas spielt besonders im Denken des Philosophen Johannes Duns Scotus eine wichtige Rolle. Aus quidditas wurde das Eigenschaftswort quidditativus („die Wesenheit betreffend“) abgeleitet.
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hæc, haecceitas / τόδε τι, tode ti
* hoc pro hoc, nesciohoc?,
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https://la.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haecceitas
* τόδε τι = a this; We now approach one of the distinctions that will be fundamental to the purpose of this paper, namely the difference between ‘this becomes something’ (τόδε γίγνεσθαί τι) and ‘becoming something from this’ (ἐκ τοῦδε γίγνεσθαί τι). Aristotle informs us that there are cases of becoming where we can use both expressions. In fact, we could say both that ‘not-musical comes to be musical’ and that ‘from being not-musical he comes to be musical’. In other cases, however, it is preferable to use only one of the two expressions. I will soon discuss the criterion besides these peculiarities. There is also a textual problem at 190a6, with some manuscripts that have τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι instead of τόδε γίγνεσθαι. My argument is independent from the linguistic choice we face here, but it is remarkable that in a part of the manuscript tradition we already find in this passage the problematic expression (τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι) that is present in 190a32. In any case, some translators think that there is an undefined pronoun (τι) that functions as object complement for the verb ‘to come to be’ in the manuscript.19 If we want to translate the lesson τόδε γίγνεσθαι literally, as Charlton does, we would use “this comes to be”, but in this way we run the risk of interpreting this form as identical to the simple generation that is exclusive to the substances and will be introduced only some lines below by Aristotle. I therefore think that the lesson τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι should be taken seriously into account and that it may also be preferable to the text accepted in Ross’ edition of Physics.
https://www.scielo.br/j/archai/a/yrG9tD8qjfXWsp5XJ8pxqBw/?lang=en
* In contemporary analytic metaphysics, Lewis' characterization of qudditism and haecceitism seems apt. Quidditism is to properties as haecceitism is to individuals. See Deborah Smith's "Quid Quidditism Est?", which seems to give more detailed background.
https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/ml1d5m/whats_the_difference_between_quidity_and_haeceity/
* Thinking of their (2) beingness, on the other hand, loses the particularity, the haecceity or thisness of (1) beings to focus on general traits or modes. And concentrating on either occludes the far more basic fact that (3) they are manifest to us at all, leaving us inexperienced in talking about being itself, the problem we started with. https://www.beyng.com/docs/LeeBraver-SameThing.html
* 1681, Richard Baxter, Church-history of the Government of Bishops and their Councils Abbreviated. Including the Chief Part of the Government of Christian Princes and Popes, and a True Account of the most Troubling Controversies and Heresies till the Reformation ..., Printed for Thomas Simmons at the Princes Arms in Ludgate-Street, page 21, London: "He [Ignatius of Loyola] ſaith not this of ſome one Church, but of all; nor yet as of an accident proper to thoſe times of the Churches minority; but as of the Notes of every Churches Individuation or Hæcceity as they ſpeak. The Unity of the Church is characteriſed by One Altar, and One Biſhop with the Presbytery and Deacons."
* N[athan] Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary: Comprehending the Derivations of the Generality of Words in the English Tongue, Either Ancient or Modern ...: "HÆCCEITY [with Chymiſis] the ſame ſpecifick Eſſence or active Principle, by which a Medicine operates." Thomas [Norton] Harper, The Metaphysics of the School: "But then, precisely the same distinction is applicable to the Hæcceity itself. For it, too, has its notes of similarity with other Hæcceities, as well as its distinctive notes which add something conceptually distinct from the common Hæcceity."
* Gary Rosenkrantz, Non-existence and Predication [Grazer philosophische Studien; 25/26]: "The haecceitist's claim that there exist unexemplified haecceities of disjoint objects is an extremely controversial one. Indeed, many of those who accept an ontology which includes properties vehemently deny the existence of even exemplified haecceities." "What is there in the nature of individual substance which accounts for its unity and activity? As has been argued, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
* Joel Kupperman, Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts: "The late-twentieth-century philosopher Roderick Chisholm, in his Person and Object, suggested such a view: that each of us has an inner self-nature, a "haecceity," which is available to introspective experience. This suggestion (which Chisholm later appeared to drop) had the appeal of having it both ways, preserving individuality (everyone's haecceity is different from everyone else's) while insisting on changelessness."
Mark Goulthorpe, The Possibility of (an) Architecture ...: Collected Essays: "Being asked to present our work in terms of 'technology' seems to somehow imply it as haecceity – as a graspable essence or entity, a 'this-ness'.
* Fred Evans, The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity: "Gilles Deleuze" James F[ranklin] Harris, The Ascent of Man: A Philosophy of Human Nature: "Following Charles Peirce, I argued that it is the particular haecceity (the thisness), the come-up-againstness, presented by the natural world provides human beings with a particular physical environment within which actions can be fitted to circumstances in certain ways in order to attempt to bring about certain desired results. Therein lies the most fundamental basis for will, choice, and rationality."
* Anne Sauvagnargues, Deleuze and Art: "This is because Gilles Deleuze"
https://www.wordsense.eu/haecceity/
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quod, quodditas, "actus purus", "quod sit" / ἐκείνος, ὅτι
* Quod pro quo, nescioquod?
* why ὅτι? - In the Kitâb al-Ta'rîfât we read the following definition (Jurjani) "anniyya notes existence in itself, considered at the level of pure essence". The meaning of this definition is this: the ὅτι (that or quoddity) is limited to noting pure and abstract existence from the point of view of being or essence (to render the term dâtiya exactly, one would have to form the word essentiality); it is being considered in itself and by abstracting from everything that can serve to determine it, such as quiddity, quality and cause Cf. my extracts from the Source of Life by Ibn Gebirol or Avicebron, 1. V, 30". After which, Munk criticizes the translation given by Silvestre de Sacy and the etymology he proposed. https://www.themathesontrust.org/papers/metaphysics/alverny-anniyya-anitas.pdf
* Essence = Being, Wist, Aweseness (OE awesnis), Edwist (OE edwist), Wesing/Awesing (OE weosung/áweosung)Haecceity/Ecceity = Thisness;Quoddity = Thatness;Quintessence, Quiddity = Whatness;Quality = Suchness;Quantity = Muchness
* Unvordenkliches Daβ (unprethinkable thatness/quoddity/pure or naked Being) before it has become cognoscible per posterius (i.e. nachdenklich or thinkable through its consequents) is pure act anterior to Was (whatness/quiddity/essence), i.e. prior to its potency. Without this prior moment – that in and of itself is actually nothing – actual differences and identity would be impossible.
https://www.academia.edu/2000984/The_Unity_of_Thinking_and_Being_Schellings_Doctrine_of_the_Potencies
* Bing hallucination: ???Ipsitas/Hoc Ipsum/Id ipsum???
* #ITALIAN #CARTESIANGHOSTS - "quodidative musicology" - From analytical musicology to quodditative musicology But it is above all the belief in the general and universal scope of Jankélévitch's musicology that pushed us to overcome those prejudices and follow the chosen path. Convinced that the relationship between music and philosophy is perfectly coherent in Jankélévitch, we are therefore going to support the legitimacy of the following parallelism: just as philosophy is divided into First, Second and Third, so in our opinion three different musicologies can be identified: - Third musicology, or empirical musicology , that is, pure listening prior to any intellectual reflection on music, before any analysis. This is the naive approach of non-experts. At this level, music coincides with practice: on the one hand due to its complementarity with human work (for example the songs of slaves or fishermen) on the other due to its link with entertainment (music for consumption and entertainment, etc.), in which time is experienced in an immediate and psychological way. - Second musicology, or analytical musicology . It is competent and specialized listening. It is true musico-logy, the science of music and theoretical musical aesthetics. It seeks relationships between linguistic and stylistic elements, considering sounds, harmonies, themes for their formal value and their causal determinations. It often finds its explanations in the theory of harmony and counterpoint. Time is resolved in the space of formal analysis, since it conceives time solely as a succession of schematisable sound data, easily identifiable in the mere rhythmic articulation, in the metric differentiations and in the infraformal organisation. It is therefore quidditative musicology . In this dimension the answers provided by analytical conceptualizations will always remain insufficient and powerless to explain the essence of those same elements, chords, rhythms and melodies, among which the analysis tries to extricate itself. - First musicology, or quodditative musicology . It is a kind of superior metamusicology, having to do with a superior form and time: the form of the form and the time of time. It does not seek the "why" ( quid ) of the musical elements and the material, but attests to the quod , the fact of the fact, and considers the musical components as "situations", complexes, constellations to be explained in the light of an order supralinguistic and suprastylistic. This is the metharmonic and metarhythmic level, the harmony of harmony, the rhythm of the rhythm, the determination of which concerns a non-chronological but "chronothetic" temporality. This means that it places time temporally, that is, the authentic dynamic and propulsive sense of duration (rhythm), succession (melody) and simultaneity (harmony). Instead of segmenting the musical continuum into discrete successions , this musicology places itself before the musical event in its inexplicable temporal evidence, before the fact of "living" between an initial silence and a final silence, that is, of being, like the existence, an almost-silence, an almost-nothing .
www.lettere.unimi.it/dodeca/migliac/jank04zz.htm#03
* #ITALIAN - Gabriel Marcel x Vladimir Jankelevitch - "quididativa e da efetividade quodidativa." https://www.academia.edu/112937802/O_tempo_da_esperança_em_Gabriel_Marcel_e_Vladimir_Jankélévitch
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??? / ποσόν, poson

* poson = one of Aristotle's 10 categories - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle)
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??? / ποῦ, pou

* Where or place (ποῦ, pou, where). Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Examples: in a marketplace, in the Lyceum. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle)
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sanskrittathata, sunyata
* sunyata - In a Mahayana context, suchness is just a synonym of emptiness., While also used in Theravada, it is a significant concept in Mahayana Buddhism
* tatata tathata Tatātā or Tathātā
svabhāva/svarūpa (and sometimes tattvata??)
* svabhāva (sva bhava = ownbeing), Svarupa (svarūpa): Focuses on the essential form or nature that determines a thing's category or kind. It emphasizes the "what" something is fundamentally.Tattvata (tattvata): While broader, it can also encompass the essential nature aspect of "quiddity" in certain contexts.
* WHATNESS/KEIN WAS: Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Avicenna, Aquinas - quiddity, whatness, essence = svabhava = "own-being=own-becoming"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svabhava
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svalakṣaṇa
* Svalakṣaṇa (svalakṣaṇa): This translates to "having its own characteristic" or "distinguishing feature." It emphasizes the unique qualities that set a particular entity apart from others. Idam + Vishesha (idam + viśeṣa= idamviśeṣa): "Idam" means "this" and "vishesha" means "particular" or "special." Combining them emphasizes the particularity of this specific instance. Sattā (sattā): This translates to "being" or "existence" and can be used to refer to the individual existence of a particular entity. Uniqueness: Svalakṣaṇa (svalakṣaṇa) Particularity: Idam + Vishesha (idam + viśeṣa) Individual Existence: Sattā (sattā)
* ChatGPT? - ??svalakṣaṇa/idamviśeṣa/sattā??
* svalakṣaṇa. ( T. rang mtshan; C. zixiang; J. jisō; K. chasang 自相‎). In Sanskrit, “own characteristic,” or “specifically characterized,” a term used in contrast to “general” or “generic” “characteristic” (sāmānyalakṣaṇa)
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tattva, tattra-abhyäsa

* Tattva (Sanskrit) Tattva [from tat that] Thatness, the reality behind phenomenal appearance. The tattvas represent the consciousness-, force-, or spirit-side of being, in contrast to the dhatus or bhutas which as elements represent the vehicular or matter-side of being. Hence the tattvas are called the principles of nature, and the dhatus or bhutas the elements of nature. These tattvas and dhatus or bhutas are inseparable and work together constantly, for spirit and matter are fundamentally one. Exoterically the tattvas are usually reckoned as five, but esoterically they are reckoned as seven: adi-tattva (primordial); aupapaduka-tattva (parentless or unevolved); akasatattva (aether); taijasa-tattva (fire); vayu-tattva (air); apas-tattva (water); and prithivi-tattva (earth). Each of these tattvas is reflected and active in the human constitution, since man is a copy in miniature of the cosmos https://www.theosociety.org/pasadena/etgloss/encyclopedic_theosophical_glossary.pdf
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arabic/hebrewTathatha تاتهاتا Tathatha / Tathata טטהאטה Tathata
* https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/تاتهاتا
* https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/טטהאטה
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māhiyya, ḥaqīqa, dhāt / mahut

* https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/ماهية
* whatness vs thingness in Avicenna/sanskrit - Avicenna’s according to Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity” (māhiyya) or “thingness” (šayʾiyya) of the thing. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/
* Quintessence, Quiddity = Whatness//Avicenna's theory of 'the pure quiddity' / 'what is' māhiyya (quiddity)?
* 126 «Concediendo la tesis de Graham, según la cual ‘en árabe no hay una palabra adecuada’ que combine las funciones existencial y copulativa, el hecho sigue siendo que los escritores árabes, incluyendo a al-Fārābī y a los traductores de las obras griegas, idearon modos parafrásticos en torno a los rasgos de la lengua que estaban utilizando y usaron sus propios recursos para crear términos como ‘esosidad’ [thatness] (‘annīya), ‘quidad’ [whatness] (māhīya), ‘esdad’ [isness] (huwiyya), facilitando el trabajo de los escolásticos que escribieron en latín, por tender las bases para desarrollar una terminología flexible» (L. E. Goodman, Avicena, p. 104). «Es posible que Ustāth [un contemporáneo y compañero de Al-Kindī (801-873)] haya sido el creador de algunos de los neologismos que disgustaban a los puristas de la lengua árabe y encantaban a los secuaces del nuevo estilo. Creemos que las palabras ‘annīya y huwiyya fueron acuñadas por él» (S. F. Afnan, El pensamiento de Avicena, p. 23). «Pero ¿cuál es el significado exacto del término ‘esencia’, al cual Avicena a veces reemplaza por la palabra ‘realidad’ (ḥaqīqa) y otras veces, por el término ‘ello mismo’ (dhāt)? La esencia es la aseveración que se da como respuesta a la cuestión ‘¿qué es?’ [mā huwa / τί τί ἔστιν]» (S. F. Afnan, El pensamiento de Avicena, p. 155). Hay un listado de palabras que traducen las expresiones aristotélicas que designan de alguna manera lo que es en A.-M. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne), pp. 29-30.
* "Granting A.C. Graham's thesis, according to which 'in Arabic there is no adequate word' that combines the existential and copulative functions, the fact remains that Arab writers, including al-Fārābī and the translators of Greek works, devised paraphrastic modes around the features of the language they were using and utilized their own resources to create terms like 'thatness' (‘annīya), 'whatness' (māhīya), 'isness' (huwiyya), facilitating the work of the scholastics who wrote in Latin, by laying the foundations to develop a flexible terminology" (L. E. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 104). "It is possible that Ustāth [a contemporary and companion of Al-Kindī (801-873)] was the creator of some of the neologisms that displeased Arabic language purists and delighted followers of the new style. We believe that the words ‘annīya and huwiyya were coined by him" (S. F. Afnan, The Thought of Avicenna, p. 23). "But what is the exact meaning of the term 'essence,' which Avicenna sometimes replaces with the word 'reality' (ḥaqīqa) and other times with the term 'itself' (dhāt)? The essence is the assertion given in response to the question 'What is it?' [mā huwa / τί τί ἔστιν]" (S. F. Afnan, The Thought of Avicenna, p. 155). There is a list of words that translate Aristotelian expressions that somehow designate what it is in A.-M. Goichon, The distinction of essence and existence according to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), pp. 29-30.
* For the word “anitate,” the manuscript tradition transmits the variants “veritate” and “quiditate.” Only ms. A, through a correction in the margin, testifies three variants, while “anitate” alone is transmitted by mss. B, H, K, L, N; “veritate” alone is transmitted by mss. C, D, E; and “quiditate” by mss. G, I. These three terms translate the Hebrew word מציאות (metsi’ut), corresponding to the Arabic וגוד (wuğūd).73 These variations might be the result of a later correction that was not clearly indicated. Furthermore, the same word is translated as “inventio seu essentia” a few lines later.74 74 DN, p. 123, l. 39; Ḥar., p. 163; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Hébreu 682, f. 39v. In other passages of the Dux, the word “quiditas” usually translates the Hebrew term מהות (mahut)—corresponding to the Arabic מאייה (mahīya)—while “veritas” renders אמתה (’amittah), which is in Arabic חקיקה (haqīqa). On this term, see d’Alverny, 1959, pp. 59‑91. https://journals.openedition.org/yod/3505?lang=en#bodyftn74
* Avicenna made the distinction between essence, quiddity, or the reality and nature of something (his Arabic notions for these are dhāt, māhiyya, ḥaqīqa, and ṭabīʿa; see Goichon 1937: 30–32), on the one hand, and its existence (wujūd), on the other hand, the central feature of his metaphysics. His main argument in favor of the distinction between essence and existence is that we can know what things are (human beings, horses, triangles) without knowing whether they exist. This argument relies on a conceptual test that is highly characteristic of Avicenna’s type of essentialism (Benevich 2018a and 2022). Simply stated, Avicenna’s conceptual test posits that if x is essential for y, then we cannot conceive of x without conceiving of y. Conversely, if we can conceive of x without y, y is not essential for x; y is distinct from x and extrinsic to it. Thus, insofar as we can conceive of things without knowing whether they exist or not, their existence is distinct from their essence (Avicenna, Remarks and Admonitions, 121).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-essence/
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‘Anniyya, wujūd / ???

