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| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | superversus POTENTIAL / candidatos potenciales / Potentielle Kandidaten G philosophers André Gorz https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9_Gorz Alvin Gouldner https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Gouldner H philosophers Eric Hobsbawm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Hobsbawm Dietrich von Hildebrand https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dietrich_von_Hildebrand Pierre Hadot - Check me out on the great @Imperfectbuddha podcast. We talked about Pierre Hadot, Peter Sloterdijk, Slovaj Zizek, martial arts, contemplative practice, and much more. https://twitter.com/AE_Robbert/status/1227265005298470913 N philosophers Arne Næss https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arne_N%C3%A6ss R philosophers | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Auge v Auden v Abulafia v Aurobindo v Ariès v Aira Marc Auge vs WH Auden vs Abraham Abulafia vs Sri Aurobindo vs Philippe Ariès vs Cesar Aira A philosophers: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Aug%C3%A9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._H._Auden https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Abulafia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Aurobindo https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippe_Ari%C3%A8s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%C3%A9sar_Aira | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Badiou v Bataille v Bourdieu v Blanchot v Botton v Baudrillard v Baudelaire v Bachelard v Bergson v Blondel v Braudel v Burnham v Brentano v Barthes v Barth v Brandom v Bastian v Bateson v Bakhtin v Bradley v Ballard Alain Badiou v Georges Bataille v Pierre Bourdieu v Maurice Blanchot v Alain de Botton v Jean Baudrillard v Charles Baudelaire v Gaston Bachelard v Henri Bergson v Maurice Blondel v Fernand Braudel v James Burnham v Franz Brentano v Roland Barthes v Karl Barth v Robert Brandom v Adolf Bastian v Gregory Bateson v Mikhail Bakhtin v F.H. Bradley v JG Ballard ???more??? - Jakob Böhme/Boehme, Niels Bohr, David Bohm ???more(socialists)??? - Louis-Auguste Blanqui B philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_Badiou https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Bataille https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Bourdieu https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Blanchot https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_de_Botton https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Baudrillard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Baudelaire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaston_Bachelard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Bergson https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Blondel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernand_Braudel (historican, world systems theorist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Burnham https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_Brentano https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Barthes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Barth https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Brandom https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Bastian%20 (Elementargedanke, anthropology, polymath) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregory_Bateson%20 (anthropologist, social scientist, linguist, visual anthropologist, semiotician, cyberneticist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Bakhtin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F._H._Bradley https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._G._Ballard | Please compare and contrast Badiou with Bataille with Bourdieu (including influences, influenced, books, year of birth) Please compare and contrast Badiou with Bataille with Bourdieu, including their influences and birth /death dates Sure. Here is a comparison and contrast of Badiou, Bataille, and Bourdieu, including their influences and birth/death dates: Philosopher Birth Date Death Date Influences Key Ideas Alain Badiou 1937 2019 Hegel, Lacan, and Marxism Event, truth, subject, fidelity Georges Bataille 1897 1962 Nietzsche, Hegel, and Marx Excess, expenditure, eroticism, sacrifice Pierre Bourdieu 1930 2002 Marx, Weber, and Durkheim Habitus, field, capital, symbolic violence Badiou was a French philosopher who was born in 1937 and died in 2019. He is best known for his work on ontology, politics, and ethics. Badiou was influenced by Hegel, Lacan, and Marxism. He developed a theory of the event, which he defined as a rupture in the ordinary course of things that opens up the possibility of change. Badiou also developed a theory of the subject, which he defined as the one who is faithful to the event. Bataille was a French philosopher and writer who was born in 1897 and died in 1962. He is best known for his work on eroticism, sacrifice, and the sacred. Bataille was influenced by Nietzsche, Hegel, and Marx. He developed a theory of excess, which he defined as the expenditure of energy that goes beyond what is necessary for survival. Bataille also developed a theory of eroticism, which he defined as the experience of jouissance, or unmediated pleasure. Bourdieu was a French sociologist who was born in 1930 and died in 2002. He is best known for his work on social class, culture, and education. Bourdieu was influenced by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. He developed a theory of habitus, which he defined as the embodied dispositions that shape our perceptions, thoughts, and actions. Bourdieu also developed a theory of field, which he defined as a social space in which individuals compete for resources. Badiou, Bataille, and Bourdieu were all important figures in 20th century philosophy. They each developed their own unique theories about the nature of reality, society, and the individual. Their work has had a significant impact on a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, political science, and cultural studies. | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | Bateson and Brentano both influenced psychoanalysts (Jung and Freud, respectively). ?Brentano/Husserl influenced Freud/Heidegger? |