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* In a broader context, both hūwiyya and ‘anniyya also denote existence (wujūd), if existence is to be defined as the actuation and individuation of a thing’s essence.
* existence = wujud in Arabic;;;both hūwiyya and ‘anniyya also denote existence (wujūd), if existence is to be defined as the actuation and individuation of a thing’s essence. https://kevjnlim.wordpress.com/2005/01/18/essence-and-existence-avicenna-and-subsequent-polemics/
* #COLLISION - أنّية - ʾannīya substance individuelle, être déterminé, être individuel et concret; existence; quiddité, essence; esistenza, il fatto di esistere; being, thatness; fact-that; being, unique existence https://mylittlewordland.com/course/447485/vocabulary-of-arabic-philosophy
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inniyya / Kiyyun,

# ARABIC
* "Heidegger in the Arab context" Fathi Meskini Although this term is among the most important terms in the history of Arab ontology, there is ambiguity about its significance, due to its usage by philosophers, as well as the mystery surrounding its origin. In philosophical writings "inniyya" is the term used to express the concept of being as an abstraction. It also connotes the ‘thatness’ of a thing, in contrast to its ‘whatness’ (mahiyya) and ‘whyness’ (limmiyya) , and also refers to the ‘fact-that being’, or ‘unique existence’. Many origins have been suggested for this term; firstly, there was the hypothesis of a Syriac abstract derivation, then, it was put forward that it is a transcription of εἶναι (or another Greek term), of which "anniyya" is often the translation. There was also the hypothesis of its derivation as a noun, from the particles "inna" or "anna". According to some authors, such as Abu Al-Baqa, the first of these, "in-inna", has an assertive function, so is used to assert the power of being or existence. Therefore, according to Al-Bake, some Arab philosophers derived a noun from it, to refer to the quintessential and necessary existence, that is, Allah/God. This explanation is significant, because it simplifies the often complicated hypotheses of its origin, and also depicts the way in which the term has evolved
* ‘Inniyya’ إنية, one of the terms which appear to have been coined as a copula during the time that Aristotle’s Metaphysics was being translated by Usṭāth and others, such as Matti and Ishaq: τὸ εἶναι τὸ μη εἶναι τὸ εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 1042 b 28) (Metaph. 1043 a l) (Metaph. 1075 b 5) (Metaph. 1024 b 29) (Usṭāth ) (Usṭāth) ( Matti) (Usṭāth) Al-Inniyya الانية La Inniyya لا انية Inniyya انية Although this term is among the most important terms in the history of Arab ontology, there is ambiguity about its significance, due to its usage by philosophers, as well as the mystery surrounding its origin. In philosophical writings "inniyya" is the term used to express the concept of being as an abstraction. It also connotes the ‘thatness’ of a thing, in contrast to its ‘whatness’ (mahiyya) and ‘whyness’ (limmiyya) , and also refers to the ‘fact-that being’, or ‘unique existence’. Therefore, the infinitive, "inniyya", retains the connotation of the assertion, “that it is”, in other words, "assertive being". This interpretation of the origin of "inniyya" provides a clue to the usage of this term by Al-Kindi and Al-Farabi (870-951). "Inniyya" has yet another significance, which is evident in Avicenna’s usage of it. Here, it referred to "the affirmation of self-existence" or "the constitutive essential factor of self" that was used by Avicenna to differentiate between the existence of the soul, referred to as "I am” (Inniyya), and that which is outside the soul, including the body, which he called "it is"1. Meskini took the original meaning of "inna" and combined it with the notion of the existence of self ("inniyya"), to create the equivalent of what Heidegger termed "Das Selbst" (Selfhood), which is the unity of Dasein in the ways and possibilities of its Being. the question by "whether" ("hal"); this is an investigation of being ("inniyya"), in the sense of asking if something exists or not. the question of “what” ("ma"), which is an investigation of the genus of every existent ("inniyya") which has a genus. The question of “why” which is an investigation of the final or absolute cause. The first of these enquiries establishes the existence, or not, of something, whereas the other inquiries seek to identify the nature of this existence1. The plural form of “inniyya” ("being",) was used initially by Al-Kindi, to refer to the presence of the multiple entities faced by Man, and, later, to investigate the nature of the being of every object. In view of this, it is possible to say that Al-Kindi moved from enquiring about the existence of concrete things with multiple entities, to identifying the substantial nature of every one of these entities. Therefore, when faced with the question of whether or not the world is eternal, Al-Kindi proved that it is, in fact, a finite world. This argument was based upon his observation that all bodies are finite, where “body” was defined by him as a substance which has length, width and depth, that is, it is three- dimensional. The substance is the body’s genus, and its length, width and depth constitute its specific difference; in other words, a “body” is that which is composed of matter and form. Composition is the change of the form of a body. Thus, because it involves change, composition is motion. Hence, it follows that the body of the universe is finite, both temporally and spatially. In stating this, Al-Kindi provides an understanding of the entity as finite, but it is not clear whether or not he is equating the concept of “inniyya” with the concept of the Aristotelian substances. However, one thing that is clear is Al-Kindi’s assertion that the world, in its substance, is finite, and that there is no time beyond the universe, in the sense of eternal matter. It is these assertions that form the basis of his arguments that all beings are limited, which he uses to preface his discussion of the true cause of beings. Using similar reasoning, Al-Kindi went on to contradict other possible arguments as to how a thing could be the cause of itself. Using this reasoning, Al-Kindi concluded that the thing, in its essence, is "coming-to-be of being” ("ays") from “non-being” ("lys"), through the act of “true being” ("inniyya”), which is “bringing-to-be” ("ta'yis"). Al-Kindi thus provides an ontological thesis arguing that God rather than being Aristotle’s “efficient cause of Being”, is just a final cause of motion. In Al-Kindi’s text First Philosophy, can be found a usage of the term “wujud”, which is interesting, because it implies that he used it in its original sense. This word originally expressed the idea of a human being in a state of knowledge. Hence, “mawjud” ("existent") was used to refer to the thing that received the act of knowledge as it was perceived, rather than simply the fact “that it is”. So, when he wanted to point to its being, that is, that which is characterised by concreteness and sheer givenness, he used “inniyya” ("Being"). This is an infinitive derived from “inna” ("that it is"), the answer to the question, “Is something there?’’

# HEBREW
* Kiyyun Technically, the name Kiyyun could also be construed as כי plus ון and mean a rather contrived Likeness or Thatness or He Why, which brings this name in close vicinity with the most likely meaning of the name YHWH.
https://www.abarim-publications.com/Meaning/Kiyyun.html
* טטווה is ttva (tattva) but no wikipedia article on it like in english? weird
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.Hūwiyya, wujūd / ???
* Granting Graham's thesis, according to which 'in Arabic there is no adequate word' that combines the existential and copulative functions, the fact remains that Arab writers, including al-Fārābī and the translators of Greek works, devised paraphrastic modes around the features of the language they were using and utilized their own resources to create terms like 'thatness' (‘annīya), 'whatness' (māhīya), 'isness' (huwiyya), facilitating the work of the scholastics who wrote in Latin, by laying the foundations to develop a flexible terminology"
* Some Arab philosophers chose to use the Arabic equivalent Hwa "HE" in place of the Persian "HST" and Greek “Esti.”..... It is a derivative and conjugated word. They put the word "existence" in place of Huwiyya (Heness). And they used the noun – forms of its derivations in the sense of existential wording and put them in place of Kana (Was), Yakoun (is) and Sayakoun (to be). They also use the word Mawjud (That which exists) in both the context of referring to the whole things and the subject-predicate proposition with the aim of leaving Time unmentioned. These two contexts are the ones in which the Persian "HST" and Greek “Esti “were used. They used the Arabic word Wujūd (existence) in a context wherein the Persian HST is used. And they used Wojideh (existed), Youjed (to exist) and Sa youjed (will exist) in places of Kana (Was), Yakoun (is) and Sayakoun (to be), consecutively.1
* #COLLISION - And the Spoken Surat (Constraint to form the acoustics) of Al-Waw is as follows: The first Waw is the Waw of Al-Huwiya (IT-ness, That-ness) ... research.untiredwithloving.org/one-ahadأَحد-vs-wahidواحد/
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šayʾiyya???? / דאָיִקייט Doikayt
* Doikayt The concept of Doikayt (Yiddish: דאָיִקייט, lit. 'hereness', from דאָ do 'here' plus ־יק -ik adjectival suffix plus ־קייט -kayt '-ness' suffix), was central to the Bundist ideology, expressing its focus on solving the challenges confronting Jews in the country in which they lived, versus the "thereness" of the Zionist movement, which posited the necessity of an independent Jewish polity in its ancestral homeland, i.e., the Land of Israel, to secure Jewish life. Today this often manifests in the form of Non-Zionism or Anti-Zionism and a focus on local politics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundism
* doikayt became the subject of Zionist ridicule. As a turn to the interior ;;; doikayt in the US is rarely regarded as causal, such as in Diner 2004, p ... (1909); Zivion, 'Di bundisten ;;; Wie kann die bundische Maxime der Doikayt und seine antizionistische Grundhaltung im Staat Israel realisiert werden? Die Ideen der Bundisten für den ... ;;; Unter dem Titel Globalizing Doikayt: How the Bund Became .Einerseits waren Bundistinnen und Bundisten stolze Jüdinnen und ... Doikayt war eine Antwort auf die „Dortheit“ des Zionismus, der
* A black square in the middle, representing the bund and doikayt, the idea that we don't need a land mass to be a nation, to have our language. Not sure why we would ever want to commemorate the USSR writ large, let alone its relationship to Jews. That, combined with the inclusion of the Bund, makes me think you're purposefully overestimating the role of communism and the USSR. That's only about one century out of nine in the history of Yiddish (not to mention the active persecution we suffered through it all). And 'fighting for independence from oppression' isn't exactly compatible with the memory of the USSR. There's no holistic connection or commonality between them. https://old.reddit.com/r/Yiddish/comments/vf9pz1/new_yiddish_flag_design/?tl=de
* Jargon has always been philosopher's weapons first. look up the story of how Yiddish Bundists in Germany came up with a term called "hereness" (דאָיִקייט, a term rightfully created so that their families would stop getting slaughtered), but unfortunately Yiddish Zionists later invented a term called "thereness" (שםיִקייט) in order to completely dominate Palestine. and the things that Dugin is doing with language on every platform on all languages, hoo boy https://old.reddit.com/r/redscarepod/comments/1h0dlxn/holding_space_wicked_lore/lz3e1g0/
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???? / שם-ness sham-ness
* Other languages are languages by convention, i.e. by the common decision of a group of people to agree to use certain sounds (words) to represent certain things . Hebrew, however, is intrinsic, i.e. the words actually reflect the reality of a particular object at a certain level. Since the world was created by G-d using Hebrew words (עשרה מאמרות של מעשה בראשית /בדבר ד’ שמים נעשו), were we to trace any object back up its spiritual trajectory, we would, at some stage get to the word. The word then, is the reality of the object at a higher level. This is how אדם הראשון (the first Man) knew what the names of the animals were. He did not name them, rather, וכל אשר יקרא לו האדם נפש חיה הוא שמו: And whatever Man understood to be each animals name, that was indeed its name. (בראשית ב:יט) The שם (name) of something is its thereness, its - שם ness . The word, therefore, actually sustains the physical reality it produced. Man, who is an עולם קטן (microcosm of the world) is made up of all 22 letters (שם). https://www.simpletoremember.com/articles/a/oral-law-written-law/
* Why did Yiddish Bundists come up with "שםיִקייט" but the evil Zionists didn't create "דאָיִקייט"
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limmiyya
* "Heidegger in the Arab context" Fathi Meskini Although this term is among the most important terms in the history of Arab ontology, there is ambiguity about its significance, due to its usage by philosophers, as well as the mystery surrounding its origin. In philosophical writings "inniyya" is the term used to express the concept of being as an abstraction. It also connotes the ‘thatness’ of a thing, in contrast to its ‘whatness’ (mahiyya) and ‘whyness’ (limmiyya) , and also refers to the ‘fact-that being’, or ‘unique existence’. Many origins have been suggested for this term; firstly, there was the hypothesis of a Syriac abstract derivation, then, it was put forward that it is a transcription of εἶναι (or another Greek term), of which "anniyya" is often the translation. There was also the hypothesis of its derivation as a noun, from the particles "inna" or "anna". According to some authors, such as Abu Al-Baqa, the first of these, "in-inna", has an assertive function, so is used to assert the power of being or existence. Therefore, according to Al-Bake, some Arab philosophers derived a noun from it, to refer to the quintessential and necessary existence, that is, Allah/God. This explanation is significant, because it simplifies the often complicated hypotheses of its origin, and also depicts the way in which the term has evolved2
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eingedeutscht

"Unvordenkliches So" "Unvordenkliches Was" "Unvordenkliches Dies" "Unvordenkliches Daβ"

Qualität Quiddität Haecceität Quoddität
"Die Qualität" "Die Quiddität" "Die Haecceität" "Die Quoddität"
"Das Sosein" "Die Washeit" "Die Diesheit' "Das Daßein"
Die Soheit/Solchheit, Das Sosein, so, oder "Das Ding an sich"

* Tathata (Sanskrit तथाता, tathātā, Pali तथता, tathatā[1]; chinesisch 真如, Pinyin zhēnrú, W.-G. chen-ju; tibetisch དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད Wylie de bzhin nyid; koreanisch 진여, jinyeo; japanisch 真如, shinnyo; vietnamesisch chân như oder chơn như; dt. etwa: Soheit bzw. Solchheit) ist im Buddhismus (insbesondere im Mahāyāna) ein Begriff für die Form wahrer bzw. fundamentaler Wirklichkeit (nicht aber diese Wirklichkeit selbst),[2] meist in Bezug auf den ihr unterstellten Aspekt der Leere bzw. wesentlichen Wesenlosigkeit.
* Sosein = being-so, so = so. Die Soheit/Solchheit
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tathata
* Sosein vs Dasein - acc to Balthasar and Schrijver, As Schrijver says, "Viewed in this manner, the notions of esse (Dasein, etre-la) and essentia (Sosein, etre-tel) // https://www.academia.edu/35673246/Trinitarian_Analogia_Entis_in_Hans_Urs_von_Balthasar
* On the contrary, rather than resolve the dilemma between thoughtful adherence to the universalist Godhead and faith in the Christian God by opting for the former, Schürmann maintains the tension by developing the Christian character of Eckhart’s notion of releasement (this is not to say, however, that Schürmann was not already tempted by the first approach, as other texts from around this time attest). 4 The most conspicuous example of this can be found in a letter Schürmann wrote to Geffré from Israel during Sukkot (28 September – 5 October) 1966: “after many conversations with Jews, Christians, and Muslims here […] I am becoming more of a monotheist, a disciple of Eckhart and Heidegger, someone who hopes for the experience of God, than a Christian preacher speculating on the essence of Christ [nach vielen Gesprächen mit Juden, Christen, Mohammedanern hier […] werde ich mehr monotheist [sic], Eckhart- und Heideggeranhänger, Hoffender auf die Erfahrung Gottes, als über das Sosein Christi spekulierender christlicher Prediger]” (DPF).
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149
* ChatGPT says Das Sosein (suchness)
* ???ChatGPT says and for "suchness" it is "Solchheit" or "Solchsein."???
* sosein, "being so", "being such-and-such' -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meinong%27s_jungle
* The word “present” is a translation of the German term “sosein,” which can also be translated as “suchness,” or “particularity.” Buber, who wrote in the first half of the 20th century, claimed that an “I-Thou” relation requires effort and strength of soul, while an “I-It” relation does not. Such strength, he went on to write, is often missing. The shift from “I-It” to “I-Thou” relations is what the humanistic philosophy of Martin Buber aspires for and is not unrelated to what we try to impress on negotiation students when we tell them that relationships matter in negotiation.
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dispute-resolution/an-alternative-to-traditional-dispute-resolution-instruction/ "Buber describes what he sees as two different sets of human relations and modes of interaction: an “I-It” relation that is characterized by cold indifference with respect to the other, who is treated as an object, and an “I-Thou” relation “where each of the partners really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them” (Buber 1932/2002, p. 22)."
* The Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Eschatology as Communion In other places he distinguishes between Existenz und Wesen (TL i. 108-13), Dasein and Sosein (TL i. 218-19), or Wirklichkeit and Seiende (Epilog, 38). In ... Chapter Two articulates, in dialogue with Thomas Aquinas, Balthasar's understanding of the structure of the analogy of being as a relation of Giver and gift. The key to understanding the relationship between God and creation as neither a juxtaposition of two things nor a negation of creaturely existence is the non-substantial fullness of being as gift and the consequent "real distinction" between being and essence. Balthasar develops this metaphysical scheme unfolding the meaning of the act-character of being in light of interpersonal relations.
https://academic.oup.com/book/7391/chapter/152217955
* Qualität - Freilich ließe sich dann auch fragen, ob die Liebe eine ›Substanz‹ oder eine ›Qualität‹ sei und was es in Ansehung ihrer mit der ›Haecceität‹ und ›Quiddität‹ auf sich habe; aber ist man je sicher, das nicht doch einmal noch fragen zu müssen?« https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/musil/mannohn3/chap028.html
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das Wesen, die Wesenheit, die Washeit oder das Wassein, Die Quiddität, Die Quidität, the Was
* QUIDDITAS=WASHEIT=WESEN - Der Begriff Wesen (von mittelhochdeutsch wësen, „Aufenthalt, Hauswesen, Art zu leben, Eigenschaft, Lage“,[1] seit dem Spätmittelalter für lateinisch essentia,[2] von esse „sein“ (mittelhochdeutsch „wësen“), seit Cicero als Lehnübersetzung von griechisch ousia, „Wesen“, lateinisch auch quidditas) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ousia Ludger Honnefelder: Johannes Duns Scotus.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quidditas https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesen_(Philosophie)
* Wesenheit is "essentiality", Wesen is "essence", Washeit is "essence" or "whatness"....see Edith Stein and Jean Hering
* Was = Negative Philosophy = Naturphilosophie and the Identitatphilosophie form one whole of what Schelling will later "Negative Philosophy," ;- a Philosophy devoted to the infinite potency of thought or what Schelling calls "the Was" --essence-- "Whatness," ;;; Hi Paconinja, Chris Satoor here! Schelling was called a protean thinker due to his several projects that he left unfinished, However, Schelling is extremely articulate about his projects. Naturphilosophie and the Identitatphilosophie form one whole of what Schelling will later "Negative Philosophy," ;- a Philosophy devoted to the infinite potency of thought or what Schelling calls "the Was" --essence-- "Whatness," which employs intellectual Intuition. The late Schelling, from the Freiheitsschrift to the Ages drafts, and die Philosophie der Offenbarung und Mythologie make up Schelling's Positive philosophy. This is a philosophy in search of the facticity of existence. What Schelling states is "a philosophy without potency," ... "For Being proceeds thought." Schelling is in search of a philosophy surrounded by the das or Thatness, "that which has being!" There is essentially two Schelling's according to Schelling himself, A "Negative philosophy," and "Positive philosophy."
https://old.reddit.com/r/GermanIdealism/comments/1d8pjsh/four_ways_to_periodize_schellings_writings_walter/l7q7gq7/?context=3
* kein Was
* Was (whatness/quiddity/essence),
https://www.academia.edu/2000984/The_Unity_of_Thinking_and_Being_Schellings_Doctrine_of_the_Potencies
* Was - The aim of Schelling´s positive philosophyis to think the existence (the "quod") and not the essence (the "quid") as negative philosophy had done. That is the reason why he speaks about the "Daß" of God and not about the "Was" (the essence) of God. For Hegel, the Absolute´s necessity is contained in the concept.
* "Wasein"? According to Heidegger, what is to be analysed in phenomenology cannot be classified as ‘objects’. Rather, what is to be analysed is the relating-to (Verhalten) of factical life-experience. Thus, the task of hermeneutics is to make the ‘how’ of this experience explicit, and the task of formal indications is to lead the attention to how it is given. What a phenomenon is can only be ‘formally indicated’ by approaching the meaning of the phenomenon in both its ‘what’ and its ‘how’. A formal indication is thus supposed to draw the attention away from the given fact of experience, and towards the attitude in which it is experienced. Formal indications makes explicit that we always stand in a specific relation to that which is experienced. In other words, formal indication makes the subject matter accessible in such a way that its ‘how-being’ (Wiesein) becomes a definition of its authentic ‘what-being’ (Wasein). In addition to the relational aspect, the formal indication points towards a possible concretion (Vollzug) or enactment of the phenomenon. The formal indication only gives a certain direction for enactment, and it is the interpreter or philosophising individual’s concrete task to fulfil the enactment in application. Heidegger’s point is thus that a genuine understanding of a philosophical concept only can take place through application
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/24458/Thygesen_Master_v10.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
* see also #Satoor and #Protean
* "Pferdheit ist die Washeit des Allpferds." J. Joyce, Ulysses
* „Washeit“, eingedeutscht Quiddität oder Quidität https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quidditas
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* Schönberger - Den Heinrichschen Begriff der „res", der in seinem allgemeinsten Verstände nur einen intentionalen Gehalt, ein pures Gemeintes symbolisiert, das als solches die Differenz von Sein und Nichts noch gar nicht enthält 2 7 , diesen Begriff hält Scotus für einen Unbegriff. Er übersetzt ihn in seine Sprache mit „Etwasheit" („aliquitas") und fragt, ob und wenn ja, was sich dabei denken lasse:;;;von Honnefelder durchaus anerkannt, op. cit., 427: „durch eine Resolution der washeitlichen Begriffe, durch einen abstraktiv gewonnenen Begriff nach Art der Wesensbegriffe, durch eine Weise von consideratio absoluta, wie sie an Avicennas Wesensbetrachtung anknüpft, und durch eine formale Betrachtung, wie sie Scotus für die Erfassung normaler Inhalte anwendet." https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11553976.pdf
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Die Diesheit, Diesheit, Dieses-Sein, Die Haecceitas
* Why Why "die Diesheit"? - because of Arendt/Kristeva - Möchte ich dies gern glauben weil ich, Sprach- und Literaturtheoretikerin die zugleich Psychoanalytikerin ist, versuche, die ecceitas (die Diesheit) des quid (des konkreten Dieses oder Diesem) auszuloten? Aber auch das Arendtsche „Versprechen“ und „Verzeihen“, deren moderne Version nichts anderes ist als die psychoanalytische Deutung, wenn sie uns gestattet, wiedergeboren zu werden? Wobei die Psychoanalyse Hannah Arendt stets opak blieb, obschon das Leben und das Werk der Philosophin jene in vielfältigen und ungewohnten Weisen herausfordern. / Would I like to believe this because I, a language and literature theorist who is also a psychoanalyst, am trying to fathom the ecceitas (the thisness) of the quid (the concrete this or that (#CONFLICT?))? But also the Arendtian "promise" and "forgiveness", the modern version of which is nothing other than the psychoanalytic interpretation when it allows us to be reborn? Hannah Arendt's psychoanalysis has always remained opaque, although the philosopher's life and work challenge it in diverse and unusual ways. Festrede anlässlich der Hannah-Arendt-Preisverleihung 2006 von Julia Kristeva Hannah Arendt oder: Wiedergründen als Überleben Speech at the Hannah Arendt Prize ceremony 2006 by Julia Kristeva Hannah Arendt or: Refounding as Survival
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/arendt2006_kristeva.pdf
* Dieses-Sein oder Diesheit
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haecceitas
* "das reine dies" - Therefore, only the pure this -Leibniz' "Monadology"
* Diesheit - Scotus hat von der Einzigartigkeit der „Diesheit“ gesprochen und das ist für das Verständnis der „formalen Anzeige“ wichtig. „Existenz“, „In der Welt sein“
* Dieses-Sein vs Diesheit vs Die Haecceitas
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haecceitas
* "das reine Dies"? - Leibnitz Angeschaut wird daher nur das reine Dies, Wolfgang Speyer: "Demgegenüber wendete der gegenwärti- ge Mensch seinen Blick auf das reine Dies", Femuni Hagen: "Mensch seinen Blick auf das reine Dies", keinverlag.de "Im Zustand der Fülle ist das "Reine" dies", Was ist Musik? "Reines Sein und das reine Dies der sinnlichen Gewißheit lassen sich nicht festhalten, sondern sind immer schon übergegangen in ihren Gegensatz und in ihre"
* "das reine Dies" vs "das reine Daß"? "Dieses-Sein" oder "Diesheit" oder ??Dassein??
* "Unvordenkliches Dies"?
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die Dasheit, das Daßein, das Daß, das reine Daß, Unvordenkliches Daβ, Quoddität

* Dasheit=Tattva -
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva
* Dasheit and Schelling / Sean McGrath - Schelling is never more elusive than in his discussion of the absolute prius. He calls it the pure that (das rein Daβ), the actus purus, A0 , unprethinkable being (das unvordenklich Sein), being without potency (for it is preceded by nothing but is itself the absolute first), being which has a certain infinity about it, not because it exists necessarily but because it cannot be reduced to anything prior to it, the absolutely transcendent being. As such the absolutely first, the absolute prius is not experienced, at least not directly or immediately, for to experience anything at all is to experience something, a that which is given as a what. The question concerning the prius is a question that interrogates the being of being, the existence that precedes all essence, or the absolute fact, that there is something rather than nothing. I will quote Schelling at some length here for nowhere else in his corpus is his reasoning so close and inscrutable: The positive philosophy starts out just as little from something that occurs merely in thought (for then it would fall back into the negative philosophy) as it starts out from some being that is present in experience. If it does not start out from something that occurs in though, and, thus, in no way from pure thought, then it will start out from that which is before and external to all thought, consequently from being, but not from an empirical being. For we have already excluded this, in that empirical being is external to thought only in the very relative sense, to the extent that every being that occurs in experience inherently carries with it the logical determinations of the understanding, which it could never be represented. If positive philosophy starts out from that which is external to all thought, it cannot begin with a being that is external to thought in a merely relative sense, but only with a being that is absolutely external to thought. The being that is external to all thought, however, is just as much beyond all experience as it is before all thought: positive philosophy begins with the completely transcendent being and it can no longer be just a relative prius like the potency that serves as the basis of the science of reason. For precisely as potency—as nonbeing—it has the necessity to pass over into being, and, thus, I call it the merely relative prius. If that being from which positive philosophy proceeds were also merely relative then the necessity of passive over into being would inhere with its principle. Thus, through this principle, that being would be subordinated to the thought of a necessary movement and, consequently, the positive philosophy would fall back into the negative. If, therefore, the relative prius cannot be the beginning of the positive philosophy, then it must be the absolute prius, which has no necessity to more itself into being. If it passes over into being, then this can only be the consequence of a free act, of an act that can only be something purely empirical , that can be fully apprehended only a posteriori, just as every act is incapable of being comprehended a priori and is only capable of being known a posteriori (Schelling, 1854c:126-7/178-9). One of the many challenges in interpreting the above paragraph is that Schelling moves between two senses of being and does not always specify when he does so. He sometimes means being as essence (quidditas or Washeit) and at other times being as existence (quodditas or Dasheit). “Some being (Seiende) that is present in experience” is an essence (quidditas) given as existent. “Being” (Seyn) “which is before and external to all thought” is existence (quodditas) without essence—not that an existent can exist without essence but that existence as such must be prior to any essence for to assert otherwise, to assert the primacy of essence to existence, is to fall into contradiction, to say that something (some essence) is and that that something is not 13 (does not exist) in the same respect at the same time. The potency that is a relative prius is “nonbeing” in the sense of non-existent (but not for that nothingness, rather, the me on of Plato, not the ouk on), essence that is not yet determined as existing, or as a possible being. To think being as non-existent is not to fall into contradiction because being is here thought as the possibility of existing in some way or another. The relative prius (here meant as –A) “has the necessity to pass over into being,” not in the sense of the necessity to exist (for that way lies the ontological argument), but rather the necessity to be a possible something. –A cannot be posited alone but only in conjunction with +A, that is, –A (determinability or indeterminacy) is as the possibility to be determined (+A). But the absolute prius has no necessity to be a possible something because there is no possible being which it could be: as absolutely first it is preceded by no possibilities by which it could be determined. Thus it exists without prior determination, in other words, it is absolute contingency or event.15 Hence its existence is a “free act,” and can only be known (inferred) a posteriori (but not experienced).
* das = existence? - The late Schelling, from the Freiheitsschrift to the Ages drafts, and die Philosophie der Offenbarung und Mythologie make up Schelling's Positive philosophy. This is a philosophy in search of the facticity of existence. What Schelling states is "a philosophy without potency," ... "For Being proceeds thought." Schelling is in search of a philosophy surrounded by the das or Thatness, "that which has being!"
* das reine Daß = "the pure that" - Schelling uses this term in some of his late texts to refer to the sheer fact that anything exists at all;;;God is the totality of possibilities in an eternal manner, hence prior to every act and thus also prior to every volition (Wollen). And yet he himself is not this totality. In himself there is no "whatness" (kein Was), he is the pure "thatness" (das reine Daß) - actus purus." - Friedrich Schelling, "On the Source of Eternal Truths", trans. Edward Beach, in The Owl of Minerva, 22, 1, (Fall 1990):
https://twitter.com/RyanHaecker/status/1689923540307324928
* Daß - Unvordenkliches Daβ (unprethinkable thatness/quoddity/pure or naked Being) before it has become cognoscible per posterius (i.e. nachdenklich or thinkable through its consequents) is pure act anterior to Was (whatness/quiddity/essence), i.e. prior to its potency.
https://www.academia.edu/2000984/The_Unity_of_Thinking_and_Being_Schellings_Doctrine_of_the_Potencies
* Daß - The aim of Schelling´s positive philosophy is to think the existence (the "quod") and not the essence (the "quid") as negative philosophy had done. That is the reason why he speaks about the "Daß" of God and not about the "Was" (the essence) of God. For Hegel, the Absolute´s necessity is contained in the concept.
* #Satoor #Protean - Hi Paconinja, Chris Satoor here! Schelling was called a protean thinker due to his several projects that he left unfinished, However, Schelling is extremely articulate about his projects. Naturphilosophie and the Identitatphilosophie form one whole of what Schelling will later "Negative Philosophy," ;- a Philosophy devoted to the infinite potency of thought or what Schelling calls "the Was" --essence-- "Whatness," which employs intellectual Intuition. The late Schelling, from the Freiheitsschrift to the Ages drafts, and die Philosophie der Offenbarung und Mythologie make up Schelling's Positive philosophy. This is a philosophy in search of the facticity of existence. What Schelling states is "a philosophy without potency," ... "For Being proceeds thought." Schelling is in search of a philosophy surrounded by the das or Thatness, "that which has being!" There is essentially two Schelling's according to Schelling himself, A "Negative philosophy," and "Positive philosophy."
https://old.reddit.com/r/GermanIdealism/comments/1d8pjsh/four_ways_to_periodize_schellings_writings_walter/
* Leibniz coined Quoddität?
* Hypostasis establishes the transition from potency to action, from essence to existence, from "quiddity" to "quoddity". It is the object of the nodal point of rationality. Der Begriff der Hypostase muss sorgfältig von dem der "Substanz" unterschieden werden. Wir könnten auf den ersten Blick sagen, dass die beiden Begriffe eine ziemlich ähnliche Etymologie haben. Beide würden "das, was unten gehalten wird" bezeichnen, was es impliziert. Dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall. Beachten Sie zunächst, dass das Wort "Subjekt" selbst "das bedeutet, was unten gehalten oder gestellt wird": " Subjekt ". Hypostase sollte mit dem Wort "Subjekt" verglichen und sorgfältig vom Wort "Substanz" unterschieden werden. Hypostase ist das Thema, das Sein als Individuum oder sogar Ecceity im Sinne von Duns Scotus . Jeder Mensch ist eine Hypostase oder ein Subjekt oder ein individuelles Wesen. Umgekehrt ist jedoch nicht jede Hypostase eine Person, weil die Person für sich genommen keine Transzendentale ist: Alle Wesen sind keine Personen, während alle Wesen ausnahmslos Hypostasen sind oder Hypostase haben. Die Essenz ist eine Kraft, das heißt ein rein virtuelles oder konzeptuelles Wesen, rein zu kommen, rein ideal oder besser noch ideal. Existenz bedeutet andererseits, in Aktion zu sein, real zu sein, tatsächlich zu sein. Hypostase hingegen ist sowohl Essenz als auch Existenz, Macht und Handlung. Sie ist das Thema von beiden. Sie stellt die Verbindung zwischen dem einen und dem anderen her. Es ist das Gefäß von beiden. Es ist die Hypostase, die wir der Essenz oder "Quiddität" zuschreiben: Was für eine Sache ist. Und wenn wir von Hypostase sprechen, sagen wir, dass so und so etwas existiert. Das Wesen wird immer noch unter dem Gesichtspunkt des rationalen Identitätsprinzips beobachtet. Es beantwortet die Frage nach der Identität des Seins, seiner Natur, seiner Definition. Existenz kann im Gegenteil nicht definiert werden. Es kann durch Erfahrung gesehen werden. Es entspricht dem zweiten rationalen Prinzip, dem der Kausalität. Es beantwortet die Frage nach dem Ursprung oder der Ursache eines solchen und eines solchen Wesens. Hypostase stellt den Übergang von Potenz zu Handlung, von Essenz zu Existenz, von "Quiddität" zu "Quoddität" fest. Es ist das Objekt des Knotenpunktes der Rationalität. Es beantwortet die Frage nach der Intentionalität des Wesens und seiner Übernahme durch die Persönlichkeit. Darin wird das Wesen zum Dialog, weil es die beiden Pole des Denkens vereint und verbindet. https://de.frwiki.wiki/wiki/Hypostase_%28métaphysique%29
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..die Hiesigkeit, das Hiersein, Dasein, die Daheit, Doikejt, Doykait, Hierheit, ?Hierenheit?

* Hiesigkeit, Hiersein
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doikejt
* "Daheit" "doikayt" Doikayt: „Wo wir leben, dort ist unser Land“ Pressenza Und was auch so spannend ist, ist das bundistische Konzept von doikayt, die «Daheit», die auch eine Antwort war auf den Zionismus, den sie ... - International Press Agency https://www.pressenza.com › doik... · Translate this page Das jiddische Wort Doikayt, was übersetzt so viel bedeutet wie „Daheit“, war genau dieses
* Dortheit, Daheit/doikayt VON DOIKAYT UND JIDDISCHKAYT DIE WIENER SÄNGERIN ISABEL FREY IM GESPRÄCH MIT FLORIAN WEIS ÜBER JIDDISCHE LIEDER UND DEN ALLGEMEINEN JÜDISCHEN ARBEITERBUND Ja, es ist faszinierend. Weil es auf den Widerspruch der Moderne zwischen Partikularismus und Universalismus eine bestimmte Antwort bietet. Und was auch so spannend ist, ist das bundistische Konzept von doikayt, die «Daheit», die auch eine Antwort auf den Zionismus war, den sie gesehen haben als eine Art «Dortheit». Und das ist, würde ich sagen, ein zentrales Konzept, das weiterlebt. Der «Bund» lebt natürlich nicht mehr als Bewegung weiter, aber sein Konzept von doikayt erzählt sehr viel und findet wieder sehr viel Anklang. In einer von Globalisierung geprägten Welt und eben auch als Antwort auf den modernen heutigen Zionismus. Oder auch als eine bestimmte Antwort auf säkulares jüdisches Leben in der Diaspora. https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/luxemburg_beitraege/lux_beitr_20_Juden_in_der_Linken_Bd4.pdf
* Hierenheit (fake poet word) https://hellopoetry.com/poem/4678164/mein-liebe-fur-englisch-ist-ubersetzbar-im-deutsche/
* Doikejt https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doikejt
* Dasein
* Dasein (not Das Daßein) -
https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
* die „Dortheit“ des Zionismu
* "meine hierheit, deine dortheit","my here-ness, thy there-ness" Transactions of the Philological society 1858 - Now t, i-tifc, Kse are the common possessive affixes of the econd person singular, dual, plural, and nga^ guk, gut e common accusative affixes of the first person added to erbs. I agree with Kleinschmidt that the latter three are irobably here somewhat irregularly used as possessives. is clear then that the real personal character is only in thesesuffixes, and that the remaining bases UVA and ILE aremerely employed for the purpose of giving them a support,since the Greenlandish is averse to the separate use of pronominal bases and always wants to affix them to something.Kleinschmidt's further assumption, that the said two basesUVA, ILE, are identical with the two demonstrative rootsUV, here, IK (IV), yonder, is highly probable as to thelatter, and as to the former I consider it certain. Consequently the learned missionary is right in saying that uvanga,ivdlit mean originally "meine hierheit, deine dortheit","my here-ness, thy there-ness". https://dn790004.ca.archive.org/0/items/transact185900philuoft/transact185900philuoft.pdf t is already remarkable that in these Greenlandish absolute personal pronouns we should again trace a connectionbetween me and here, thee and there, but still more remarkable is it, that the NG, T, the characteristics of the firstand second person find an echo in, or are the echo of,two pronominal bases simply demonstrative. Namely onp. 21 of Kleinschmidt's grammar we find a demonstrativeroot MA, here, and another TASS, there. Besides thereis an enclitic demonstrative base ta , which may be prefixedto all the other demonstrative bases, except Tdss, and whichI because of this very exception consider with Kleinschmidtas the original root of that same tdss. Hence it would appear that exactly as the root MA 'here' is to TA 4 there',so is M?, the root of the first person, to T, the root ofthe second; or, according to my view, the two latter at the two former transformed into p
* דאָיקײט
https://old.reddit.com/r/Judaism/comments/xmqyim/does_anyone_know_what_the_hebrew_letters_in_the/?tl=de
* Zur Geschichte des Jüdischen Arbeiterbundes Der Jüdische Arbeiterbund kämpfte für den Verbleib in den Heimatländern bei Wahrung der jüdischen Identität. Håkan Blomqvist dokumentierte seine Spuren in Schweden, aber auch die Geschichte des Bundes ganz allgemein. Zusätzlich zu der Tatsache, dass der Bund eine sozialistische Bewegung war, befürworteten sie „Doykait“, Hierheit, was bedeutete, dass sie sich eine Zukunft in Europa für das europäische Judentum vorstellten. Anders als unter anderem die Kommunisten befürwortete der Bund keine Assimilation, sondern wollte eine starke säkulare jiddisch-jüdische Kultur fördern, die in Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Gruppen eine sozialistische Gesellschaft aufbauen konnte. Sie distanzierten sich sowohl vom Zionismus als auch von einem religiös begründeten Judentum. Der Bund wurde unbestreitbar zerschmettert, hauptsächlich von den deutschen Nazis und ihren Kollaborateuren, aber auch von den sowjetischen Kommunisten. Die unabhängigen Aktivitäten des Bundes wurden von den Bolschewiki nach ihrer Machtergreifung in Russland 1917 verboten. Danach begann der Bund seine zweite Blütezeit im neu gegründeten Polen. Als der Zweite Weltkrieg begann und Polen zwischen einer sowjetischen und einer deutschen Besatzung aufgeteilt wurde, wurde der Bund in beiden Teilen verboten und verfolgt. Auch nach dem Krieg wurden die Wiederaufbauversuche des Bundes vom neuen polnischen Regime unter Stalins Kontrolle vereitelt. Zurückgekehrte polnische Juden waren nach dem Krieg großer antisemitischer Gewalt ausgesetzt, von der das Pogrom in Kielce 1946 das bekannteste Beispiel ist. Dieser Umstand trug mit zu den Schwierigkeiten der Bewegung bei, sich in Polen wieder aufzubauen. Der Bund gehört unbestreitbar zu den Verlierern der Geschichte, ermordet und vertrieben von dem, was Timothy Snyder den blutigen Boden zwischen Hitler und Stalin nennt. Trotzdem können uns die Erfahrungen dieser Verlierer, ihre Positionen, ihre Selbstverteidigung, Gemeinschaft, Solidarität und Bewegung heute etwas mitteilen, während ihre Besieger vor aller Welt als die zynischen Massenmörder dastehen, die sie waren. https://www.inprekorr.de/632-bund.htm
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die Dortheit, ?Dorthenheit?

* Dorthenheit sham שם https://old.reddit.com/r/hebrew/comments/1f9nmsj/שם/
* Doikayt war eine Antwort auf die „Dortheit“ des Zionismus, der Emigration als die einzige Lösung für jüdische Selbstbestimmung sah.
* LOCALNESS Ortlichkeit Dortheit Doikejt - On tropes, states, and the combinatorics of the copula werden in German Dortheit(lit. 'thereness'). Furthermore,cases such as ̈Ortlichkeit(lit. 'localness', locality) do not introduce a property in a bearer, but the locality as
* ABOVENESS "Hierheit, Dortheit, Obenheit" here, there, aboveness - Theodor Celms - Phanomen und Wirklichkeit des Ich - Studien uber das subjektive Sein
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.Seinheit / Sein-igkeit / dem Sein / So-sein, Seiendheit

* https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/surrender-to-the-is-ness-of-the-present-moment.3336644/
* Heidegger also calls Sein, the existence of the ontological event, Seiendheit [ontological eventness]. It is the signifiant maître S1 [master signifier] that is posited in the "seat of truth" (yellow) in the structure of academic discourse as the structure of alienation [alienation]. Such Sein is metaphysical. https://x.com/ogswrs/status/1095645052456513538
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hispanización

calidad quididad haecceidad quodidad
qualidade quididade haecceidade quodidade
asidad, cualidad, calidad, talidad / qualidade, talidade