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| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Copjec v Kojève v Cohen v Cassirer v Creuzer v Castoriadis v Crawley v Caspari v Cusset v Condillac v Canguilhem v Critchley v Clouscard v Cioran v Caraco v Claessens v Katsiaficas vs Caffentzis v Krasznahorkai v Cacciari v Carvalho Joan Copjec v Alexandre Kojève v Hermann Cohen v Ernst Cassirer v Georg Friedrich Creuzer v Cornelius Castoriadis v Ernest Crawley v Otto Caspari v François Cusset v Étienne Bonnot de Condillac v Georges Canguilhem v Simon Critchley v Michel Clouscard v Emil Cioran v Albert Caraco v Dieter Claessens v George Katsiaficas vs George Caffentzis v László Krasznahorkai v Massimo Cacciari v Olavo de Carvalho # C philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joan_Copjec https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandre_Koj%C3%A8ve https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Cohen https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Cassirer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Friedrich_Creuzer (philologist/archaeologist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornelius_Castoriadis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Crawley (anthropologist, schoolmaster) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Caspari https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Cusset (writer) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89tienne_Bonnot_de_Condillac https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Canguilhem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Critchley https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Clouscard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Cioran https://old.reddit.com/r/PhilosophyMemes/comments/139jq1i/im_ready/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Caraco https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieter_Claessens https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Katsiaficas (historian and social theorist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Caffentzis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A1szl%C3%B3_Krasznahorkai https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massimo_Cacciari https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olavo_de_Carvalho | Georg Friedrich Creuzer was a German philologist, Kreutzer, Gert Caspari = https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Caspari | QUOTES: * "Contaminated by the superstition of action, we believe that our ideas must come to something. What could be more contrary to the passive consideration of the world? But such is our fate: to be incurables who protest, pamphleteers on a pallet." - Emil Cioran * "En la palabra naturalización se esconde el error: ella debería más bien denominarse como eticización. Porque el hombre no debe renunciar a su condicionamiento natural cuando se somete a una tarea moral" (Hermann Cohen). https://twitter.com/FacundoMilman/status/1727687573282181411 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Cohen * * * * * | The term was coined by Sigmund Freud in 1917, based on the earlier work of English anthropologist Ernest Crawley. Crawley theorized that each individual is separated from others by a taboo of personal isolation, which is effectively a narcissism of minor differences.[2] | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | DeBord vs Derrida vs Deleuze vs Donzelot v Damisch Guy DeBord vs Jacques Derrida vs Gilles Deleuze vs Jacques Donzelot v Hubert Damisch D philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guy_Debord https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Derrida https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilles_Deleuze https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Donzelot https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubert_Damisch | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | Debord vs Baudrillard | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Ellul v Eliade Jacques Ellul vs Mircea Eliade E philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Ellul https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mircea_Eliade | Compare and contrast Jacques Ellul vs Mircea Eliade ChatGPT Jacques Ellul and Mircea Eliade were both prominent intellectuals of the 20th century, but they approached their respective fields with different focuses and perspectives. Here's a brief comparison and contrast between the two thinkers: Fields of Study: Jacques Ellul: Ellul was a French philosopher, sociologist, and theologian. He primarily focused on the analysis of technology, propaganda, communication, and the impact of modern technological society on human beings and culture. He explored the dehumanizing effects of technology and the risks it posed to individual freedom and autonomy. Mircea Eliade: Eliade was a Romanian historian of religion, philosopher, and writer. He specialized in the study of comparative religion, mythology, and religious symbolism. His work delved into the study of religious experiences, rituals, and the sacred, with an emphasis on the role of myths and symbols in human life and culture. Perspectives: Jacques Ellul: Ellul had a critical perspective on modern technological society. He argued that technology had become an autonomous force that dominated and shaped human life, eroding personal freedom, individuality, and ethical values. He highlighted the dehumanizing effects of technological progress and advocated for a critical examination of its impact on society. Mircea Eliade: Eliade approached religion from a phenomenological perspective. He viewed religion as a fundamental aspect of human existence, highlighting the need for religious experiences and the search for the sacred. He emphasized the significance of religious rituals, myths, and symbols in providing individuals with a sense of meaning, transcendence, and connection to the sacred. Methods and Approaches: Jacques Ellul: Ellul employed sociological analysis, philosophical inquiry, and theological reflection in his works. He combined critical analysis with a deep understanding of the social, cultural, and technological factors at play in modern society. Mircea Eliade: Eliade used a comparative and historical approach to study religious traditions and phenomena. He explored various religious beliefs and practices across cultures and civilizations, examining their similarities, differences, and