* asidad - Juan Arnau dice: "Hay también un interés en lo absoluto que aparece en términos como "asidad" (tathata) y la idea de "los medios hábiles" (upayakausalya) toma un lugar central. Para aquél que ha progresado espirih1almente tanto en quehaceres como en pensamientos, estos "métodos" (upaya) se convierten en herramientas de una compasión que todo lo abarca y todo lo comprende. Otro de los temas es la dedicación del mérito (pul).ya). El mérito es la base sobre la que se construye el discernimiento. El aspirante debe esforzarse en acumularlo y una vez obtenido, entregarlo a otro: el que renuncia al mérito lo adquiere. Y al renunciar a él lo transfiere a otros seres para ayudarlos en su búsqueda del despertar." https://budismolibre.org/docs/libros_budistas/Arnau_Juan%20_La_Palabra_Frente_Al_Vacio.pdf
* Talidad o Asi -
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prajnaparamita#Tath%C4%81t%C4%81
* Talidad o Así ??o Semejitud?? - "La esencia es aquello por lo cual la realidad es tal (talidad), y al mismo tiempo es real de modo trascendente (ente como realidad existente)."
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esencia
* is talitas a real word?
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/talitas
* calidad = Esta sustitución de la οὐσία por el τί, de la substantia por el quid, trastoca todo el sistema categorial aristotélico y, en consecuencia, todo lo relativo a la Seinsfrage. Al proyectarse la palabra con su fuerza demiúrgica sobre el «algo», ya sea o ya no sea (ya exista como los cuerpos, ya sub-sista o in-sista como los incorporales, ya no-exista como las quimeras), lo que importa no es ya el grado de ser (grado de luz), como en Platón, ni el modo de atribución (forma de la palabra, de ser dicho), como en Aristóteles, sino el matiz, el cómo. Lo que importa es lo idiomático —el λόγος es la fuente de todo idioma—, lo que constituye al individuo, la singularidad. Lo que importa no es el ser sino las maneras de ser. Tenemos en los estoicos lo que podemos llamar un manierismo metafísico. De ahí que en ese trastrueque sean dos las categorías que adquieren una importancia central: la categoría de cualidad (ποιότης) y la categoría de relación (πρός τι). Para entender el alcance del planteamiento agustiniano sobre el idipsum, nos interesa ahora —dejando a un lado la categoría de relación, cuya profunda huella ha marcado la doctrina trinitaria de San Agustín— hacer un conciso acotamiento de la categoría de cualidad. La cualidad (ποιότης) es, para los estoicos, algo más que un accidente que depende de una sustancia a la que afecta de una forma adjetiva; es una cualidad constituyente, sustantiva, que se apodera del sujeto y lo transforma, que se identifica con el modo de ser integral del individuo; es la expresión de la fuerza del λόγος que toma la materia y la domina, la captura, la maneja, le da forma de sujeto. Por eso al sujeto conformado por ese lógos-cualidad lo llaman los estoicos τὸ ἐκτόν, es decir, lo cogido, lo capturado. La ποιότης, como categoría del matiz como intensio, constituye la singularidad, la idiocia, que no ha de confundirse con la particularidad, que junto a la generalidad perteneciente al campo de la extensio. Es por lo tanto el principio de individuación, constituyente de la hecceidad o talidad irreductible a una sustancia común o específica; es la categoría que confiere a todo ser, desde la piedra hasta el hombre, pero sobre todo a este —en el caso de San Agustín también y sobre todo al idipsum—, su idiosincrasia propia, su proprium, que no es ni lo general ni lo particular,
* José Ferrater Mora - redux: <Calambur>: Hola a todos: Hoy la canícula ha decidido complicarme la vida… Me encontré por primera vez con la palabra “talidad” en el contexto que cito abajo (el énfasis es mío). Aparte de lo que signifique o deje de significar el texto en sí, la palabra está explicada por el autor. Así que no busco el significado. (A mí me hizo pensar en el antónimo de “otredad”, término al cual he ido acostumbrándome, aunque sea para usar en broma. Pero esto es una cosa mía.) --- Mi pregunta es si alguno de ustedes reconoce ese término, si lo ha visto en uso (y en tal caso, dónde y cuándo), o si se trata de una palabra “nueva”. (Me sorprende que ya esté en el DRAE.) Contexto: Un derecho fundamental es un derecho sustancial, concierne al meollo de los medios (derechos) para asegurar los fines existenciales del hombre y su dignidad; ahora bien, recordemos que la sustancia es la resultante de la unión de la materia “prima” o “primera” con la “forma” (teoría hilemórfica); la “forma” es lo que determina la esencia de una cosa, su “talidad”*. La “forma” es el “acto” de la materia, es lo que la define, le da su fisonomía, es el principio de especificación, es el fundamento de la diferencia específica que hace a la esencia de una cosa, que la hace ser lo que es; en cambio, la materia es el principio de individuación. * La “talidad” es la condición “de tal” con las determinaciones que caracterizan a algo o a alguien. La “talidad” afecta a todos los principios constitutivos del ser de modo conjunto. Fuente: “Las instituciones, el orden público, los derechos y las garantías. Reflexiones a partir del debido proceso adjetivo”, por Julio Conte Grand, artículo publicado en EL DERECHO – 60 AÑOS, Bs. As., octubre de 2022. --- Muchas gracias a todos por el tiempo usado en la lectura y por cualquier comentario que deseen aportar. <Artifacs>: Nunca había visto esa palabra. Si lo hubiera hecho creo que tampoco la habría asociado a la cualidad de tal. No creo que se usara mucho en el pasado. Un saludo. <Señor K>: Yo tampoco la conocía. Si me preguntaran, pensaría que al escritor le faltó escribir el "to" para "totalidad". <jilar>: Primera vez <Rocko!>: Desconocido por aquí. <Mister Draken>: Aparece en el Diccionario de Filosofía de José Ferrater Mora. En la entrada "tal/talidad" pone: Lo que caracteriza todo "ser tal" puede llamarse "talidad". Zubiri ha indicado que si "la esencia es aquello que hace que lo real sea 'tal' como es", la esencia será esencia por lo pronto "en el orden de la talidad" (Sobre la esencia, 1962, pág. 357). Ahora bien, la talidad no es, según Zubiri, una determinación categorial en el sentido corriente. No puede serlo, porque lo que caracteriza formalmente la esencia de una cosa son sus notas en cuanto "notas-de", y estas "notas-de" son a la vez el "contenidode". Este "contenido-de" es, dice Zubiri, "la talidad de las notas". Las notas "talifican", lo cual no quiere decir determinar un sujeto por tal nota, sino "conferir tal contenido a un sistema por ser 'nota-de'" (ibid., pág. 359). <jilar>: Calambur, a los filósofos hay que echarles de comer aparte. ;) Sí, acabo de ver ese tema. No te martirices. :) Mañana a alguno se le ocurrirá hablar de "cosidad", "comoidad", "dondeidad" "porqueidad", etc... :D <Mister Draken>: Cosidad ya se usa. Y también "haecceidad" y "quididad". <Calambur>: :D:D:D Eso, eso, fuera bichos. ¡Que me parto! <lagartija68>: Todos esos términos fueron inventados por filósofos medievales, primero en latín. No se quejen de talidad, si usan cualidad, calidad y cantidad, que tuvo un proceso de formación similar. Sólo que talidad hizo menos carrera <Calambur>: Un médico por aquí, por favor... O una farmacia de turno... (Me da igual.) (¡Exijo mi bidón de Reliverán!:mad:) Convengamos, mi estimado vecino Lagartija, en que "talidad", si alguna vez se usó, ha perdido vigencia. ¿O vos la oíste alguna vez en cualquier café del rioba, o de Corrientes...?:confused: Saludos._ <lagartija68>: Sólo digo que así como del pronombre qualis,-e (cuál) surgió qualitas, y de allí los sustantivos abstractos castellanos cualidad y calidad (y lo mismo pasó con quantus, -a, -um y quantitas), de talis (tal) surgió talitas y de allí talidad. Unos términos tuvieron más suerte que otros en pasar al lenguaje extrafilosófico.
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# PORTUGUESA
* Talidade - Master Thiền Thích Nhất Hạnh wrote: "People often consider walking on water or air a miracle. But I think the real miracle is not walking on water or air, but walking on land. Every day we are surrounded by a miracle that we do not even recognize: a blue sky, white clouds, green leaves, the black, curious eyes of a child - our own eyes. Everything is a miracle." [ 29 ] and that "In the unenlightened state, however, what we take as our world of reality is only the world of discrimination ( vikalpa ), which manifests on the basis of tathata. In this world of discrimination, subject and object, representation and name are revealed. But by penetrating these ideas by skillful means, we return to the world of tathata and true wisdom. This does not imply the disappearance of the world of phenomena. What disappears is discrimination-imagination. The world of phenomena is revealed in true wisdom without being veiled by vikalpa. The world of phenomena is only one with the world of tathata, in the same way that waves cannot be separated from water." [ 30 ]
quididad, quiddidad, la esencia, la ousía / Quididade, essência, "o que é", que-idade

* la Ousía: Aristoteles, y Lacan: Aristóteles, en su tratado lógico Categorías (2a11-19) caracteriza la sustancia (ousía) de la siguiente manera: La substancia, en el sentido más propio, primario y profundo de la palabra es aquello que ni se predica de un sujeto, ni está presente en un sujeto, por ejemplo, un hombre o un caballo individual.15​ Otra tradición hermenéutica, que se apoya en la lectura del libro Z de la Metafísica, establece que oὐσία no es sustancia, sino «lo que es primero», en tres órdenes: lógico, del conocimiento, y del tiempo. En el orden lógico porque en el enunciado de cada cosa es requisito que esté presente el enunciado de la oὐσία; en el orden epistémico porque se cree conocer cada cosa solo cuando se sabe cuál es su oὐσία. En el orden del tiempo porque ningún predicado puede existir separado de la oὐσία. De esto se desprende que la oὐσία es aquello que antes, ahora y siempre se ha buscado, y que siempre será objeto de aporía o perplejidad. Las conclusiones del libro Z apuntan a comprender por oὐσία a la forma o causa formal, de manera que la pregunta verdadera no es la que corresponde a la sustancia «¿por qué X es X?», sino «¿por qué en X se da Y?». A partir de estas conclusiones de Aristóteles, oὐσία es la representación del en-sí de las realidades individuales sensibles, que hace que sean lo que realmente son.16​ Como premisa, esta lectura tiene una especial interpretación en el psicoanálisis, que se expresará como el S1 de Jacques Lacan. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustancia_(Aristóteles)#Ousía
* quidditativas - Puede hablarse según Zubiri de esencias constitutivas (entitativas) y esencias quidditativas (definitorias) pero su diferencia no consiste en que unas sean realizaciones numéricas y las otras unidades comunes abstractas. La diferencia se produce dentro del mismo ejemplar numérico, pues las esencias quidditativas son, desde el punto de vista físico, momentos de las esencias constitutivas. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esencia
* nescioquid, quid vs quod - Dicho en otras palabras, si el “Yo-sé-qué” de alguna manera condensa la tradición especulativa de una filosofía de poco movimiento que ha buscado producir una constatación amalgamada entre el ser y las cosas remitiéndolas a un dominio de leyes generales y universales; el “Yo-no-sé-qué”, en cambio, es una noción hibridada de dubitaciones que busca más humilde y simplemente “acercarse a las cosas que son”, en su manifestación singular. Así, incrustado implícitamente en el nescioquid del ser, el “Yo-no-sé-qué” nos permitiría acceder al “hecho general de que una cosa exista”, realizando este movimiento a través de una entre-visión y no por recurso a dar cuenta de las condiciones de su confirmación. Es el quod y no el quid quien marca aquí el hecho de ser – nos recuerda Jankélévitch. Tal como nos explica en el primer tomo de su trilogía acerca de Le Je-ne-sais-quoi et le Presque-rien (1980), “(…) el nescioquid es la verdadera quoddidad del quid ; este impalpable, vacío de todo contenido asignable, no es entonces nunca entrevisto más que en un relampagueo : como acontecimiento o aparición”.[29] La intuición permite saber el quod sin conocer el quid, dirá Jankélévitch.[31] El recurso a indicar esta oposicionalidad quod.quid de la cosa a la hora de hacer referencia a los objetos de conocimiento, reinscrita como tensión paradojal en la escritura de V. Jankélévitch, viene a subrayar la existencia inapagable de cierta “simpatía parpadeante”, según sus propias palabras, que vincula, tal como lo habilita la formulación del “Casi-nada”, la afirmación de un simple “hay” (“il y a”) minando el suelo cierto del “hay algo”, o, literalmente, del “hay alguna cosa” (“il y a quelque chose”), ya descrito precedentemente. La “ « quoddidad » de la cosa” –acorde a su propia expresión– reenvía a la cuestión de la “totalidad”, a esta suerte de “organicidad” –que, según Bergson– es propia a todas las cosas del mundo, terreno donde la posibilidad del instante y de un saber intuitivo se plantea y se renueva constantemente. El quid, en cambio, intenta representar una suerte de momento posterior: es “la cosa” que circunscribo ya haciendo la experiencia misma de su conocimiento. Finalmente, la intuición tendrá lugar en el seno del quod del “Yo-no-sé-qué”, allí ocurrirá siempre como acto primero de una gnosis-a-medias que no podrá nunca ser totalmente completada. Esta pieza clave del pensamiento de Jankélévitch aparece siempre bajo un aspecto “transitivo”; no tiene materialidad por fuera de este tiempo. Es el dominio de lo intuitivo el que permite entonces asir esta contrariedad y esta completitud: tal como desarrollamos, es el acto que se da “inmediatamente”, casi sin distancia, en el instante mismo, a la vez que conserva siempre la “potencia” de una totalidad atmosférica, englobadora de todos los posibles. [29] Ibíd., p. 26. “…le nescioquid est la vraie quoddité du quid ; cet impalpable, vide de tout contenu asignable, n’est donc jamais entr’aperçu que dans un éclair : comme événement ou apparition.” Traducción propia. https://www.redalyc.org/journal/288/28852687003/html/
* Y como aquello por lo cual una cosa se constituye en su propio género o especie es lo que significa por la definición, la cual indica lo que es la cosa [quid est res], de aquí se deriva que el nombre de esencia ha sido mudado por los filósofos en el nombre de “quididad”. Y esto es lo que el Filósofo [Aristóteles] – en el Libro VII de Metafísica – llama frecuentemente “quod quid erat esse” o sea: esto por lo cual tiene que ser algo. - Santo Tomás de Aquino / Aquinus Del ente y de la esencia. Libro I.
* chatgpt nonsense: ??Quéidad??
* QUIDDITATIVA. La que explica la esséncia de la cosa por sus predicados, y partes essenciales: uno, en que conviene con las demás; y otro, en que se diferencia de ellas: y assí consta de género y diferéncia https://apps.rae.es/DA_DATOS/TOMO_III_HTML/DEFINICIÓN_000810.html
* Varios filósofos árabes usa­ron el vocablo Māhiyya para traducir la ex­presión aristotélica τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, a la cual nos hemos referido en el artículo Esencia, pues dicha expresión aristotélica significa li­teralmente «lo que era antes de haber sido» o «el que era un ser», y esta significación es la misma que la significación de ‘esencia’, o por lo menos de uno de los modos de entender ‘esencia’. Los árabes introdujeron otros tér­minos para lo que nosotros llamamos ‘esen­cia’ o algunos modos de ser esencia; así, por ejemplo, Huwiyya (que se ha traducido por «ipseidad», ipseitas), Anniyya (que corres­ponde más o menos a lo que se ha llamado haecceidad, haecceitas), Sūra (que corres­ponde i forma), etc. De todos los términos usados al respecto, los que nos interesan más aquí son el ya citado Māhiyya y Haqīqa. Am­bos han sido tomados como equivalentes a lo que los escolásticos latinos llamaron quidditas, pero Several Arabic philosophers used the word Māhiyya to translate the Aristotelian expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, to which we have referred in the article Essence, for such Aristotelian expression literally means “that which was before it was” or “that which was a being », and this signification is the same as the signification of 'essence', or at least of one of the modes of understanding 'essence'. The Arabs introduced other terms for what we call ‘essence’ or some modes of being essence; thus, for instance, Huwiyya (which has been translated by «ipseity», ipseitas), Anniyya (which corresponds more or less to what has been called haecceity, haecceitas), Sūra (which corresponds to i form), etc. Of all the terms used in this regard, the ones that interest us most here are the already cited Māhiyya and Haqīqa. Both have been taken as equivalent to what Latin scholastics called quidditas, but https://www.diccionariodefilosofia.es/es/diccionario/l/3300-quiddidad.html
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# PT
* Na filosofia escolástica, "quididade" (latim: quidditas)[1] era outro termo para a essência de um objeto, literalmente seu "o que é".
* que-idade https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quididade https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talidade
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haecceidad, aecceidad / haecceidade, isso-idade

* aecceidad - A 50 años de El Anti-Edipo.pdf ¿El siglo será deleuziano o guattariano? Nolo hoc saeculum nemini. ¿No seguirá este siglo siendo monárquico-hegeliano aún cuando se disfrace de deleuziano, guattariano, foucaultiano, aún cuando aquí y allá se emplacen apologías de la diferencia, la multiplicidad, el rizoma, la aecceidad, la singularidad, la caosmosis, la ecosofía, la revolución molecular y micro-física?
* chatgpt: ??Estoicidad or Estidad??
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# PT
* Haecceidade (do latim, "isso-idade") https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talidade
* MOINOTES: conflict? ISSO means that more than this? - does isso also mean this? CHATGPTSLOP: Yes, "isso" can sometimes mean "this" in Portuguese, depending on the context. Generally, "isso" is used to refer to something close to the listener but not the speaker. However, in conversational contexts, it can be used similarly to how "this" is used in English. Here’s how it works: "Isso": Refers to something near the listener. Example: "Isso é interessante." (This/That is interesting.) For things closer to the speaker, you would use "isto": "Isto": Refers to something near the speaker. Example: "Isto é meu." (This is mine.)
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quodidad, quoddidad / Quodidade
* MOITHOUGHT - ??"Allidad"/"Aquellidad/Ese-idad"?? Ese-idad vs Eseidad vs aecceidad

* OU A PROXIMIDADE DO INAPREENSÍVEL JOÃO M.pdf Quodidade» («le grand mystére de la Quoddité»14) não é uma ordem de inteligibilidade, mas um puro acto, eventual, de estar vindo a ser. Desta forma ..
* And if this is what it means to live, then dying is the pinnacle—not the conclusion—of the absurd. ('Absurdity' is what the translator literally renders.) Because neither survival nor annihilation (or 'nihilization') makes death meaningful in this endless forward flight that is life. In the first case, neither palingenesis nor panbiotism considers me—only my 'quoddity'—when speaking of survival. That is to say, the transmigratory or undifferentiated immortality they advocate treats individuals as interchangeable, analogous, and disregards my 'impenetrable haecceity,' my 'irreducible monad,' my 'ontic identity,' and my 'tautousia.' In other words, they neither resurrect nor eternalize Don Miguel with his Unamuno and his Jugo, as he feared. In the second case, there is no reason for what is to cease to be, so death, in addition to being absurd, appears as a terrible injustice and a sarcasm against being. Or because what has been cannot cease to have been, making death impossible despite everything—because, despite everything, the fact of having lived is eternal: 'Its irreversibility, which prevents resurrection, also prevents annihilation.' - Y si esto significa vivir, morir es el colmo, no el final, del absurdo. ('Absurdidez' traduce literalmente el traductor). Porque tanto supervivencia como aniquilación (o 'nihilización') de esa mera huida hacia adelante que es la vida, no tiene sentido la muerte. En el primer caso, porque ni la palingenesia ni la panbiótica piensan en mí, sino sólo en mi 'quoddidad', cuando hablan de pervivencia; es decir, la inmortalidad transmigratoria o indiferenciada que defienden considera a los individuos intercambiables, análogos, y hace poco caso de mi 'haecceidad impenetrable', 'mónada irreductible', 'identidad óntica' y 'tautousía'; vamos, que no resucitan ni eternizan a Don Miguel con su Unamuno y su Jugo, como él temía. En el segundo, porque no hay razón para que lo que es deje de ser, de modo que la muerte, además de absurda, aparece como una terrible injusticia y sarcasmo al ser; o porque lo que ha sido no puede no haber sido, de modo que la muerte es imposible, a pesar de todo, porque, a pesar de todo, el haber vivido es eterno: 'Su irreversibilidad, que es lo que impide su resurreción, impide asimismo su aniquilación'.
https://www.smry.ai/proxy?url=https://elpais.com/diario/2002/05/25/babelia/1022282229_850215.html
* Presentimiento de la ciudad fronteriza (sobre la Politeia de Platón).pdf - Aristóteles se acercó a ello al designar aquello (tode ti) que constituye el ser singular en el cual toda “sustancia” afinca e inhiere. La escuela de Duns Scoto llamó haecceitas al concepto que de ello puede desprenderse. Schelling lo denominó quoddidad (como contraposición a la esencia, quididad). Eso es aquello que, en cada variación de sí, o en toda recreación, se recrea en el modo de ideas, formas, símbolos; o arquetipos; a eso lo llamo ser del límite, que se singulariza radicalmente siempre en una existencia. Quizás sea en el arte donde esa singularización comparece, para decirlo con Nietzsche, del modo “más transparente”. Pero aquí el arte interviene como óptica de la concepción filosófica y ontológica: como fenómeno originario que descubre una dimensión del ser y del sentido de carácter primero y fundamental. Y es que en Goethe ese Urphaenomen se encarnaba siempre en singularidades específicas que permitían hacerlo visible y palpable. Frente a lo que suponía Schiller, ese fenómeno, siempre en perpetua transformación, según el imperativo del “muere y transfórmate” (del poema Divina Nostalgia del Diván Oriental-Occidental), no era Idea Separada sino Idea encarnada (y simbólica) revelada aquí, o ahí, en un existente en devenir, susceptible de ser experimentado. Pero esa singularidad, que el arte permite descubrir, sirve de hecho para componer una ontología y una topología, o una filosofía primera, en la que eso que siempre se varía y recrea, y que se determina según Ideas y Formas, y a través de Símbolos, y en consecuencia de Arquetipos vivientes, eso sea siempre un singular (sensible y en devenir); un singular existente, o viviente; un singular potencialmente inteligente (y libre); un singular que se recrea y varía; y que puede recrearse en virtud del gozne o la bisagra que permite esa activación o giro, o ese principio general de transformación y variación; a ese gozne, a esa bisagra, concebida en términos filosóficos, la llamo Límite (y ser del Límite). De hecho lo que en el Límite se recrea es un ser (sensible, singular, en devenir): un ser del límite que a través de Ideas y Símbolos puede hacerse accesible a la comprensión; al sentido.
* “quodidade” - É em torno e a partir do mistério do tempo que se organiza e configura a metafísica jankélévitchiana. Para Jankélévitch, a verdadeira “filosofia primeira” não é essencialista nem substancialista, ou seja, não pretende indagar o “quid” do que existe, nem visa um substrato resistente ao devir. A metafísica dirige-se ao “quod”, à pura efetividade, ao simples “facto de ser” sempre originário e último. Visa o horizonte metempírico, metalógico e infinitesimal dum “je-ne-sais-quoi” que é um “presque-rien”, porquanto tanto a “quodidade” do que é, quanto a “ipseidade” da pessoa humana estão para além da lógica da predicação solidária da ontologia da substância. O “tempo”, pensado como emergência e irreversibilidade, fulguração do instante e devir é, simultaneamente, a dimensão por excelência do “quodidativo” e o paradigma do “nescio quid”. “O tempo é o objeto por excelência da filosofia”, afirma Jankélévitch (Jankélévitch 1987, p. 28). Não se trata, porém, de um objeto, mas de um “não sei-quê”. Imponderável, impalpável e invisível, trata-se de um “quase-nada” que é, paradoxalmente, tudo: “o tempo é consubstancial ao nosso pensamento, à nossa existência, a todos os nossos atos, ele é a carne da nossa carne, a nossa essência invisível” (Jankélévitch, 1987, p. 33). O tempo é “aquilo que não existe nem subsiste e é, no entanto, a única substancialidade do ser”; dizendo de outro modo, o “devir”, alternância perpétua de ser e não ser, é o “modo de ser do ser” (Jankélévitch, 1980(a), p. 33; p. 43). Assim fica enunciada a centralidade da questão do tempo no prisma “meontológico” da metafísica de Jankélévitch. Trata-se de uma nova “filosofia primeira”, metalógica e metempírica, que procura “fazer o luto de toda a consciência substancial em geral” e ser a “ciência nesciente” que, numa despojada entrevisão, visa surpreender a “quodidade” do que vem ao ser, mas não subsiste. .. O tempo não se pode confundir com os “contadores sociais” (os relógios e calendários), com os movimentos e ritmos no tempo, com as transformações orgânicas que balizam as idades da vida ou sequer com a sucessão dos acontecimentos que preenchem a história (Jankélévitch, 1980(b), p. 91; idem, 1987, p. 32-33). Através do esquecimento, da perda da ocasião, da mutação ou do diferimento temporal próprio do aparecer da realidade, tensa entre a essência e a aparência, o tempo é a dimensão privilegiada da méconnaissance. Mais do que isso, ele é “o méconnaissable por excelência”. “O tempo não é uma coisa, mas um quase-nada” simultaneamente controvertível e inegável, difuso, mas absolutamente evidente. Esta contradição faz dele uma fonte inesgotável de mal-entendidos. Jankélévitch retoma a pergunta célebre de Santo Agostinho “quid est tempus?”. Ora, não podemos responder ao pronome interrogativo “quid?”, como também não podemos saber o que é Deus ou dizer o que é a morte; mas podemos constatar a certeza ontológica do quod aquém e para além de toda a predicação quididativa (Jankélévitch, 1980(b), p. 91-92). A noção de “não-sei-quê” (je-ne-sais-quoi), em Jankélévitch, visa e indica a “quodidade”, ou seja, a pura efetividade do que é e escapa às determinações de essência e natureza; quer dizer, o puro facto de ser na sua unicidade e inefabilidade. Aplica-se aos “mistérios concretos” de cuja especificidade é de existir e “fazer existir”, mas que nenhuma predicação esgota ou torna objetiva, que nenhum discurso pode cercar e exaurir: Deus, a liberdade, o charme, a alma, a morte, o tempo, entre outros. O tempo, sob a dupla forma do devir e do instante “é o não-sei-quê por excelência” (Jankélévitch, 1980(a), p. 77). O tempo é aquilo de que experienciamos o quod sem conhecer o quid, como efetividade pura: um inexprimível “Il y a” que devém, advém, sobrevém na forma continuada do devir e na forma instantânea do acontecer. O tempo é uma espécie de evidência fundante que se esvanece assim que a olhamos diretamente: nunca detemos a sua “quididade” e a sua “quodidade” num mesmo momento. O tempo, uma vez reificado e conceptualizado, perde-se como tal. Em vez da duração, do devir ou do instante, somente nos restam os conteúdos imóveis, análogos a coisas, ou um “conteúdo que é a dimensão formal das coisas”. “Ninguém pode, portanto, sinceramente pretender pensar o tempo”, afirma Jankélévitch (Jankélévitch, 1980(a), p. 78). Aquele que crê fazê-lo pensa em acontecimentos, ritmos e movimentos, mas não na “ipseidade do tempo”, pois, “do mesmo modo que não podemos dizer o que o é o Ser, o Ser sendo ele-próprio o universal atributo de todos os sujeitos, não podemos visar o devir” (Jankélévitch, 1980(a), p. 78). Nos três momentos do tempo vivemos sempre a não coincidência da determinação quididativa e da efetividade quodidativa. O facto do tempo é imediatamente vivido: experiência da qual não se pode fazer doutrina. A recordação ou a expectativa apenas nos dão o quid sem o quod ou o quod sem o quid. Só no advir presente, no instante do acontecer se dá essa coincidência, sob a forma duma ínfima centelha faiscante da qual, no fundo, jamais somos contemporâneos. Dá-se no “presque-rien” de uma aparição de imediato desaparecida, que se entrevê para logo se perder. .. A irreversibilidade dá-se, assim, numa “continuidade infinita”, na velocidade constante e imperturbável da futurição quodidativa. O curso dos acontecimentos e o ritmo da existência podem ser alterados, acelerados, travados, imobilizados, mas não o tempo metafísico e a sua irreversível temporalidade, regular, uniforme e implacável. Não há regresso, paragens, travagens ou acelerações possíveis na “velocidade imóvel do tempo” que igualiza todas as velocidades e as mantém inflexivelmente na direção do futuro. Jankélévitch fala, por isso, numa “velocidade nula e infinita”, lenta e veloz, inexpugnável e incansável (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 41-42). .. O autor reconhece que a consciência, enquanto consciência do irreversível é simultaneamente prospetiva e retrospetiva, que não é pura “consciência pontual ou instantânea”. Sem a vivência concreta de uma certa “duração” feita de permanência e inovação, de retenção e fluência, não haveria irreversibilidade, mas plena coincidência num presente sempre instantâneo (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 61). Por outro lado, a filosofia jankélévitchiana, valorizando o “fazer ser” e o “vir ao ser” face ao “ser” substantivado e estacionário, privilegiando a emergência irruptivamente fecunda face à continuidade estável do intervalo, redunda numa metafísica instantaneísta e meontológica. O instante Ŕ quase nada e instância não subsistente, “híbrido de ser e o não ser” Ŕ é a expressão punctiforme do devir que é a “intenção do ser” (Jankélévitch, 1980(a), p. 30; idem, 1985, p. 160). Jankélévitch diz-nos que o instante “é a única forma sob a qual o absoluto é revelado a uma criatura” (Jankélévitch, 1985, p. 242). Fala-nos da “espessa, [...] intensiva e fervente plenitude de eternidade” próprias do instante (Jankélévitch, 1938, p. 205). Não se trata de uma mera fracção da duração, ponto matemático na linearidade horizontal, mas do que Isabelle de Montmollin designa por uma “instante plenitude”, de inscrição vertical (Bergson, 2000, p. 204) expressando um absoluto da existência: a fulguração do tempo e da eternidade. Na verdade, o instante realiza emergência criativa do tempo e, para, além disso, a irrevogabilidade metempírica da sua advinda quodidade Ŕ o facto de ter sido Ŕ que é inextinguível. .. Na experiência não subsistente do instante há tanto a repentinidade da sua emergência como a gradualidade da sua erosão. Aos poucos, o acontecer do instante semelfactivo parece quase irreal, dele restando apenas a sua inapagável “quodidade”, ou seja, o facto absolutamente nu de ter acontecido. Não é possível estancar este fluxo irreversível de instantes primúltimos. Não há segunda-vez da primeira, pelo que nada se pode reviver, repetir, confirmar ou recomeçar (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 49-50). É sempre um outro instante e uma outra ocorrência, inédita e única, que se vive sempre no sentido da imparável futurição. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, “a quodidade do instante, quer dizer, o facto de o instante ter uma vez existido (fuisse) é irrevogável e inexterminável” (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 50-51). É tão óbvia a impossibilidade de reviver efetivamente e carnalmente o passado quanto é evidente a impossibilidade de refazer ou repetir algo no futuro. Mesmo sem nenhuma diferença qualitativa, indiscernível do precedente e intercambiável, a “mera secundariedade ordinal na sucessão” de um acontecimento confirma já a sucessão e anula a verdadeira repetição (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 59). A irreversibilidade e a primultimidade afetam os instantes, mas banais do devir, independentemente da sua importância objetiva. O autor defende que a “nostalgia” confirma esse paradoxo. Contrariamente ao que poderíamos crer, a irreversibilidade mais característica não é a dos acontecimentos excepcionais ou solenes, das datas históricas e memoráveis. Na verdade, os factos sensacionais ou gloriosamente semelfactivos Ŕ revestem-se de um significado normativo ou objetivo que, de algum modo, os subtrai às contingências da primultimidade. Pelo contrário, os factos mais anódinos da banalidade quotidiana, as coisas insignificantes, nas entranhas da história, são aquelas que melhor encarnam o irreversível e a correspondente nostalgia. Face à pura irreversibilidade deste tempo pulsátil feito de uma miríade de instantes sucessivos, surge a pura e imotivada nostalgia: “o lamento lamenta a passeidade do passado”, ou seja o “puro e simples facto de ser passado” (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 54-55). Ela está, portanto, aquém e para além das razões objetivas para lamentar. O que está em jogo é o “paradoxo derisório” duma “causalidade circular que consiste em lamentar o passado simplesmente porque é passado”, fora de qualquer axiologia e mesmo de toda a etiologia (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 56). Na verdade, “é esta forma pura e nua da passeidade”, é esta quodidade do tempo que é o elemento não reiterável e o irreversível por excelência comum a todos os momentos do pretérito (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 57). A nostalgia não é, desta forma, um “comprazimento fútil”, mas uma “deleitação séria”: um “sentimento de infinita incompletude” ante o “ter sido”, o “ter feito” ou “ter acontecido” irreversíveis, mas também ante a impossibilidade de acumular passado e presente numa mesma vivência. Há um lamento e decepção inapagáveis inerentes ao irreversível. Nenhuma memória ou reiteração nos devolve a ipseidade dessa vez única e irrepetível em toda a eternidade: “falta o não sei quê, um quase nada que é tudo; apenas falta o essencial”, deficit impossível de localizar e colmatar (Jankélévitch, 1983, p. 69). .. A morte destrói a totalidade do ser humano, “mas ela não pode niilizar o facto de ter vivido”. Só a “quodidade” do ser humano Ŕ “não-sei-quê” impalpável e invisível Ŕ é permanente, definitiva, eterna. O facto de ter existido é inexterminável Ŕ a irrevogabilidade da quodidade é a última “esperança dos mortais”. A “única vida eterna” reside no “facto indelével de ter existido” e é uma “dádiva da morte à pessoa viva” (Jankélévitch, 1966, p. 415). Assim como o devir consagrava a irrevogabilidade de cada instante, único em toda a eternidade, ele sela, de igual modo, o “grande instante” que constitui cada vida humana. A única e primúltima aparição-desaparecente de cada ipseidade é, ela mesma, irrevogável: trata- se de um “instante eterno”. A imensidão da história pode soterrá-la no esquecimento, mas jamais niilizá-la: “o facto de ter vivido uma vida efémera é um facto eterno”. Por isso, Jankélévitch conclui que “o mistério da niilização é, paradoxalmente, a nossa esperança” (Jankélévitch, 1966, p. 416; 418). The metaphysics of Jankélévitch revolves around and is organized around the mystery of time. For Jankélévitch, the true "first philosophy" is neither essentialist nor substantialist; in other words, it does not aim to investigate the "quid" of what exists, nor does it seek a substratum resistant to becoming. Metaphysics addresses the "quod," the pure actuality, the simple "fact of being" that is always both original and ultimate. It aims at the metempirical, metalogical, and infinitesimal horizon of a "je-ne-sais-quoi" (I-don't-know-what), a "presque-rien" (almost-nothing), since both the "quodity" of what is and the "ipseity" of the human person lie beyond the logic of predication tied to the ontology of substance. Time, conceived as emergence and irreversibility, the flash of the instant and becoming, is simultaneously the dimension par excellence of the "quoditative" and the paradigm of the "nescio quid" (I know not what). "Time is the object par excellence of philosophy," Jankélévitch asserts (1987, p. 28). Yet it is not an object but a "je-ne-sais-quoi," intangible, impalpable, and invisible—an "almost nothing" that is, paradoxically, everything: "time is consubstantial with our thought, our existence, all our actions; it is the flesh of our flesh, our invisible essence" (1987, p. 33). Time is "that which neither exists nor subsists and yet is the only substantiality of being"; put differently, becoming—the perpetual alternation of being and non-being—is the "mode of being of being" (1980(a), p. 33; p. 43). Thus, the centrality of the question of time is articulated within the "meontological" prism of Jankélévitch's metaphysics. It is a new "first philosophy," metalogical and metempirical, that seeks to "mourn all substantial consciousness in general" and be the "unknowing science" that, in a stripped-down glimpse, aims to grasp the "quodity" of what comes into being but does not subsist. Time cannot be confused with "social counters" (clocks and calendars), movements and rhythms in time, the organic transformations marking life's stages, or even the succession of events that fill history (1980(b), p. 91; 1987, p. 32–33). Through forgetting, the loss of opportunity, mutation, or the temporal deferral inherent to the appearance of reality—tense between essence and appearance—time becomes the privileged dimension of **méconnaissance** (misrecognition). More than that, it is "the unrecognizable par excellence." "Time is not a thing, but an almost-nothing"—simultaneously disputable and undeniable, diffuse yet utterly evident. This contradiction makes it an inexhaustible source of misunderstanding. Jankélévitch revisits Augustine's famous question, "quid est tempus?" (What is time?). However, we cannot answer the interrogative pronoun "quid?" just as we cannot know what God is or define what death is. But we can acknowledge the ontological certainty of the "quod"—both below and beyond all "quiditative" predication (1980(b), p. 91–92). The notion of "je-ne-sais-quoi" in Jankélévitch points to and indicates "quodity," that is, the pure actuality of what is and escapes determinations of essence and nature: the pure fact of being in its uniqueness and ineffability. This applies to "concrete mysteries," whose specificity lies in existing and "making exist," but which no predication exhausts or objectifies, and which no discourse can enclose or deplete: God, freedom, charm, the soul, death, time, among others. Time, in its dual forms of becoming and the instant, "is the je-ne-sais-quoi par excellence" (1980(a), p. 77). Time is that which we experience as "quod" without knowing the "quid," as pure actuality: an inexpressible "il y a" (there is) that becomes, arises, and transpires continuously in the form of becoming and instantaneously in the form of happening. Time is a kind of foundational evidence that vanishes as soon as we look at it directly: we never grasp its "quiditative" and "quoditative" aspects simultaneously. Once reified and conceptualized, time is lost as such. Instead of duration, becoming, or the instant, we are left only with fixed contents analogous to things, or a "content that is the formal dimension of things." "No one can, therefore, sincerely claim to think time," Jankélévitch asserts (1980(a), p. 78). Whoever believes they are thinking time is actually thinking about events, rhythms, and movements but not the "ipseity of time," because, "just as we cannot say what Being is—Being itself being the universal attribute of all subjects—we cannot aim at becoming" (1980(a), p. 78). Through all three temporal moments, we always experience the non-coincidence of "quiditative" determination and "quoditative" actuality. The fact of time is immediately lived—a kind of experience from which no doctrine can be derived. Memory or expectation gives us either the "quid" without the "quod" or the "quod" without the "quid." Only in the present happening, in the instant of occurrence, does this coincidence manifest itself as a fleeting spark—a glimpse that is immediately lost. The irreversibility of time is expressed in an "infinite continuity," in the constant and imperturbable velocity of its quoditative futurity. While the course of events and rhythms of existence can be altered, accelerated, or slowed, metaphysical time and its irreversibly regular, uniform, and implacable temporality remain unchangeable. Jankélévitch speaks of a "null and infinite velocity," simultaneously slow and fast, inexorable and tireless (1983, p. 41–42). The author acknowledges that consciousness, as consciousness of the irreversible, is simultaneously prospective and retrospective, not merely "punctual or instantaneous consciousness." Without the concrete experience of a certain "duration" composed of permanence and innovation, retention and flux, there would be no irreversibility, but rather full coincidence in an ever-instantaneous present (1983, p. 61). By valuing "making be" and "coming into being" over substantivized, stationary "being," and privileging the irruptive fertility of emergence over the stable continuity of intervals, Jankélévitch's metaphysics culminates in an instantaneous and meontological philosophy. The instant—an almost-nothing and non-subsistent instance, a "hybrid of being and non-being"—is the punctiform expression of becoming as the "intention of being" (1980(a), p. 30; 1985, p. 160). Jankélévitch tells us that the instant "is the only form in which the absolute is revealed to a creature" (1985, p. 242). Ultimately, the instant enacts the creative emergence of time and, moreover, the metempirical irrevocability of its quoditative coming-into-being—the fact of having been—which is inextinguishable. While we cannot relive, repeat, or recreate any past moment, each lived instant seals its irrevocable uniqueness for eternity: "the fact of having lived a fleeting life is an eternal fact." For Jankélévitch, the mystery of annihilation paradoxically becomes our hope: "The mystery of annihilation is, paradoxically, our hope" (1966, p. 416; p. 418). https://www.academia.edu/112937802/O_tempo_da_esperan%C3%A7a_em_Gabriel_Marcel_e_Vladimir_Jank%C3%A9l%C3%A9vitch?email_work_card=view-paper
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?cual-idad?dualidad
?ambosidad?
cantidad
* quantidad is not a word
ipseidad / ?autoidad?
ser, eseidad
Solo posteriormente se utilizó también la hipóstasis como sinónimo de Sustancia (en griego ousia). Sin embargo, como muestran los pasajes del texto, hay una diferencia de significado. La hipóstasis denota la manifestación del ser abstracto (literalmente «ser» o «eseidad») que significa ousia, la existencia concreta en la realidad. Así, el comentarista de Aristóteles Alejandro de Afrodisias escribe que la sustancia y la forma difieren según su ser (kat' ousían), pero son inseparables en su existencia (hypostásei) y ocurrencia.4​ https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hipóstasis
cosidad
* persona1: Mañana a alguno se le ocurrirá hablar de "cosidad", "comoidad", "dondeidad" "porqueidad", etc... :D persona2: Cosidad ya se usa. Y también "haecceidad" y "quididad".;;;
https://es.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?search=cosidad
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?aquíidad?