underlying patterns. Influence: Jacques Ellul: Ellul's work on technology, propaganda, and the impact of modern society had a significant influence on critical theory, sociology, philosophy, and media studies. His ideas continue to shape discussions on the relationship between technology and society. Mircea Eliade: Eliade's studies on religion, myth, and symbolism have had a profound impact on religious studies, anthropology of religion, and the understanding of the human quest for meaning and transcendence. His work continues to be widely studied and referenced in the field of religious studies. In summary, while both Jacques Ellul and Mircea Eliade were influential thinkers of the 20th century, they focused on different areas of study and had distinct perspectives. Ellul critically analyzed the impact of technology on society, while Eliade explored the significance of religion, myths, and symbols in human life. Tell me Ellul's influences and who he influenced, and same with Eliade. If there are any overlapping people between the two then please highlight those individuals. ChatGPT Jacques Ellul's Influences and Influenced: Influences: Ellul was influenced by various philosophical, theological, and sociological thinkers. Some of his major influences include Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Max Weber, and Gabriel Marcel. He drew upon their ideas and integrated them into his analysis of technology, communication, and modern society. Influence: Jacques Ellul's works have influenced a wide range of disciplines and scholars. His critical analysis of technology and its impact on society resonated with thinkers in fields such as sociology, philosophy, media studies, and theology. Some notable scholars who have been influenced by Ellul include Neil Postman, Albert Borgmann, Andrew Feenberg, and Langdon Winner. Mircea Eliade's Influences and Influenced: Influences: Mircea Eliade drew inspiration from various sources, including the works of Carl Jung, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and Rudolf Otto. He was also influenced by the traditional religious and mythological systems he studied, particularly those of India and other ancient civilizations. Influence: Eliade's studies in the fields of comparative religion, mythology, and symbolism have had a significant impact on religious studies and related disciplines. Many scholars in the fields of religious studies, anthropology, and philosophy have been influenced by his work. Some notable figures who have been influenced by Eliade include Joseph Campbell, Jonathan Z. Smith, Wendy Doniger, and Eliade's student, Ioan P. Culianu. Overlapping Influence: There are no major overlapping individuals between the direct influences and influenced scholars of Jacques Ellul and Mircea Eliade. However, both Ellul and Eliade have contributed to shaping the field of religious studies, albeit from different angles. Their works have been studied and cited by scholars working in religious studies and related disciplines, demonstrating some degree of overlapping influence within that academic domain. Please note that the above lists are not exhaustive, as both Ellul and Eliade have had a broad and diverse range of influences and have influenced numerous scholars in their respective fields. | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | vonFoerster v Florensky v Florovsky v Feyerabend v Feuerbach v Flaubert v Farrer Heinz von Foerster vs Pavel Florensky vs Georges Florovsky vs Paul Karl Feyerabend vs Johann Anselm Feuerbach v Gustave Flaubert F philosophers: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_von_Foerster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavel_Florensky https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Florovsky https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Johann_Anselm_Ritter_von_Feuerbach https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustave_Flaubert https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austin_Farrer | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Ilyin v Illich v Ingarden Ivan Ilyin v Ivan Illich v Roman Ingarden I philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Ilyin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Illich https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Ingarden | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Lasch v Laclau v Lefebvre v Lingis v Lukacs v Luhmann v Lévy-Bruhl v Lévi-Strauss v Strauss Christopher Lasch v Ernesto Laclau v Henri Lefebvre v Alphonso Lingis v György Lukács v Niklas Luhmann v Lucien Lévy-Bruhl v Claude Lévi-Strauss v Leo Strauss (SPECIAL) Lucien Lévy-Bruhl v Claude Lévi-Strauss v Leo Strauss v Bernard-Henri Lévy (philosopher) vs Dominique Strauss Kahn L philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Lasch https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernesto_Laclau https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Lefebvre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphonso_Lingis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gy%C3%B6rgy_Luk%C3%A1cs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niklas_Luhmann https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucien_L%C3%A9vy-Bruhl (anthropologist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_L%C3%A9vi-Strauss https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Strauss | Bard: Please compare and contrast laclau v lefebvre v lukacs v lasch (including influences, influenced, books, year of birth), preferably in a table | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | Compare and contrast Lucien Lévy-Bruhl v Claude Lévi-Strauss v Leo Strauss: Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Leo Strauss are notable thinkers in different fields, and while their work may intersect at times, they have distinct approaches and contributions. Here's a brief comparison and contrast: Lucien Lévy-Bruhl: Field: Anthropology and Philosophy. Key Ideas: Lévy-Bruhl focused on the study of primitive mentality and the differences between "primitive" and "civilized" thought. He argued for the existence of a "pre-logical" or "mystical" mentality in non-Western societies. Notable Works: "How Natives Think" and "Primitive Mentality." Claude Lévi-Strauss: Field: Anthropology and Structuralism. Key Ideas: Lévi-Strauss is known for his contributions to structural anthropology and his emphasis on the underlying structures of human culture and thought. He analyzed cultural phenomena through binary oppositions and sought to uncover universal patterns in human societies. Notable Works: "The Elementary Structures of Kinship" and "The Savage Mind." Leo Strauss: Field: Political Philosophy. Key Ideas: Strauss is associated with the revival of classical political philosophy and the study of political theory. He focused on the interpretation of classical texts and emphasized the importance of examining the teachings of political philosophers throughout history. Notable Works: "Natural Right and History" and "The City and Man." In terms of comparison, both Lévy-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss made significant contributions to the field of anthropology, although their methodologies and foci differed. Lévy-Bruhl's work focused on the contrast between "primitive" and "civilized" thought, while Lévi-Strauss examined the underlying structures and patterns in human culture. Both thinkers aimed to understand the diversity of human societies and challenge ethnocentric perspectives. Leo Strauss, on the other hand, belongs to the field of political philosophy and is distinct from the other two thinkers. His work is centered around the interpretation and analysis of classical political texts, seeking to revive the study of political theory. Overall, while there may be some overlaps and connections between their work, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Leo Strauss primarily made distinct contributions within their respective fields of study. |
Laclau, Lefebvre, and Lukács were all influential Marxist theorists who wrote extensively about the nature of society, politics, and culture. However, they had different theoretical approaches and emphasized different aspects of Marxism. Laclau was a post-structuralist Marxist who was interested in the role of discourse and ideology in the construction of social reality. He argued that hegemony is not a fixed or stable state, but rather a process of articulation in which different social forces come together to form a temporary unity. Lefebvre was a Marxist humanist who was interested in the everyday life of ordinary people. He argued that everyday life is a site of struggle where people can resist the dominant ideology and create new forms of sociality. Lukács was a Marxist philosopher who was interested in the nature of class consciousness. He argued that class consciousness is not something that is given, but rather something that must be won through struggle. He also argued that the proletariat is the only class that is capable of achieving true class consciousness. The work of Laclau, Lefebvre, and Lukács has had a profound impact on contemporary social theory. Their work has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, from the rise of populism to the development of new social movements. Laclau, Lefebvre, Lukács, and Lasch were all influential theorists who wrote extensively about the nature of society, politics, and culture. However, they had different theoretical approaches and emphasized different aspects of these topics. Laclau was a post-structuralist Marxist who was interested in the role of discourse and ideology in the construction of social reality. He argued that hegemony is not a fixed or stable state, but rather a process of articulation in which different social forces come together to form a temporary unity. Lefebvre was a Marxist humanist who was interested in the everyday life of ordinary people. He argued that everyday life is a site of struggle where people can resist the dominant ideology and create new forms of sociality. Lukács was a Marxist philosopher who was interested in the nature of class consciousness. He argued that class consciousness is not something that is given, but rather something that must be won through struggle. He also argued that the proletariat is the only class that is capable of achieving true class consciousness. Lasch was a cultural critic who was interested in the nature of consumer culture and the rise of the therapeutic culture. He argued that consumer culture is a form of false consciousness that prevents people from understanding their true interests. He also argued that the therapeutic culture is a form of social control that encourages people to focus on their own personal problems and to ignore the larger social problems. The work of Laclau, Lefebvre, Lukács, and Lasch has had a profound impact on contemporary social theory. Their work has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, from the rise of populism to the development of new social movements. | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Maimonides v Mendelssohn v Maimon v Mauss v Malinowski v Michéa v Mouffe v Marion v Mallarmé Moses ben Maimon / Maimonides vs Moses Mendelssohn vs Salomon Maimon v Marcel Mauss v Bronisław Malinowski v Jean-Claude Michéa v Chantel Mouffe v Jean-Luc Marion v Stéphane_Mallarme M philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maimonides https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moses_Mendelssohn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salomon_Maimon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcel_Mauss (sociology, anthropology) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronis%C5%82aw_Malinowski (anthropologist, ethnologist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Claude_Mich%C3%A9a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chantal_Mouffe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Luc_Marion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stéphane_Mallarmé (poet) | Maimonides (1138-1204), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) were all influential Jewish philosophers who lived in different periods and had different perspectives on Judaism and philosophy. Maimonides was a medieval Jewish philosopher who wrote extensively on Jewish law and theology. He believed that reason and philosophy could be used to deepen one's understanding of Judaism, and he sought to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with Jewish theology. Maimonides' philosophy emphasized the importance of ethical behavior and the pursuit of knowledge. Mendelssohn, on the other hand, was an Enlightenment thinker who sought to integrate Jewish values and practices with the ideals of the