* ??? bundista bundismo https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unión_General_de_Trabajadores_Judíos
?allidad??dondeidad??porqueidad??comoidad?"?el Acercade?" (chatgpt nonsese0?ahoraidad?..
french/italian

qualité quiddité haeccéité quoddité

"la qualité" "la quidditè" "l'haeccéité" "la quoddité"
"la qualità" "la quiddità" "l'haecceità" "la quoddità"
La qualité, l'ainsité, l'ainséité, être-tel / la talità

* Why La qualité?
* ainsité, ainséité https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tathatā ;;; chatgpt nonsense; ainsi-ité, so-ité, talité: A neologism that could be coined for "suchness," combining "so" with the suffix -ité., You’ve got a good intuition! While “talité” isn’t a standard word in French, it can be used in philosophical contexts to capture the essence or intrinsic quality of a thing, similar to “qualité.” Here are a few French words that can express the concept of suchness or as-it-is-ness:
* être-tel v être-là, Sosein vs Dasein - As Schrijver says, "Viewed in this manner, the notions of esse (Dasein, etre-la) and essentia (Sosein, etre-tel)
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la quiddité, l'ousia / la quiddità, il che cosa

* https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eccéité
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l'haeccéité, l'eccéité, le ‘je’ existant / l'haecceità, l'ecceità, questa, questità

* https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eccéité
* https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecceità
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la quoddité / l’“essere di ciò”, la quoddità il Che
* D'après la distinction classique entre la quiddité d'un étant, l'ousia, son essence, ce qu'est l'étant et la quoddité, le pur fait que, son existence, il serait. - According to the classical distinction between the quiddity of a being, the ousia, its essence, what the being is and the quoddity, the pure fact that, its existence, it would be.
* Alla tematica dell’ineffabilità del reale si collega anche l’interesse di Jankélévitch per la tarda filosofia di Schelling, argomento della sua tesi di dottorato. Da Schelling il filosofo francese ricava in particolare la distinzione tra il “Quid” o la “quiddità” (in Schelling “das Was”, “il che cosa”) e il “Quod” o la “quoddità” (in Schelling “das Dass”, “il Che”). Mentre il primo termine indica l’essenza concettualizzabile e quindi esprimibile di una cosa, il secondo sta a significare l’esistenza stessa della cosa, il “fatto che” essa sia, fatto assolutamente gratuito e senza fondamento, in quanto non riconducibile ad una causa “ontica”. In altri termini, si tratta della consapevolezza del fatto che quando definiamo concettualmente una cosa, in realtà la definiamo necessariamente in funzione di ciò che essa non è, ovvero in relazione ad altro da sé; mentre resta preclusa all’analisi concettuale la singolarità unica e irripetibile di quella stessa cosa, per indicare la quale Jankélévitch conia dal latino le espressioni “semelfattività” e “ipseità”. Anche Bergson, del resto, affermava di sperimentare ad ogni istante «la creazione continua d’imprevedibile novità che sembra realizzarsi nell’universo», e definiva l’intuizione come «la simpatia mediante la quale ci si trasporta all’interno di un oggetto per coincidere con ciò che esso ha di unico e, conseguentemente, d’inesprimibile»[5]. https://aduevoci.org/2022/05/13/filosofia-e-musica-in-vladimir-jankelevitch-prima-parte/
* Etienne Gilson- ... la quoddité et à une volonté de reconstruire une métaphysique qui a dégagé ... Maritain, il affirme que dans cette intuition de l‟être décrite par ..."
* la quoddité - In some of these authors, we also find a way of thinking about being that will help Levinas to think about it differently from Heidegger, in particular in Louis Lavelle and Gabriel Marcel. Lavelle, whose Total Presence Levinas lists, defends a philosophy "based on the primitive experience of the "participation" of finite being in absolute being. By this very fact, he gives his spiritualism an ontological character that distinguishes it as much from that of Brunschvicg as from the vitalist spiritualism of Bergson"[17]. The spirit for Lavelle is not identifiable with the intellect, but in an existential perspective as "an act that can only be grasped in its accomplishment"[18] (which would be, to take up a distinction of Jankélévitch, of the order of quoddity and not of quiddity). Being is therefore not something that we contemplate (which supposes separation of the subject from the object) against tradition, but something that we are (such that there is no separation between spectator and spectacle). Gabriel Marcel proposes – the link between Marcel and phenomenology is made by Hering, a professor of Levinas – another way than that of Husserl to do phenomenology. His phenomenology gives a great deal of space to the importance of corporeality (of which we find, J. Hansel emphasizes, the trace in On Escape and “Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”) and to otherness. Marcel denounces the “monadism” and the “solipsism” of the subject of idealism, which lacks, to resolve the aporias, intersubjectivity. Marcel therefore concludes that being oneself comes down to recognizing that one is not sufficient to oneself: Thought is turned towards the other[19].https://www.actu-philosophia.com/joelle-hansel-levinas-avant-la-guerre-une-philosophie-de-levasion/
* la quoddité et à une volonté de reconstruire une métaphysique qui a dégagé ... Maritain, définit comme « appréhension catégoriale i diate ou ate po ...Ravaisson et le problème de la métaphysique
* l’essere di ciò
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tattva
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japanese / mandarin

sonomama kotosei kotosei toiukoto
sonomama, shinnyo / zhenru, Ziran
* Sonomama (as-it-is-ness) https://www.wearehuayruro.com/post/the-paradox-of-sonomama-embracing-as-it-is-ness-for-personal-well-being
* Chinese zhenru 真如 (Japanese, shinnyo) Chinese zhen "true; etc." was used to translate various other Buddhist expressions. Mantra is translated into Chinese as zhenyan 真言 "true words" and the Japanese esoteric Shingon school is 真言宗, the "true word school" or "mantra school." Tathata "thusness, suchness, the unconditioned, unchanging reality" is Chinese zhenru 真如 (Japanese, shinnyo) "true resemblance". It also occurs in the name of the Shinnyo En school. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhenren
*真如 https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hans/真如_(佛教)
* shinnyo 真如 - https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%9C%9F%E5%A6%82
* Sonomama そのまま - https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/そのまま
* Taoism's Ziran = 自然 = self-so = natural spontaneity
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ChatGPT vomit for mandarin suchness:
Mandarin Words for "Suchness"
These terms represent different facets of suchness in Chinese philosophy, particularly influenced by Daoism and Buddhism:
即真 (jí zhēn) - Immediate universal quality: This can refer to the immediate manifestation of truth or reality, emphasizing the direct experience of reality as it is.
如是 (rú shì) - As-it-is-ness: A phrase commonly associated with Buddhism and the Taoist notion of being-in-itself. It represents reality as it truly is, beyond conceptualization.
实有 (shí yǒu) - Being-so qualitas: This term indicates something that exists or is real, often used in Buddhism to describe the true nature of things.
实际 (shí jì) - Reality or actuality: Refers to actual being or existence, often in a metaphysical sense of what is real or actual in contrast to appearances.
真实 (zhēn shí) - Truth or reality: This is a direct term for truth, often used in both Daoist and Buddhist contexts to describe what is true or real in contrast to illusion or falsehood.
实在 (shí zài) - Existence or actuality: Similar to 实际, this term emphasizes the actuality of being, especially as distinct from mere appearance.
实体 (shí tǐ) - Substance or essence: Refers to the substance or essence of something, a term often used in metaphysical discussions of reality.
实际性 (shí jì xìng) - Qualitative reality: This refers to the quality or nature of reality, indicating a more concrete or qualitative aspect of existence.
Scholars and Theorists
Several prominent Chinese scholars and philosophers have contributed to the exploration of suchness, especially in the context of Daoism, Buddhism, and metaphysical discussions:
Zhuangzi (庄子):
Zhuangzi, a Daoist philosopher, emphasizes the fluid and ever-changing nature of reality. His writings often reflect the idea that things should be allowed to manifest naturally and spontaneously in accordance with their true nature, which aligns with the idea of suchness as "being as it is" or "suchness of things".
Wang Bi (王弼):
Wang Bi was a Daoist commentator on the Dao De Jing, and his interpretations often explore the idea of the unity of opposites and the natural way of things. In his works, suchness may be related to the Dao itself as the ultimate reality, the way things naturally are, beyond conceptual distinctions.
Summary:
The concept of suchness in Chinese philosophy has deep roots in both Daoism and Buddhism, with terms like 如是 (rú shì) and 即真 (jí zhēn) expressing different aspects of reality-as-it-is, often emphasizing the immediacy and naturalness of existence. These ideas are explored by key figures such as Zhuangzi, Wang Bi, Xuanzang, Dōgen, and Fazang, who have each contributed to a nuanced understanding of reality that transcends conceptual distinctions. These scholars integrate suchness into broader discussions about truth, emptiness, and interconnectedness.
kotosei / ???

* "kotosei" vs "Kōki Sheringu tetsugaku" (a transliteration of a Jankelevitch japanese text)
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kotosei / 此性=cǐxìng=this nature, ???

* this japanese duns scotus expert might have info on haecceitas in japanese -
https://x.com/yamauchishiro/status/1862056885480014175
* 〈此性〉(cǐxìng) haecceitas =全体の質料materia totius という誤ったスコトゥス理解の源泉はAntonius Andreaにあって、それの誤解がどう広がったかは、Girogio Pini が深くやっているがその道筋を補うものなのです。この発見のご利益は、「個体論の歴史」に反映されるはずです。ライプニッツ『モナドロジー』(新訳)に大サービス(いや大迷惑になったりするか)でつけます。付録として。Giorgio Pini だった。名前を間違った。彼はFordamにいるが、スコトゥス研究者として本当に素晴らしい。スペルミスも畏れ多い、大学者です。たくさんの新発見を彼はスコトゥス研究について行っています。とても素晴らしい、本当に素晴らしい学者です。 https://x.com/yamauchishiro/status/1485958168677355520
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to iu koto 「~というコト(quod)」/ ???

# WHAT IS HAPPENING - All these translations of Jankelevitch's quoddity is flawed?
* QUODDITY0: 「(so-re ga a-ru) to-i-u ko-to = ~というコト(quod)」「それがあるというコト(quod)」
* QUODDITY1: 善をしなければな らないというコト Zen o shinakereba naranai to iu koto QUODDITY2: to iu koto というコト QUODITY3: しなければならないshinakereba naranai

# NOTES
* la mort réduit en poussière l'architecture psychosomatique de l'individu, mais la quoddité de la vie vécue survit dans ces ruines ;;;"On se résigne à la temporalité indispensable, la quoddité innacélérable de la futurition exige avant tout la patience !";;;1/Jankélévitch,philosophe du "je-ne-sais-quoi",du "presque-rien",de la quiddité,de la quoddité, du "potius-quam",de l'hapax,de la métempirie;;;まさ🍉 @masakazu_kaigo · Aug 8, 2021 Replying to @masakazu_kaigo 死は、個人の魂と肉体をもった構造を塵埃と化するが生きられた生というコト性(la quoddité de la vie vécue) はその残骸のうちに生き延びる。〔…〕ただ、われわれがコト性(quoddité)と呼ぶ、目に見え触知できない単純で形而上学的なこの何だか分からないものだけが虚無化を免れる。
* Does "コト性" (kotosei) mean both quoddity and quiddity? Have you heard of this word? - 死は、個人の魂と肉体をもった構造を塵埃と化するが生きられた生というコト性(la quoddité de la vie vécue) はその残骸のうちに生き延びる。〔…〕ただ、われわれがコト性(quoddité)と呼ぶ、目に見え触知できない単純で形而上学的なこの何だか分からないものだけが虚無化を免れる。
* Maybe find more Jankelevitch in Japanese - "ジャンケレヴィッチ" "quoddite"
* https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/ウラジミール・ジャンケレヴィッチ
* Jankelevitch in japanese https://www.google.com/search?q="ジャンケレヴィッチ"+"quod"
* PDF1: (so-re ga a-ru) to-i-u ko-to = quod?「~というコト(quod)」「それがあるというコト(quod)」 https://da.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/da/kernel/D1006798/D1006798yy.pdf ジャンケレヴィッチの郷愁論 "論 文 内 容 の 要 旨 論 文 題 目 ジャンケレヴィッチの郷愁論 Summary of thesis contents Thesis title Jankelevitch's theory of nostalgia" chatgpt review: Attempt at Impressing: The author might have been trying to add a layer of sophistication or erudition to the text by using a Latin word, even if it was used incorrectly.
* PDF2 (not yet factored into the rest because i'm so mad that PDF1's quod is so different from PDF2's quod): 他を存在させること他を存在させること.pdf 存在の問題を考察するにあたってジャンケレヴィッチは、シェリングの事実存在にならって、「というコト(quod)」とい において重視された「何 う語を用いている。彼はこれらの言葉を、後期シェリング哲学(quid)であるか」という本質規定に 用いられるwasと、その対立項である「というコト」とい う事実性に用いられる<lassに基づいて使用している。シェリ 独自の道徳的な特徴をともなった形而上学を形成している。 哲学が、ジャンケレヴィッチの形而上学の方法論ともなり、彼 上のような宗教論とも言えるシェリングの神話の哲学・啓示の 在の根源を探求するためにシェリングがとった方法である。以 叡智的な神そのものの生成を現象的な場で描くこと、それが存 は ジャンケレヴィッチにとって、私たちの生成を促す「何か」 「何か知らないもの か捉えられない。理解することも言語化することもできない は言語化できず、ただ「それがある」という事実性の領域でし (lejene,S'quoi) 」を捉えることができ 性を絶えず取り戻す」 「わたし」は自己を生成させる諸徳をおこない、「自分自身の神 覚することである。この有限性の自覚の瞬間をバネにして、 る「何か」に直面して、それが自分には理解できないことを自 して意識に取り込んでしまうことではなくて、私の前に現われ じているのは、対象に対して「何」といったカテゴリーを付与 る「ーというコト」の領域に身を置く瞬間において私たちに生 (TV1. 270-271 [288-289) 行為さらに言うならば、『徳論』の行為に関する考察もまたジャ の対比によって行われている。 ンケレヴィッチの形而上学において重視されたクイドとクオド ジャンケレヴィッチによれば、私たちは「善をしなければな らないというコト (quod) 」を知っている (TVl. 219[234])。ジ たちは「行動の客観的目的である《善》」 が行為へ向かうための形式をつくる。行為へと向かう場合、私 ャンケレヴィッチの道徳哲学の場合は、この「ーというコト」 (TVl.217 [232])を観 想の思弁的目的として「善とは何か(quid)」を考えるとして も、行為へと向かう意志は臆病となり、意志自体が主導権を .)。しか (ibid.) し、重要なのは「非合理な世界に身を賭す」勇気である。瞬間の捉えがたいきらめきのうちで、私たちは「何をするべきか(quid)を知る前に、しなければならない(quod) と悟る」(ibid.)。行為へ向かう意向の真剣さは、クイド化され で善を創っていく。 は「善をしなければならないというコト」を知り、自らの意志 惰性的
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/rinrigakukenkyu/47/0/47_77/_pdf/-char/ja ChatGPT simplication and transliateration: 善をしなければな らないというコト (quod): Zen o shinakereba naranai to iu koto (quod) というコト(quod) しなければならない(quod): to iu koto (quod) shinakereba naranai (quod) 後期シェリング哲学(quid): Kōki Sheringu tetsugaku (quid)
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.....???

* RahXephon Interlude: "Thatness and Thereness" (ラーゼフォン間奏曲「彼女と彼女自身と」?)/"Her and Herself" RahXephon Interlude: Her and Herself/Thatness and Thereness https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bones_(estudio) https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/RahXephon
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......Ziran..
longnotes# Whys
* #WHY multiplicative How Can Suchness Be Positive If Everything Is Empty? Here’s a central question when it comes to suchness: How can suchness, in the sense of reality perceived without a mental map, or reality, when we understand emptiness, be positive? If everything is empty and in the absolute or when we were perceiving things this way, there is no good or bad. There’s no relative. Then how could you say anything was positive? I mean, Hongzhi was describing silent and serene illumination, shining brightly, gleaming, embodied with spirit, manifested, celebrated, smooth and level, magnificently peaceful.
* Why is it so special? - Because Tathata means SUCHNESS or THUSNESS or BEING-SO, capturing more primordial pronouns and to me is like quid/hæc/quod had a baby called qual. Also "this and that" and "whatness and whichness" are dismissive phrases whereas SUCHNESS wakes you from your dogmatic slumber
* Why immediate? Because according to Buber, Mead, and SEP: thisness=suchness and both are fundamentally opposed to whatness, so immediacy and geometry is their attribute
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# Other Notes
* ChatGPT says suchness=QualitasPropria/Sicitas
* random comment on suchness - Blaine Snow - I continue to fully digest the “wonderfully weird” Tiantai moves on Mahayana nonduality. It would appear to me that Indo-Tibetan nonduality goes beyond the appearance/reality dichotomy and other subtle dualisms lingering in Indo-Tibetan Sanskrit-based Middle Way philosophy possibly only through the One Taste or Suchness of Dzogchen, where the sameness-difference of nirvana-samsara, reality-appearance, ultimate-conventional drop away but also entail each other – that special Dzogchen “basic space of phenomena” or Rigpa. Rigpa seems to erase or make the appearance-reality distinction both trivial and supremely important, collapsing-yet-affirming all opposites. But you’re right, even the Tibetan Shentong/Rangtong debate seems to be another example of lingering duality as is the whole Emptiness/Buddhanature dialectic, as are the problems with defining conventional truth in contrast to ultimate truth. Perhaps there’s some overcoming of this lingering dualism in the pluralism in the 19th century Rime movement? https://voices.uchicago.edu/ziporyn/why-chinese-buddhist-philosophy/
* For a general treatment of the concept of ultimate reality, see Schellenberg (2016) and Diller (2021). For references to treatments of God, Brahman, and Suchness as ultimate reality, see Leftow (2012), Gupta (2020), and Zappulli (2023). https://philarchive.org/archive/ZAPTMO
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# dump
139 – Suchness: Awakening to the Preciousness of Things-As-It-Is
by Domyo | Jun 22, 2020 | Buddhist Teachings

138 - Buddhist Images of Fierceness and Compassionate Anger142 - Direct Experience Is Liberation: When There Are No Stories, There Is No "You"
All religions and spiritual practices have two purposes: 1) To relieve our suffering and 2) give us hope. Buddhism is no different, teaching us that all we need to do is awaken to reality and we will be free and at ease. However, as Buddhists we sometimes emphasize “relieving suffering” and leave it unsaid that, after being freed from your suffering, you will perceive things in a way that gives you hope, inspiration, and solace. The Buddhist teaching of suchness arose a couple hundred years after the Buddha, at least in part to address the need some of us feel to hear descriptions of the positive aspect of reality from the beginning of our practice.





Quicklinks to Rough Transcript Headings (sorry for awkward text):
Two Ways to Describe the Absolute Aspect of Reality
Sunyata, or Empty of Inherent, Enduring, Independent Self-Nature
Suchness: How Everything Is Experienced When You See It’s Empty
Turning Toward Suchness
Perceiving Suchness
Caution: Suchness Is Not a Thing
How Can Suchness Be Positive If Everything Is Empty?



Transcript:

Most other religions have a God or gods. The hope that they provide has to do with going to heaven and afterlife; being part of God’s plan, that even if things don’t seem to make sense, God does have a plan. At the basis of everything is love and compassion and at some level things make sense, even if it’s not obvious to you at the moment. In Buddhism, we don’t have a God in that sense and we don’t have a permanent heaven refuge. If you believe in that kind of cosmology, our heaven is a temporary place and then you’re going to get reborn somewhere else where it’s not as pleasant.

How does Buddhism answer that question? How does it give you hope? We obviously know Buddhism does a lot around relief of suffering. The Buddha said, this is what I teach: I teach the relief of suffering. From the very beginning, the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path all has to do with giving up our desires, our ideas, and therefore becoming free from dukkha or stress or dissatisfactoriness or suffering. Where do we get our hope? Where is the positivity?


Two Ways to Describe the Absolute Aspect of Reality
What Buddhism tends to do is focus on that relief of suffering, and just leave it rather unsaid that what you perceive or wake up to or how you are able to be after that is positive and redeeming. To be fair, early on you talked about achieving Nirvana, which would definitely have a positive aspect to it. In Buddhism, what we say is that you can relieve your suffering and access this sense of hope and positivity and meaning simply by waking up to reality as it is. We don’t have any deity, we’re not counting on any afterlife, but if we wake up to reality as it is, both of those needs will be met: the relief of suffering and the hope. In seeing reality clearly, we end up perceiving two aspects of reality, which I’ve talked about many times on the podcast: the absolute and relative.

It’s very difficult to talk about these two aspects using language and concepts because we immediately become dualistic about it. The absolute transcends dualism. Let me give it a try. It’s like, you have a finger and it is independent and free. It’s a thing unto itself, right? The fact that it is separate from other fingers is part of what defines it, part of what makes it functional. At the same time, the finger is part of the hand. Those things can be true simultaneously, and they reflect a different reality of the finger.

In the same way, everything we perceive has relative aspects, has time, space, causation, individuality, good and bad, but there’s another way to perceive reality. Reality has another aspect in which we recognize that all of these things, good and bad, the boundaries we draw between individuals, in a way these are all just ideas. When we let go of those ideas, we just see everything as one in its essential being. Sometimes I’ll say things like: in the absolute there is no good or bad; in the relative, there’s good and bad; in the absolute there’s no self or other good or bad. Sometimes saying in the absolute, in the relative, it sounds like there are two different places, and that most of the time I’m in the relative, but sometimes I’m in the absolute. The limitations of language definitely show up there.

Lately I’ve been testing a different way to describe it, which is: Reality has two natures, the particular versus the whole. The particular, of course, it’s true that reality has individuals and individuals interact. There are positive and negative repercussions of actions. This is the way that we usually experience reality. At the same time, reality is a seamless whole, if you will. It’s just as it is. When experienced that way, the particulars can be true, but they don’t ruin the wholeness. Everything is included.

This is kind of a strange analogy, but I kind of imagine this is like if you were caught up in a drama and you were concerned about your well-being and who was doing what and what was going to happen next. It could be full of angst or excitement, but if you somehow realized that all of this was part of a movie or a novel and this novel or this movie has a point, has an artistic arc, and when you stood back, you could see it was just all part of the story. When we’re watching a movie, for instance, we don’t think, “Oh, no, how could that happen to that person?” The happening is just all just part of the story. It’s a very difficult concept to get across, but in any case, what we usually call the absolute aspect of reality, the essential, the wholeness, the things as it is, how we perceive things directly, when we’re not interpreting them through our mental map or our self interest, we just see things in this whole way.


Sunyata, or Empty of Inherent, Enduring, Independent Self-Nature
One of the keys to getting to be able to see and experience reality this way is to recognize that things are empty. The term for this is Sunyata; emptiness. I’ve also heard the translation boundlessness, which is kind of cool because it basically means all of these individual things that we usually think or who we usually think have inherent, essential, independent, enduring self nature. There’s something inherently, independently real about them, and that that’s not actually the case, that all individual beings arise interdependently with everything else. That’s where we focus on emptiness. If you see the emptiness of things, then you see their true nature.

Emptiness can sound a little negative, right? It’s about what things don’t have, but there’s another way of describing reality, describing the absolute aspect of reality, which is more positive and has been around since a few hundred years after the Buddha or maybe even earlier. That term is Tatātā or Tathātā. This is translated as suchness or thusness because emptiness doesn’t mean a nihilistic void. Once we let go of our mental map of reality, of our attachment to an idea that something or someone has an inherent, enduring self nature, reality doesn’t just disappear. It doesn’t become a nihilistic void, it just is what it is without our mental map of it. Everything is such.

It’s actually quite rewarding. We’re seeing this point of giving us hope, of giving us meaning and context to our lives, not just recognizing everything is empty, but once you see that things are empty, then things are just as they are. There is something that’s been described many different ways and language is limiting, but it can be luminous. Sometimes it’s described as perfect. Everything is perfect, just as it is. I kind of like the word precious because perfect to me invites too much relative comparison, like perfect as opposed to imperfect, whereas precious is something that’s not tied to something being perfect or pure.

For example, we might have relationships with people and the people aren’t perfect, we’re not perfect, the relationships aren’t perfect. Maybe the relationships are even rather fraught, but nonetheless, that relationship is precious to us. That’s the kind of preciousness we can perceive. Therefore, suchness describes this.

Emptiness is mentioned quite a lot in our Buddhist scriptures. For instance, the Heart Sutra:

“Avalokiteshvara Bodhisattva, when deeply practicing prajña paramita, clearly saw that all five aggregates are empty and thus relieved all suffering… Therefore, given emptiness, there is no form, no sensation, no perception, no formation, no consciousness; no eyes, no ears, no nose, no tongue, no body, no mind; no sight, no sound, no smell, no taste, no touch, no object of mind; no realm of sight … no realm of mind consciousness. There is neither ignorance nor extinction of ignorance… neither old age and death, nor extinction of old age and death; no suffering, no cause, no cessation, no path; no knowledge and no attainment. With nothing to attain, a bodhisattva relies on prajña paramita, and thus the mind is without hindrance. Without hindrance, there is no fear. Far beyond all inverted views, one realizes nirvana.”[1]

“Avalokiteshvara Bodhisattva, when deeply practicing prajna paramita,” the perfection of wisdom, “clearly saw that all five aggregates are empty and thus relieved all suffering…” This is the relieving suffering part. When we recognize that we’re just projecting this inherent reality on things, we’re not as upset that there’s no one to protect. There’s no one to blame. Our self, our being partakes of something larger. That’s why later on in the Heart Sutra, it says, “With nothing to attain, a bodhisattva relies on prajna paramita, and thus the mind is without hindrance. Without hindrance, there is no fear. Far beyond all inverted views, one realizes nirvana.” Nirvana is a good thing. It’s a positive experience.

In terms of getting my mind around emptiness recently I was thinking, inspired by a book that my Zen center was reading by Thich Nhat Hanh, was thinking of the example of a leaf. When I sit to meditate, I can see a shrub outside my window. I see leaves, and each leaf is an individual thing. You can imagine if you were that leaf, and what you perceived was your individuality, that’s all you perceived was the particular, then you would be very concerned about your well-being as a leaf. How long are you going to last? Are you as large a leaf as other leaves? Are you getting enough sunshine? Are you getting enough water? Why are you turning yellow in the fall? You can see where the leaf experiencing itself as a particular can lead to much stress and suffering and fear and pride and comparison and all other kinds of things.

But, if the leaf is able to see how it partakes of – it is an individual thing, and yet what on earth does a leaf mean except that it is part of a larger plant. It’s a meaningless thing in and of itself. It partakes of a larger organism. The larger organism supports it and gives it meaning and the leaf would be meaningless apart from the shrub. At another level, the leaf is composed of elements that came out of the Big Bang and have been thousands of other things before they became the composition of a leaf. The leaf is also stardust. The leaf is composed of cells, and at a certain level you could see each of those cells as being an individual living thing in and of themselves. The shape and structure of the leaf reflects our solar system, reflects the presence of a sun that’s not too close and not too far away, and reflects the evolution of photosynthesis. There’s so many things beyond the individuality of that leaf that are contained within it.

If the leaf, as a metaphor for us, is able to let go of itself as a sense of an individual thing and able to see that it’s a manifestation, it’s connected to a lot of other things, and therefore, when it’s individual manifestation goes away, it’s not as terrifying. It doesn’t cause as much suffering.




Suchness: How Everything Is Experienced When You See It’s Empty
Emptiness is not the only way to describe the absolute. We have other regularly recited teachings, including the precious mirror samadhi, which starts with, “The dharma of thusness is intimately transmitted by buddhas and ancestors. Now you have it; preserved well.” [2]

Then there’s Faith in Mind by Chan master Sheng Ts’an: (translated by Chan Master Sheng Yen):

The Way is perfect like great space,
Without lack, without excess…
If the mind does not discriminate,
All dharmas are of one suchness.
The essence of one suchness is profound;
Unmoving, conditioned things are forgotten.
Contemplate all dharmas as equal,
And you return to things as they are.
When the subject disappears,
There can be no measuring or comparing…
In the Dharma Realm of true suchness,
There is no other, no self.
To accord with it is vitally important;
Only refer to not-two.
In not-two all things are in unity;
Nothing is excluded.
The wise throughout the ten directions
All enter this principle.[3]

This positive expression, all dharmas are one suchness, the Dharma Realm of true suchness, there is no other, no self.

When you hear these words, how does your heart respond? I think for many of us, we intuit that reality has this aspect that we’re not really separate from everything else, or if we feel that we’re separate from everything else, we feel that’s not the way it should be. We engage our spiritual and religious practice, our search, because we want that connection. We want that not-two. Nothing is excluded.

See Leighton, Just This Is It, pg. 9 for the history of the concepts of emptiness and suchness in Mahayana[4]



Turning Toward Suchness
I want to share with you another writing of one of our Zen ancestors, Hongzhi, a 12th century Chan master. I feel like Hongzhi, of all the things that I have read, does the most wonderful job of describing suchness.

A lot of times I think in Buddhism we refrain from describing the positive because otherwise people will get too fixated on it, right? Which you see happen anyway in Zen. I want to have an experience of enlightenment. I want to have Kensho. I want to see this amazing thing. If we emphasize it too much, “Wow, there’s this amazing realm, this amazing experience you can have, this amazing way you can perceive reality!” We get obsessed: Have we perceived that yet or not? Have you perceived it? Has she perceived it? Has that teacher perceived it? It becomes a concretized thing which just gets in the way.

At the same time we sometimes need some description of the positive in order to inspire us and guide us because practice can be hard. This is Hongzhi in Cultivating the Empty Field, translated by Taigen Leighton. He says

“The place of silent and serene illumination is the heavenly dome in clear autumn, shining brightly without strain, gleaming through both light and shadow. At this juncture the whole is supreme and genuinely arrives. The clear source is embodied with spirit, the axis is wide and the energy lively, everything apparent in the original brightness. The center is manifest and is celebrated. All the various events are consummated, with yin and yang balanced and the ten thousand representations equalized. Smooth and level, magnificently peaceful, from north to south, from east to west, heaven is the same as heaven, people are the same as people, responsive with their bodies, visible in their forms, speaking the dharma. This ability is fully actualized, extensively obliterating obstacles.”[5]

How does your heart respond to this description?

I heard Houston Smith, who’s written about religions, say something like, there’s something in our heart that responds – it’s unrequited – and it responds to these kinds of things and suggests the divine, suggests the ineffable, suggests the reality of suchness, the way that a bird’s wings suggest the reality of air.

Therefore, whether we think we understand this or not, whether we think we’ve experienced it or not, the fact that our hearts resonate with it, the fact that we long for this, the fact that it just sounds true suggests that there’s something in us that is responding. This is a reality that we evolved with. This is part of our reality. This is part of who we are. It’s reflected in the structure of our minds and hearts and spiritual being.


Perceiving Suchness
I gave this talk about suchness to my Zen center, Bright Way Zen. Then we went into breakout groups and I was asking them, how does your heart respond to this passage by Hongzhi and the idea of suchness? As is pretty typical in those kinds of conversations, it’s often that people say, I’ve never experienced that or, you know, I don’t know what this suchness thing is. I wanted to emphasize there and here that I think everyone has experienced this many times. Perhaps this is what we call peak moments sometimes; those moments where everything seems to make sense; moments where our life has preciousness, meaning, dignity; moments where things look just beautiful, luminous, special, O.K. It will often be at otherwise very mundane moments. This preciousness shines through the steam rising from our tea or the breeze blowing through some branches.

In Zen, what I think is remarkable is that we point to those moments, which usually we think of as, oh, wasn’t that nice? That was a nice moment. Now we’re on to a different kind of moment. In Zen, we point to those moments and we say, yes, that’s reality. For a moment you saw reality. You saw it shining through your mental map.

I love the way that Shunryu Suzuki describes what I think is suchness in his book, Branching Streams Flow in the Darkness: Zen Talks on the Sandokai. Sandokai is another scripture that we chant with regularity in Soto Zen. He explains Sandokai: San means many and Do means oneness. It’s like I was saying, the particular and the whole. San means many and Do means oneness and kai, he says, means to shake hands. It implies a friendship, a meeting, a mutual understanding. He says, “’Many’ and ‘one’ are different ways of describing one whole being.”

Then he describes something he calls things-as-it-is. English was his second language, not his native language. So sometimes the way he spoke it was a little idiosyncratic. With “things-as-it-is” he’s not using English quite correctly and he should say things-as-they-are, but it’s so appropriate that I think it was deliberate: things-as-it-is. There’s the many and the one in that one term, one phrase, and it’s written hyphenated: things-as-it-is. So he says:

“Small mind is the mind that is under the limitation of desires or some particular emotional covering or the discrimination of good and bad. So, for the most part, even though we think we are observing things-as-it-is, actually we are not. Why? Because of our discrimination, or our desires. The Buddhist way is to try hard to let go of this kind of emotional discrimination of good and bad, to let go of our prejudices, and to see things-as-it-is.

“When I say things-as-it-is, what I mean is to practice hard with our desires – not to get rid of desires, but to take them into account… We must include our desires as one of the many factors in order to see things-as-it-is. We don’t always reflect on our desires. Without stopping to reflect on our selfish judgment we say “He is good” or “He is bad.” But someone who is bad to me is not necessarily always bad. To someone else, he may be a good person. Reflecting in this way we can see things-as-it-is. This is buddha mind.” [6]

Sometimes this can be a frustrating instruction: to let go of your desires, let go of good and bad, but we have to remember that we’re not being asked to let go of good and bad permanently. We’re not being asked to pretend there is no difference between good and bad, suffering and happiness, harm and beneficial action, because in the particular, of course that is part of our reality. In order to see this wholeness, to perceive things-as-it-is, momentarily, we do have to let go of that discrimination, particularly because that discrimination almost always, even if we think of it as an ideal or we think of it as being on behalf of someone else, self-involved. There’s the sense of self, a sense of self-preservation or a sense of attachment to ideas or whatever. We have to momentarily release our grasp so that we can perceive this other nature of reality, this other aspect which then gives us that kind of hope and gives us that other aspect of our spiritual practice and the sense of meaning, preciousness, and purpose.



Caution: Suchness Is Not a Thing
Like all teachings, it’s important not to concretize the idea of suchness. Have I seen suchness yet or not? Did I just see it? Did I see it last October? Where is it right now when I’m all caught up in suffering or stress? Does it always exist or is it only something I perceive? Taigen Dan Leighton in his book, Just This Is It: Dongshan, and the Practice of Suchness says:

“I should note and emphasize here as an important disclaimer, that although I am using the term suchness, in reality there is no such thing as suchness. Speaking about a Japanese term immo… [I did Episode 8 – It-with-a-Capital-I: The Zen Version of God on this word, which I translated as “the Ineffable”] the scholar Thomas Kasulis makes an astute, important point. He adds, ‘This term is often improperly construed substantially and metaphysically as “Suchness.” [But it] is not a thing; it is a way things are experienced.’”

Leighton goes on to explain how “in actuality there are no nouns, but all words and supposed entities are verbs or adverbs. This is perhaps somewhat easier to express grammatically in Japanese than in English. In English, coherency requires the use of nouns.” [7]

Leighton goes on to explain how in actuality, there are no nouns, but all words and supposed entities are verbs or adverbs. This is perhaps somewhat easier to express grammatically in Japanese than in English. In English, coherency requires the use of nouns. We use words and concepts and teachings. We can’t communicate with one another as human beings without them. I would never have dreamed up Buddhism or Buddhist practice myself. I had to learn it. Somebody had to communicate it to me, and they had to use concepts and words to do it while constantly trying to avoid concertizing and over conceptualizing. Ultimately, this is about direct experience.

This suchness is something that can’t be described at all, and I love that, I love that description of it as, “the way things are experienced.” It’s not a metaphysical speculation about the nature of reality. At the same time, it isn’t just about our perception. It’s not just a matter of, “well, suchness is just a certain way that human beings perceive things when they kind of see that everything is one or they choose to see everything as one.” It’s more subtle than that. It’s like human beings and our perceptions are not separate from the whole picture.




How Can Suchness Be Positive If Everything Is Empty?
Here’s a central question when it comes to suchness: How can suchness, in the sense of reality perceived without a mental map, or reality, when we understand emptiness, be positive? If everything is empty and in the absolute or when we were perceiving things this way, there is no good or bad. There’s no relative. Then how could you say anything was positive? I mean, Hongzhi was describing silent and serene illumination, shining brightly, gleaming, embodied with spirit, manifested, celebrated, smooth and level, magnificently peaceful.

For most of us, we kind of assume that emptiness means reality is really nothing; that it doesn’t have any meaning. All meaning is relative. Therefore it’s all just kind of a nihilistic void. In other words, emptiness may be a good medicine for suffering in the sense that we’re not as attached, but what it leaves behind is nothing.

Ashvagosha was an Indian Buddhist, perhaps the earliest Mahayana philosopher. He lived somewhere around 80 to 100 at 150-80 B.C. He wrote a short book: Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. He talked a lot about suchness and he identifies a number of what he calls biased views, including that people think ultimate reality, which he calls Dharmakaya, is like empty space. But, he said that it’s actually a concept of a nonbeing as opposed to being, void as opposed to corporeal or physical bodies.

What we need is to realize that emptiness is used as a tool to counteract our attachment to our concepts. This is why, actually, the Heart Sutra also says that all the teachings are also empty. All the Buddhist teachings, Four Noble Truths, Eightfold Path are also empty. They are just tools to counteract our attachment to concepts. There’s no real thing called emptiness. It’s just like there’s no real thing called suchness. However, he says it’s a biased view to think that means that there’s nothing because nothing is a concept contrasted with something. Ashvagosha says:

“The way to correct this error is to make clear that Suchness or the Dharmakaya is not empty, but is endowed with numberless excellent qualities…

“From the beginning, Suchness in its nature is fully provided with all excellent qualities; namely, it is endowed with the light of great wisdom, the qualities of illuminating the entire universe, of true cognition and mind pure in its self-nature; of eternity, bliss, Self, and purity; of refreshing coolness, immutability, and freedom.”[8]

If it’s empty, how can it be positive? This is what Ashvagosha’s audience asks in his book, he quotes them and they say, “It was explained before that the essence of Suchness is undifferentiated and devoid of all characteristics. Why is it, then, that you have described its essence as having these various excellent qualities?”

Ashvagosha says, “the characteristics can be inferred.”

Essentially, through our direct experience, we recognize that suffering, what he calls, “illusions and defilement, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, such as lack of true cognition, absence of self nature, impermanence, blisslessness, impurity, fever, anxiety, deterioration, mutation and lack of freedom,” all of these things are generated by our own minds. Therefore, the absence of these things means Mind with a capital “M” or reality has many excellent qualities. Apart from this kind of philosophical reasoning, which only does so much for me, this is something that we can directly experience. These qualities are not concepts and they’re not reliant on concepts. It’s not about judgment or comparison.

We perceive these things directly, like light or heat or sound. When we sense heat, that experience is not dependent on us having a word or a concept about heat and thinking this is hotter than this other experience that I had. The experience is not dependent on those concepts and therefore the experience does not have to be relative to anything else. It is just what it is. It’s a big surprise, frankly, when you really let go when you really let go of your mental map. For most of us, that’s just for a split second. You perceive something precious, something luminous, something whole, something complete, something you belong to. I’m not saying all spiritual experiences are positive, but this particular one is. It’s strangely positive, even though it’s empty. This is what gives bodhisattvas their strength and joy, why buddha-nature is satisfied and serene.

What does this mean for our practice and daily life? In any given moment, this is what we can open up to in our mindfulness and what we seek to open up to more and more in our study, practice, zazen, and what we can place our faith in, at least provisionally, when we don’t perceive it. More and more we recognize that those moments when it’s like the clouds part and we see things clearly for a little bit, are reality. The rest of the time I get kind of confused and caught up in my delusions. That is reality. More and more we can think of being grounded in that, and then the rest of the time we’re just kind of surfing on the waves of our karma. That really can shift our whole perspective.