Enlightenment. He believed that Judaism was compatible with reason and advocated for Jewish assimilation into European society. Mendelssohn's philosophy emphasized the importance of individual autonomy and religious toleration. Maimon, a disciple of Mendelssohn, was a German philosopher who developed a critical philosophy that was heavily influenced by Immanuel Kant. He sought to reconcile Kantian philosophy with Jewish theology and argued that the pursuit of truth and knowledge could help deepen one's religious faith. Maimon's philosophy emphasized the importance of skepticism and critical inquiry. In summary, Maimonides, Mendelssohn, and Maimon were all Jewish philosophers who had different perspectives on the relationship between Judaism and philosophy. While Maimonides emphasized the importance of reason and ethics within Judaism, Mendelssohn sought to integrate Jewish values with Enlightenment ideals, and Maimon developed a critical philosophy that sought to reconcile Kantian philosophy with Jewish theology. | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Steiner v Spengler v Stiegler v Schuon Rudolf Steiner vs Oswald Spengler vs Bernard Stiegler vs Frithjof Schuon Rudolf Steiner v George Steiner??? S philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Steiner (occultist, architect) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oswald_Spengler https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Stiegler https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frithjof_Schuon | Bard: Please compare and contrast Rudolf Steiner vs Oswald Spengler vs Bernard Stiegler (including influences, influenced, books, year of birth), preferably in a table Sure, here is a table comparing and contrasting Rudolf Steiner, Oswald Spengler, and Bernard Stiegler: Philosopher Influences Influenced Books Year of Birth Rudolf Steiner Goethe, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer Thomas Kuhn, Ken Wilber, Jean Gebser The Philosophy of Freedom, Theosophy, The Foundations of Anthroposophy 1861 Oswald Spengler Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Hegel Martin Heidegger, Carl Jung, Arnold Gehlen The Decline of the West, Man and Technics 1880 Bernard Stiegler Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Gilbert Simondon N. Katherine Hayles, Timothy Morton, Graham Harman Technics and Time, The Re-Enchantment of the World, The Negation of the Gift 1952 As you can see, all three philosophers were influenced by a variety of thinkers, including Goethe, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. They also all wrote extensively on a variety of topics, including philosophy, history, technology, and culture. However, there are also some key differences between the three philosophers. Steiner was a mystic and spiritualist, while Spengler was a historian and cultural pessimist, and Stiegler is a philosopher of technology. Steiner's work is characterized by its focus on the spiritual and the individual, Spengler's work is characterized by its focus on the decline of Western civilization, and Stiegler's work is characterized by its focus on the impact of technology on human beings. I hope this table is helpful! | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Virilio v Varela v Vattimo v Voruz vs Vygotsky v Voegelin Paul Virilio v Francisco Varela v Gianni Vattimo v Veronique Voru v Lev Vygotsky v Eric Voegelin V philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Virilio https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Varela https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gianni_Vattimo https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ella_Freeman_Sharpe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev_Vygotsky (psychologist) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Voegelin | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | Winnicott v Whitehead v Wollstonecraft v Winner Donald Winnicott v Alfred North Whitehead v Mary Wollstonecraft v Langdon Winner W philosophers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Winnicott https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_North_Whitehead https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Wollstonecraft https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langdon_Winner | . | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| versus, comparisons, pairwise, ternary | insane Frenchnames - Hocquenghem v Houellebecq v Rochefoucauld v Janicaud Guy Hocquenghem v Michel Houellebecq (hollaback / who'll beck) v François de La Rochefoucauld v Dominique Janicaud https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominique_Janicaud | . | . | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Agamben Experts | * Paolo Bartoloni - In his article, "Translation Studies and Agamben's Theory of the Potential," Paolo Bartoloni * Ido Govrin on Agamben's theory of signature. * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * ??? * * * * * * | QUOTES: Agamben inoperativity - https://twitter.com/search?q=Agamben%20%20inoperativity&src=typed_query&f=live | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/GiorgioAgamben/ | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Badiou Experts | * Asad Haider (also Sylvain Lazarus expert) - https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/authors/haider-asad https://twitter.com/negationmag/status/1470441336490889217 * Alberto Toscano - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Toscano * Tzuchien Tho - https://philpeople.org/profiles/tzuchien-tho * Susan Spitzer - https://frenchculture.org/books-and-ideas/translators/11669-susan-spitzer * Ray Brassier - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Brassier * Adam Bartlett - https://books.google.com/books/about/Badiou_and_Plato.html?id=3WulBgAAQBAJ * Nick Nesbitt - "Bolzano's Badiou" https://philpapers.org/rec/NESBB * Louise Burchill - https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/essay/the-antipodean-school-gelder-klee/ * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://www.reddit.com/r/Badiou https://www.facebook.com/groups/8210097909 | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Baudrillard Experts | * Naoki Sakai? - https://www.linkedin.com/in/naoki-sakai-823b303a/recent-activity Baudrillard Experts - "Naoki Sakai is just a small sample of the work that has been done on the Baudrillardean transmutation of the Japanese