Endnotes
[1] Soto School Scriptures For Daily Services And Practice: https://global.sotozen-net.or.jp/eng/practice/sutra/scriptures.html
[2] Soto School Scriptures For Daily Services And Practice: https://global.sotozen-net.or.jp/eng/practice/sutra/pdf/01/06.pdf
[3] Sheng Yen. Faith in Mind: A Guide to Chan Practice. Dharma Publishing, 1987.
[4] Leighton, Taigen Dan. Just This Is It: Dongshan and the Practice of Suchness. Boston, MA: Shambala Publications, 2015.
[5] Leighton, Taigen Dan (translator). Cultivating the Empty Field: The Silent Illumination of Zen Master Hongzhi. Boston, MA: Tuttle Publishing, 2000
[6] Suzuki, Shunryu. Branching Streams Flow in the Darkness: Zen Talks on the Sandokai. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999. Page 29-30.
[7] Leighton, Taigen Dan. Just This Is It: Dongshan and the Practice of Suchness. Boston, MA: Shambala Publications, 2015. Page 9.
[8] Suzuki, Teitaro (translator). Açvaghosha’s Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna: Translated for the First Time From the Chinese Version (Classic Reprint). London, UK: Forgotten Books, 2015.
[9] Ibid
# Whys
* Why mediated? - see WHATNESS/PARTICULAR collision/contradiction
* Why Negative? - Because "Schelling invented thatness/Daßhood you dogmatic Hegelian / Niederhausereans"
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# Other Notes:
* "constituting the quiddities of things" - "Supersapientia Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine Science of the Platonists.pdf" By Evan King History of Metaphysics: Ancient, Medieval, Modern In Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43A, p. 66, l. 21 – p. 67, l. 42, Berthold extended the self-constituted or self-conversive all the way from the One and to the possible intellect which, considered as a conceptional being (ens conceptionale) – that is, according to the mode of being that embraces the subject, object, and mode of its knowledge in act – exercises its independence by constituting the quiddities of things. What all these principles share is that they are, at least in their activity, independent (per se standi). On the possible intellect as ens conceptionale, see Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, iii.8.1- 9, p. 183, l. 3 – p. 184, l. 51, and B. Mojsisch, “Sein als Bewußt-Sein. Die Bedeutung des ens conceptionale bei Dietrich von Freiberg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 95–105. The possible intellect, however, is not (ens naturae) an image of the Trinity because it is not essentially active. See Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.2.2, p. 46, l. 3 – p. 53, l. 41.
* Exactly!: the Quiddity of Quoddity—a kind of Loch Ness of Whatness. ᴰecentered from the Beginding. That said, cf. [2]: https://x.com/youtopos/status/440209956180992000
* #Traction versus Abstraction, #Quiddity (or rather, the Quiddity of #Quoddity) versus Liquidity/Liquidation: Everything #Quid-pro-#Quod https://x.com/youtopos/status/901955069226123268
* Desmond's question of 'how being is determinate?' is a restatement of Heidegger's Seinfrage of 'what is being?', in which, in each case, the quiddity of essence or determination is exceeded by the 'gift' of being. https://x.com/RyanHaecker/status/1327378477293723648 Therefore, the quiddity of things, which is the truth of beings, is unattainable in its purity, & although it is pursued by all philosophers, none has found it as it is. The more profoundly learned we are in this ignorance, the more closely we draw near to truth itself." -- Cusa https://x.com/aufgehenderRest/status/1624460590570782720 The proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. – St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.q84.a7 https://x.com/Shermanicus/status/1807125632314392922 The Third Man Fallacy (by a writer who knew not Plato) has deceived the many, the biggest straw man. Plato was a realist not an idealist. Forms are quiddity itself, archetypal patterns beyond time and space, underpinning material reality via Participation. Cosmic continuity. https://x.com/MattRob78281471/status/1845429954378432521 Fascinating reflection derived from Ibn Sina and al-Razi which is presented in a diagram by al-Attas. E.g. quiddity of man is not “rational animal” but rather man. This is because though definitionally man is a composite of rational + animal, that composite is not— https://x.com/AzraelArcanus/status/1852994414894789019 "Generic philosophers speak of ‘∃,’ ‘quiddity,’ and ‘moral worth,’ while the esteemed philosophers of biology speak only of ‘bonk bonk.’" https://x.com/bayesianboy/status/1280547706704924672 Plato's Form's and their scope Berthold von Moosburg tells us that since the definition of accidents lie in something extrinsic to the thing defined, accidents do not strictly have quiddity except in our way of understanding them. https://x.com/_bonaventurian/status/1804754382103126033 A depiction of makeup of contingent thing . 1) existence 2) substratum 3) Quiddity . The interesting point to note is that how the abstract concept of logic (genus and differntia ) relate to the more corporeal aspects (Matter and form). https://x.com/sultanm28903166/status/1846248088446419358 Śūnya is introduced by @JeffreyKotyk : emptiness is closer to the quiddity of zero in Sanskrit. Its etymology goes back to hollowness. Burrnett cites the Arabic ṣifr and Latin vacua. Zephirum is where we get zero. The empty circle is the symbol of the nakshatra of Shatabhisha ⭕️ https://x.com/AS_Katoch/status/1795063417092411550 first, he infers, not that they are equal (full stop), but that they are equal *as* human beings. second, the inference is valid, but it presupposes the 'no gradation (tashkik) in quiddity (mahiyya)' thesis. incidentally, this is an indication that Qaddhafi was a mashsha'i. https://x.com/mashshai/status/1785376588948816114
* The liquidity of capital is the new quiddity of being
https://x.com/RyanHaecker/status/1496149170721378322
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# Whys
* Why Inter-esse? - #SYNCHRONICITY - real/ideal dualism - Kierkegaardian presupposition vs Ryan Haecker - ii. There is a sharp division between ideality (“the ideal”, “the essential”) and reality (“the existential”, the Inter-esse) that requires different ways of thinking. vs Ryan Haecker's "real/ideal dualism" on Vico - https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/1hj7fwk/do_i_have_kierkegaard_right/ https://x.com/search?q="real%20ideal%20dualism"&src=typed_query&f=live ;;; Existentialism Existentialism was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre's endorsement of Martin Heidegger's statement that for human beings "existence precedes essence." In as much as "essence" is a cornerstone of all metaphysical philosophy and of Rationalism, Sartre's statement was a repudiation of the philosophical system that had come before him (and, in particular, that of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger). Instead of "is-ness" generating "actuality," he argued that existence and actuality come first, and the essence is derived afterward. For Kierkegaard, it is the individual person who is the supreme moral entity, and the personal, subjective aspects of human life that are the most important; also, for Kierkegaard all of this had religious implications. ;;; Inter-esse: Narrative, Theory, and the Stakes of Literature Tomislav Brlek In Davor Beganović, Zrinka Božić, Andrea Milanko & Ivana Perica (eds.), Procedures of Resistance: Contents, Positions and the ‘Doings’ of Literary Theory. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 121-131 (2024) Copy BIBTEX Abstract Contrary to received wisdom—predicated, needless to say, on not reading—the theoretical work of Vladimir Biti in general, and that on narrative in particular, has always been keenly interested in the stakes of literature.
* Angels with Filthy Souls (Home Alone) and Shazam (w Sinbad)
* Why DIvisional? Existentialism->Subjectivity->Split subject?
* Why immediate particular? - An individual has thisness if there could be a different individual who had all the same properties (in a very wide sense of ‘property’) – i.e. if the identity of indiscernibles does not apply to it. Souls have thisness, material objects might have thisness, but times and places do not have thisness. https://academic.oup.com/book/8995/chapter-abstract/155492492?redirectedFrom=fulltext
* Why divisional? - #Divisions and Bourdieu defining sociology: "What is classification? Classifying the classying subject. Constructed divisions and real divisions. "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_e8CqoPrDqA
* thisness is definitely not ipseity - Ipseity must be envisioned in itself, and not in terms of “this” or “that”
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# Other Notes
* THISNESS/DAS REINE DAß: Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Aquinas - haecceity";
* ChatGPT says the German translation for "thisness" is "Diesheit" or "Dassein (vs Dasein = being-there or there-being),"
* Si el género es un nombre que, en el uso común, se emplea para significar cierta vía colectiva de las cosas, los partidarios de la indiferencia no rechazan esta definición usual de género, pero, a su vez, hacen notar que la individualidad o la “haeccidad”, son nombres de los que se sirve los filósofos para significar la diversidad numérica de los fenómenos
* If gender is a name that, in common use, is used to signify a certain collective way of things, the supporters of indifference do not reject this usual definition of gender, but, at the same time, they point out that individuality or “haeccity” are names that philosophers use to signify the numerical diversity of phenomena. NUMERICA?
* medieval haecceity is part of possibilism-actualism debate https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/#Oth
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# Whys
* Why is it a mediated particular?
* Why is it positive? Because Schelling said so
* quiddity quoddity "I AM" ahhhhh aquinas + acvicenna + heller-roazen = <3!! PRECEPT BLEW MY MIND TODAYYY
https://x.com/aliceysu/status/6559533722 Daniel Heller-Roazen is a distinguished scholar and the Arthur W. Marks 1919 Professor of Comparative Literature at Princeton University. He has authored several influential books, including "No One’s Ways: An Essay on Infinite Naming" and "Dark Tongues: The Art of Rogues and Riddlers". Heller-Roazen is also known for his translations and introductions of works by Giorgio Agamben, such as "Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy".
* Maritain quoddity - "Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies.pdf" Existence is a category that belongs intrinsically to individuals. Indeed, a perennial philosophical adage asserts that only individuals exist (existentia est singulorum).10 Furthermore, Maritain affirms the real distinction between essence and existence, which connote two wholly distinct orders of being.11 Because existence applies exclusively to the individual, one can conclude, therefore, that the individual is somehow deficient or lacking in essence, which does not relate strictly to individuality. The essence of the human being emerges from out of one’s personality which is not grounded in matter, as individuality is, but rather in spirit.12 Expressed differently, the whatness (quiddity) of a human being is his personality, not his individuality, which is by contrast merely the basis of his thatness (quoddity). Personality is defined by Maritain as “the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite”. subsistent entity, personality has its existence within itself, that is, it supports or grounds its own independent existence. But existence, as we have just seen, is the exclusive mode of individuals, which should lead us to draw the conclusion that personality, insofar as it is subsistent, is also an individual substance, a composite of matter and form. In fact, personality belongs essentially to the human composite of body and soul, but anchored in the spirit, insofar as it exists. The manner of personality’s existence, or rather, as Maritain expresses it, superexistence, is through the communication of the acts of knowledge and love.14 As a subsistent entity, personality exercises existence, as opposed to receiving existence from individuality.15 Moreover, personality super-exists by communicating with other persons, and it is precisely through this communication, through this unique act of exercising existence, that it becomes the essence of the human composite of body and soul https://people.stfx.ca/wsweet/EM/XXI-2005/XXI-Complete-Revised.pdf
* Narasingha's Bhaktivinoda Institute and Tattva Viveka
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# Other Notes
* ChatGPT says thatness=IpsaNatura/IlludIpsum
* Platon a distingué entre le sens et la raison, entre la nature des anniyyât, et les choses sensibles... Et Platon dit : La cause des anniyyât cachées et incorporelles, et des choses corporelles est une seule et même cause. Elle est l'Anniyya première et véritable. Nous entendons par là le Créateur, première cause des anniyyât intelligibles et éternelles, comme des anniyyât sensibles et transitoires, qui est le Bien Pur8 ». On voit qu'ici le terme d'anniyyât désigne, au pluriel, les êtres individuels, soit les êtres du monde visible, soit les archétypes intelligibles de l'univers, c'est-à-dire les idées platoniciennes, et s'applique, au singulier, à Dieu. Ni 'quoddité', ni 'haeccéité' ne recouvrent exactement le sens pris par 'anniyya dans un contexte néo-platonicien. Les textes mystiques cités par M. Massignon dans le Diwan de Hallaj accentuent cette notion de « personnalité », de « moi présent » de « je en soi » que peut recouvrir le terme de 'anniyya. Il désigne le « c'est moi » de l'extatique, qui demande à en être délivré pour s'unir parfaitement à Dieu, seul « c'est Moi » qui mérite de subsister. Nous ne saisissons que son QUE seulement, non son QUOI (car Dieu ne pouvant pas être défini, nous ne pouvons pas dire ce qu'il est) ; le terme (3) MOÏSE MAÏMONIDE, Guide des égarés, I, c. 58, éd. trad. et notes de S. MUNK, I, p. 241 ; cf. aussi le ch. 57 du Guide, et le commentaire de Munk, p. 230 sqq. 62 M. T. D'ALVERNY aniyya est dérivé sans doute de la conjonction 'an ou 'ann, que, quod et pour rendre exactement ce terme arabe, il faudrait former le mot quoddité, analogue à quiddité. C'est le fru qu'Aristote met à la tête des objets que l'intelligence a en vue dans toute science, et qui désigne la pure existence de la chose (Anal. Post. II, 1). Ce n'est qu'après avoir reconnu que la chose est qu'on s'enquiert de ce qu'elle est (ibid., c. 2) Dans le Kitâb al-Ta'rîfât on lit la définition suivante (Jurjani) « l'anniyya constate l'existence en elle-même, considérée au degré de la pure essence ». Le sens de cette définition est celui-ci : le 6ri (que ou quoddité) se borne à constater l'existence pure et abstraite au point de vue de l'être ou de l'essence (pour rendre exactement le terme dâtiya, il faudrait former le mot essentialité) ; c'est l'être considéré en lui-même et en faisant abstraction de tout ce qui peut servir à le déterminer, comme la quiddité, la qualité et la cause Cf. mes extraits de la Source de vie de Ibn Gebirol ou Avicebron, 1. V, 30». Après quoi, Munk critique la traduction donnée par Silvestre de Sacy et l'étymologie qu'il a proposée. Ce passage de la Source de vie, connu dans la traduction latine sous le titre de Fons vilae dérive de la série de questions dressée par Aristote dans les Seconds Analytiques, qui est un des lieux communs les plus fréquemment allégués par les philosophes arabes. S. Munk a été suivi par M. de Slane, dans sa traduction des Prolégomènes d'Ibn Khaldûn (chapitre sur le soufisme, III, p. 107)5 . « Tout ce qui existe, dit Ibn Khaldûn en exposant les doctrines des soufîs, n'est qu'un seul être réel, une seule chose, dont on peut dire seulement qu'elle est ». L'anniyya ainsi définie est expliquée par le traducteur comme la «quoddité » dérivée de la particule 'ann, qui serait l'équivalent de ÔTt (p. 471). Depuis trente ans, de nombreux textes arabes ont été étudiés, soit les traductions des philosophes grecs, soit les œuvres des philosophes arabes, soit des œuvres des mystiques. Cette collection relativement riche, et qui s'augmente chaque année de quelques nouveaux témoins devrait permettre de se rendre mieux compte de la valeur des termes du vocabulaire abstrait. L'accord est cependant loin d'être fait, et les variations que nous devons constater, non seulement d'un auteur à l'autre, mais chez un même auteur à différents moments, et parfois dans le même livre au sujet de l'interprétation de l'anniyya témoignent de la difficulté du problème, et aussi de la conscience des érudits. M. L. Massignon, en étudiant les mystiques arabes et le vocabulaire philosophique a essayé à plusieurs reprises de saisir au vol l'anniyya, et de l'emprisonner dans un terme correspondant du langage scolastique ou néo-scolastique6 . Après quelques tâtonnements, car il avait d'abord accepté la 'quoddité' (p. 317) de Munk, puis proposé 'hicceité' (p. 487), il a adopté 'hecceité', sans doute, pour marquer à la fois la 'présence' et l'individualité que le mot lui paraissait impliquer chez les soufîs qu'il commentait, et notamment Al Hallâj. Le terme voisin de huwiyya, dérivé du pronom personnel de la troisième personne, huwa, il, très souvent allié à 'anniyya, a été rendu par lui, d'abord par 'illéité', puis par 'ipséité'. Et il a justifié ses néologismes en définissant le sens profond qu'il reconnaissait aux deux mots : «Sur les degrés de réalité des choses. La réalité minima, en nous, de telle ou telle chose existante, ceci... que, anna, l'indication de la différence individuelle, saisie du deho
* Quid sit corresponds to mere concepts without reference to empirical content, to essence in the absence of existence. By contrast, quod sit corresponds to cognitions in which existence and essence necessarily combine. This distinction helps found Schelling’s division of philosophy into Negative and Positive, his inversion of Hegel’s speculative progression from negative to positive. On his retelling Negative Philosophy constitutes an a priori Logic devoid of empirical content, constrained to address whatness or essence, the realm of necessity. Positive Philosophy, by contrast, picks up at the point at which the Negative leaves off, addressing thatness or existence and corresponding to the realm of freedom. Tracing the relation between Negative and Positive in the history of western philosophy, and beginning in Ancient Greece, Schelling sets his sights on this same path of Negative Philosophy whose end is divine contemplation. He acknowledges from the onset that Aristotle brilliantly followed the ‘path from the empirical to the logical,’ and so discovered ‘the innate and indwelling logic of nature.’ Far from being rendered superfluous by Positive Philosophy, then, such logical understanding of the structures of being inaugurates the same project Schelling had labored to advance in earlier years, further developed with Hegel’s innovations to reveal the logical structures of being’s unfolding. Harkening perhaps to his own prior meditations on the dark ground of being, Schelling continues, ‘If one follows him to the deepest depths from which he starts out, he begins his ascending progression with the potency (corresponding to the beginning) in which every antithesis is still enfolded. This progression ends in the actus, which subsists above every antithesis, even above every potency—and which is therefore pure entelechy.’30 The contributions of all three metaphysicians blend as Schelling explains the ascending progression in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, alluding first to his own earlier investigations into the birth of being and secondly to the progress by sublation set forth in his earlier systematizing, subsequently substantiated and subjectivized by Hegel.3 https://philarchive.org/archive/ROGHAS
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# Why?
* Whichness has been compared to Suchness which makes it salient, but also used frivilously with navel-gazing phrases like "Whatness and Whichness" and "Whichness and What", so we need to keep Whichness on the back burner ;)
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# COLLISIONS
* WHICHNESS=SUCHNESS - I think the #Arabic terms were inspired at least by #Greek ποιότης 'quality', literally 'suchness' or 'WHICHNESS'. Note that quality itself is a #Latin calque of the Greek word too! Arabic mahiyyah 'whatness, essence' was also calqued into Medieval Latin: https://twitter.com/bnuyaminim/status/1103286141313257474
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# notes
* Idk why i get the feeling that you think people who dislike abstract art must be fascist. Like you really expect a fascist to come and be like "hi, fascist here..." or for the average redditor to give you an impartial answer about what a fascist thinks? permalinkembedsavereportreply [–]LabradorDeceiver 4 points 4 months ago But this is something that can actually be examined. I fed the question to Google and got this article from Medium. There are studies discussing why fascists in the 1930s and 1940s went ham on abstract art. Personally I see it as part of the fascist's tendency toward "willen" - the idea that action is better than thought. The "lesser races" are the ones that spend time navel-gazing and pondering the whichness of what; master races actually do things. So when you create a work of art that invokes rather than states, you're prompting speculation. And to the fascist, speculation is Bad. https://old.reddit.com/r/leftist/comments/1dt2tqz/why_do_fascists_oppose_abstract_art/
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# Why?
* because numbers are archetypal - Pluto-Aquarius Ingression: Archetypal Cosmology & Psycho-Spiritual RenewaI like how integers (eg 1, 2, 3 etc) are described as having archetypal qualitative differences between which are quantum leaps. I think you can even force the phenomenological experience of synchronicities when you spend enough time appreciating the "two-ness" or "three-ness" of any topic or discipline (which could be the purpose of dwelling of the four-ness of Jung here). Also I like the discussion around scientific materialism and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Anyways, very thought-provoking discussion as usual, I now have an appreciation of astrology and more respect for Jung. Thank you https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZbjcco3OVA&t=4496s
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# Counter-ness
* counterpose
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# Other Notes?
* bothness https://stlcc.edu/student-support/academic-success-and-tutoring/writing-center/writing-resources/parts-of-speech.aspx
* SMUT - I remember that feeling, K said. There came a time, she said, when I realized I could no longer say in good faith: my girlfriend is killing me. I told K about a man I knew, a friend I’d slept with a few times, who drove a blue pickup truck and grasped the twoness in me but had only strange, antiquated words for it. Lying on our bellies, we read Kate Bornstein’s My Gender Workbook. I was impressed with Bornstein’s bothness, but it was Bornstein’s neither—neither a man nor a woman—that appealed to J. “To many people, that’s an impossibility, something to be viewed as a fantasy, a pipe dream, or perhaps a psychosis,” Bornstein writes. “Those people view my gender identity in the same way pre-Colombian navigators viewed the world: you sail too far, you fall off.” Nevertheless, she lives there. “You can grasp a paradox,” Bornstein insists. “You can experience nothing.”
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# Why

# Other Notes
* is exponitiation trans? transindividual, transmigratory, etc
* quantity
https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
# Why?
* Because subject-object debate

# Other Notes
* SELFNESS/IPSEITY/HUWIYYA - Before proceeding, it may be useful to highlight certain nuances that Ibn Sīnā delineates for essence (Gk. to ti ēn einai), three of which concern us.[9] Māhiyya is quiddity (lit. ‘what-ness’) considered in itself, that of secondary substances. It is thus the essence common to all beings of the same species or genus. Hūwiyya refers to the ipseity (lit. ‘self-ness’) of primary substances, that is, of all individuated, realised beings. ‘Anniyya, haecceity (lit. ‘this-ness’), refers to the individual existent (le ‘je’ existant of Amélie-Marie Goichon) but in an abstract and removed sense, and is also used to refer to the divine essence. In a broader context, both hūwiyya and ‘anniyya also denote existence (wujūd), if existence is to be defined as the actuation and individuation of a thing’s essence.
* selfness / Huwiyya / ipseity QUIDDITY Several Arab philosophers used the word Māhiyya to translate the Aristotelian expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, to which we have referred in the article Essence, since said Aristotelian expression literally means "what was before having been" or "he who was a being", and this meaning is the same as the meaning of 'essence', or at least one of the ways of understanding 'essence'. The Arabs introduced other terms for what we call 'essence' or some ways of being essence; thus, for example, Huwiyya (which has been translated as "ipseity", ipseitas), Anniyya (which corresponds more or less to what has been called haecceidad, haecceitas), Sūra (which corresponds to i form), etc. Of all the terms used in this regard, those that interest us most here are the aforementioned Māhiyya and Haqīqa. Both have been taken as equivalent to what the Latin scholastics called quidditas, but
https://www.diccionariodefilosofia.es/es/diccionario/l/3300-quiddidad.html
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# Why?
* Because subject-object debate
* “The Modern Counter-Enlightenment” algins with Hegel, and that thinkers like Maurice Blondel, Alfred Korzybski, Benjamin Fondane, Paul Feyerabend, Pavel Florensky, Peter Geach, Alfred Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Michael Polanyi, René Guénon, and the like basically following Hegel’s critique of Aristotle and “hard objectivity.”
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# COLLISION
* THINGNESS=WHATNESS acc to * Why Avicenna - his Theory of 'the pure quiddity';;; * according to Avicenna’s technical terminology—“quiddity” (māhiyya) or “thingness” (šayʾiyya) of the thing. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/
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# Why?
* Because state of Israel formed because of this?

# HERENESS / DOIKAYT - Dasein = Atwist (OE ætwist), Being-There, Therebeing, Hereness
https://old.reddit.com/r/anglish/comments/16l5tv0/outhwitly_words_philosophical_terms/
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# Why! Toyota 5 Why's, Gemba and 5S
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# Why?
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# Other Notes?
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# Why?
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