language" Sheila Faria Glaser (translator) * Oleg Maltsev https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleg_Maltsev_(psychologist) * * * * * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/Baudrillard | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Deleuze Experts | * Manuel de Landa * Daniela Voss * Todd May * Daniel W Smith * Andrew Culp's "Dark Deleuze" * Achille Mbembe, Arun Saldanha, Tara Abydos, Fred Moten https://www.reddit.com/r/Deleuze/comments/141x8dj/deleuzoguattarian_critique_of_afropessimism/jn2j94c/ * Janis Tomlinson - translated Deleuze's "Nietzsche and Philosophy" * Levi Bryant https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levi_Bryant * Brian Massumi, Brent Adkins, Manuel De Landa (from Dave/Mikey) * Mark Bonta and John Protevi's "Deleuze and Geophilosophy" * * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/Deleuze/ | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Evola Experts | experts: * Miguel Serrano * Alain De Benoist * Andras Laszlo * Robert Horvath * Jonathan Bowden * PhilosophiCat, Dominique Venner * Jean Yves le Gallou * Dugin (but Dugin is an epigone) https://www.reddit.com/r/JuliusEvola/comments/16u5xnd/evolas_influence/ * A. James Gregor Essays on Magical Idealism (Italian: Saggi sull'idealismo magico) is the first major philosophical work of Italian esoteric Julius Evola, published in 1925. At the outset of the book, Evola explains that book's subject is the many crises faced by what he calls the "modern spirit". According to scholar A. James Gregor, Evola presents problems in this work that are fundamentally epistemological, "advocat[ing] a 'suprarational' or 'sacred,' as distinct from a 'profane,' science [that is] 'universal' and 'infallible.'" * Dmitry Moiseev * * * * * * * * translators * Constance Fontana * Joscelyn Godwin - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joscelyn_Godwin * influenced by: René Guénon Oswald Spengler Ernst Jünger Plato Nietzsche The Buddha Charles Maurras Fyodor Dostoevsky Pythagoras GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel Max Stirner Laozi Arturo Reghini George Gurdjieff Novalis Giambattista Vico Athanasius of Alexandria Tristan Tzara Vilfredo Pareto Gottfried Benn Joseph de Maistre Otto Weininger Giovanni Papini Georges Sorel Gustav Meyrink Juan Donoso Cortés Johann Jakob Bachofen Louis de Bonald Carlo Michelstaedter Herman Wirth modern philosophers that are traditionalist - Alexandr Dugin Cologero Salvo Miguel Serrano Savitri Devi Olavo De Carvalho Rama coomaraswamy Eric Voegelin Crowley (debatable) Alain De Benoist Spengler Mircea Eliade Byung Chul Han (he's not a traditionalist per se but has an interesting critique of modernity ). - https://www.reddit.com/r/JuliusEvola/comments/12yrriw/are_there_any_modern_philosophers_that_are/ | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://www.reddit.com/r/JuliusEvola Evola1 - https://www.facebook.com/groups/2175962579395447 Evola2 - https://www.facebook.com/groups/516614488418149/ https://www.youtube.com/@OfficialPraxia/videos https://www.reddit.com/r/ReneGuenon+oswaldspengler/ https://www.google.com/search?q=julius+evola+influenced+by&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS995US995&oq=julius+evol&aqs=chrome.0.69i59l2j46i67i433j69i57j0i512j69i60l3.1727j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frithjof_Schuon | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Freud Experts | * Mark Solms (neuropsychoanalyst) - I am recommending that we chart the neurological organization of the deepest strata of the mind, using a psychoanalytic version of syndrome analysis, by studying the deep structure of the mental changes that can be discerned in neurological patients within a psychoanalytic relationship https://old.reddit.com/r/psychoanalysis/comments/12zrjy3/best_written_refutation_of_constant_freud/ * Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black - "Freud and Beyond" * Jingyuan Zhang (Chinese) * James Beaumont Strachey was born to Lieutenant General Sir Richard Strachey at 70 y/o, and Lady Jane Strachey, who was 47. He was their 13th child. His considerably older nieces and nephews called him 'Uncle Baby James'. Sigmund Freud called him 'my excellent English translator'. * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://www.reddit.com/r/Freud Sigmund Freud's Dank Meme Stash 2: Daddy's Return https://www.facebook.com/groups/3244420768919044/ //OLD =HYPERLINK("https://www.facebook.com/groups/3244420768919044/posts/6408436975850725/", "Sigmund Freud's Dank Meme Stash 2: Daddy's Return") | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Girard Experts | * Cynthia L Haven - https://www.facebook.com/groups/588048328669520/posts/1433399937467684/ * Thomas Hamelryck - https://thamelry.github.io/ * Geoffrey Shullenberger / Geoff Shullenburger - https://twitter.com/g_shullenberger * Luke Burgis - https://www.linkedin.com/in/lukeburgis/recent-activity/all/ * Ryan Duns - René Girard, Theology, and Pop Culture, ed. Ryan G. Duns SJ and Derrick Witherington Mimetic Theory and Film, ed. Diego Bubbio and Chris Fleming Mimesis, Movies, and Media, ed. Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, and Joel Hodge https://www.facebook.com/groups/588048328669520/posts/1535367673937576/ * Sam Kriss? - https://harpers.org/archive/2023/11/overwhelming-and-collective-murder-rene-girard/ * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/ReneGirard/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/memetics.hacking/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/588048328669520 | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Hegel Experts | * Terry Pinkard - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_Pinkard * Robert Pippin - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_B._Pippin * Bruce Gilbert - https://philpeople.org/profiles/bruce-gilbert * Stephen Houlgate - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Houlgate * Robert Brandom https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Brandom Brandom's Analytic interpretation of Hegel * HS Harris' - "Hegel: Phenomenology and System" vs Peter Singer's "A Very Short Introduction" https://twitter.com/diplopodhoretz/status/1706528191307784220 * Filiip Niklas - https://philpapers.org/s/Filip%20Niklas * Bruce Wilshire? stumbled upon this guy while looking for Bruce Gilbert - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Wilshire * Kaufmann vs AV Miller vs Stambaugh | QUOTES: * Hegel: "History is a Slaughter Bench!"!!https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8Iv4QN7wbQ * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Neurotic-Obsessionals Sure. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, neurosis is a mental disorder characterized by anxiety, depression, and other symptoms that are caused by unconscious conflicts. Obsessional neurosis is a specific type of neurosis that is characterized by obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviors. Neurotics and obsessionals are both characterized by unconscious conflicts. However, there are some important differences between the two groups. Neurotics typically experience their conflicts in a more diffuse way, while obsessionals experience their conflicts in a more focused way. Neurotics are also more likely to be aware of their conflicts, while obsessionals are more likely to be unaware of their conflicts. Neurotics typically use defense mechanisms to cope with their conflicts. These defense mechanisms can include repression, denial, and projection. Obsessionals, on the other hand, typically use rituals and compulsions to cope with their conflicts. These rituals and compulsions are designed to prevent the obsessional from confronting their underlying conflicts. Neurotics and obsessionals can both benefit from psychotherapy. However, the type of psychotherapy that is most effective for each group is different. Neurotics typically benefit from psychodynamic psychotherapy, which helps them to become aware of their unconscious conflicts. Obsessionals, on the other hand, typically benefit from cognitive-behavioral therapy, which helps them to change their thinking and behavior patterns. Here is a table that summarizes the key differences between neurotics and obsessionals: Characteristic Neurotics Obsessionals Conflicts Diffuse Focused Awareness of conflicts More likely to be aware Less likely to be aware Defense mechanisms Repression, denial, projection Rituals, compulsions Effective psychotherapy Psychodynamic psychotherapy Cognitive-behavioral therapy It is important to note that these are just general descriptions. There is a great deal of variation within each group, and not all neurotics or obsessionals will fit neatly into these categories. | Heidegger Experts | * Iain Thomas - https://philosophy.unm.edu/people/faculty/profile/iain-thomson.html Iain Thomson is far and away my favorite Heidegger commentator. His two published books are excellent, and there’s a healthy sampling of his articles available on academia.edu * Daniela Vallega-Neu - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniela_Vallega-Neu Daniela Vallega-Neu's book on the Contributions is excellent, I think. She strikes a good balance between not oversimplifying but also trying to make that beast feel a bit more manageable. (_Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction_ from Indiana UP.) * John D. Caputo - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_D._Caputo - John D. Caputo is AMAZING if you have already a robust understanding of Heidegger, otherwise you might find it very difficult to engage with his interpretations. * Richard Capobianco - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_M._Capobianco Richard M. Capobianco and Richard Polt, after reading them you will know why Thomas Sheehan's interpretations are absolutely wrong and you will appreciate Heidegger's philosophical break with Husserl, phenomenology and "Being and Time". * Richard Polt - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Polt * Gregory Fried - Also, anything from Polt and Fried on Heidegger - whether secondary or their translations of his work - are bangers. Both are careful and faithful readers. https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/schools/mcas/departments/philosophy/people/faculty-directory/GregoryFried.html * Mark Wrathall - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Wrathall * Hubert Dreyfus - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubert_Dreyfus I had the good fortune to attend Dreyfus' lectures on Heidegger before he passed, and I also knew some other good Heidegger scholars in his orbit, but in disagreement with him. I would describe the distinct interpretation of Dreyfus/Kelley to drift too frequently toward a traditional phenomenological bent. Dreyfus constantly fits Heidegger back into alignment with his sources, rather than seeing the depth of Heidegger's critical lens on the tradition, and the meaningful ways he detracts. For example, Dreyfus is very good at pointing out how Heidegger's use of Aristotle appears in the text (e.g. eudaimonia = skillful comportment), but, to me, completely misses that this orientation toward the world can be seen as extremely problematic when it comes to one's relation to being. For Dreyfus -"hey! look! you've mastered your place in the world." But really, I think Heidegger intends this as a critique of one who has become overly absorbed into their familiarity with das Man. Dasein's alignment with its own authenticity (own-most-ness) occurs in periods of intense Anxiety in the face of worldhood/meaning collapse, not when one is most skillfully comported. So, what Dreyfus reads as a kind of self-help manual, some see instead as a warning. That said, Dreyfus always amazes me at his openness for other interpretations, which I think places him on a higher footing than those who came immediately after like Sheehan. If you've heard his lectures at Cal on Div II, he often says, "Can someone tell me what is going on here, because I have no idea . . ." I really love this about the guy. He seemed to have no problem accepting multiple readings were possible, at least most of the time. Sometimes he downright berates folks that he thinks get it really, really wrong. I also think that his trouble with Div II is a consequence of his inability to recognize the darker side of Heidegger's phenomenology. * Sean Kelly - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_Dorrance_Kelly * Thomas Sheehan - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Sheehan_(philosopher) - Thomas Sheehan read Thomas Sheehan but bear in mind that he doesn't offer a comprehensive interpretations for Heidegger and doesn't appreciate the radicality of Heidegger's later philosophy and his break from phenomenology and "Being and Time". So, his interpretations are reliable only when it comes to "Being and Time" and Heidegger's early philosophy (not very reliable though!). This really isn't fair. Sheehan vs Capobianco is not as cut and dry as you make it out, and for most scholars (that I know, I mean) Sheehan had overall a more convincing argument. They both went back and forth on whether or not Heidegger was "being" metaphysical (Capo) or exclusively critiquing (Sheehan). Not only that, but Sheehan absolutely reads the entirety of Heidegger as being a single mission from being and time forward as part of that critique. He is one of the most (exhaustingly) well-read Heideggerians out there, and I find Capobianco far less so. That said, I don't agree with either one. They are both largely prooftexters that tend to steer the reading in a predetermined direction regardless of what can be done otherwise. * Julian Young - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Young * Terrence Malick - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrence_Malick * Herman Philipse - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Philipse * Dominique Janicaud (French reception of Heidegger) * Katherine Withy - (Heidegger and uncanny)!!https://www.reddit.com/r/heidegger/comments/12r5zl3/the_best_part_about_heidegger_is_that_he and mebbie - https://www.linkedin.com/in/kate-withy-44606619/recent-activity * Julian Young - DO NOT read Julian Young's books about Heidegger. * Mark Wrathall’s interpretations are good as a general introduction to Heidegger's philosophy. I really like Mark Wrathall’s interpretation of Heidegger, helped me a great deal with some of the most challenging parts. Not exactly what you're asking, but one person mentioned Wrathall. He just edited a massive lexicon that came out of Cambridge in 2021. It is an absolute gem of a book and very much worth picking up. Something like 800 pages of detailed but not too-over-technical descriptions of Heideggerian terminology and concepts. * William Richardson - DO YOURSELF A FAVOUR AND READ "Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought", AMAZING BOOK! * John Sallis - That's a kind of diving-into-the-deep end of the non-Dreyfus approach. Still, good to bookmark for if/when you get there with later Heidegger. (And just curious if anyone here has read John Sallis. Not recommending him as a learning tool for Heidegger -- just curious if any other super nerds have read his books on imagination.) Vallega-Neu is a great rec. I know Sallis' work. My undergrad prof was good friends with him, so he shared a lot of stuff with us. Interesting stuff. * Dominique Janicaud - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominique_Janicaud Janicaud's French reception of Heidegger was always very interesting, you can take a look at Janicaud's volume "Heidegger in France" for many unusual ideas.oh! I'd also recommend whatever you can from folks in the French reception like Derrida, Foucault, Levinas, etc. on Heidegger. To me, they all balance the line between solid reading, but also sincere critique. * Ted Kisiel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Kisiel - - Also, Ted Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time is another that is just so rich with insights, but also not without it's interpretive lens. Highly regarded by many of the second wave scholars like Caputo, Sheehan, etc. * Simon Critchley https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Critchley - For folks branching out, I would first recommend Simon Critchley's Apply-degger video series that started right around the beginning of the pandemic. In some ways, it is a very simple and straightforward interpretation, but one that, I feel, continuously sets the right tone, and doesn't allow itself to veer away from the source, at least not until the later sections where he starts comparing things with music. Crichley does a fantastic job of being as repetitive as Heidegger, constantly invoking the same terms and themes over and over so that you never forget just how tightly argued Being and Time really is. * Fr. William Richardson - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_J._Richardson For background, you may want to dabble in the work of Fr. William Richardson who wrote extensively on Heidegger, with his oversight, and they had a fairly close relationship. His work has been consistently lauded by scholars and use as the foundation for many subsequent works like Sheehan and Capobianco. It has been authoritative, but not sure it is still seen this way. * Jason Jorjani https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jason_Jorjani * Robert Pippin's "The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy" https://twitter.com/jensensuther/status/1673016657529151488 * Marc Richir - "Affectiveness and relation to the world" https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-67190-0_8, umwelt innenwelt Außenwelt, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Richir * * * 1 point 1 month ago Still think a lot of Zen Buddhism and advaita points towards the same stuff [–]dosceroseis | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * Cassirer v Heidegger - ??? * Heidegger vs TS Eliot - same birthday (Sept 26th) - https://twitter.com/yo101/status/1706716222220300631 | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/heidegger | OTHER: Who do you consider did the best explanation of heiddegger? Reiner Schumann, Karl Rahner, Walter Schulz, Robert Palmer, George Steiner, emad and Maley, Brett Davis, Will McNeil, David Farrell Krell. - https://twitter.com/aufgehendeRest/status/1574251573143814146 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Kant Experts | * Henry Allison https://twitter.com/search?q=henry%20allison%20kant&src=typed_query&f=live * Dieter Henrich https://twitter.com/aufgehenderRest/status/1558623202984730624 https://twitter.com/search?q=Dieter%20Henrich%20Kant&src=typed_query&f=live * Nora Schleich, PhD https://twitter.com/aufgehenderRest/status/1572214574857818114 https://twitter.com/VernunftMaxime * * * # schools * Marburg https://twitter.com/search?q=Marburg%20kant&src=typed_query&f=top | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Kierkegaard Experts | * Sam Loncar October 2022 https://www.instagram.com/p/CkOE8SVOX0j * Craig Hinkson (Loncar's mentor) and friends w "the Hongs" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4_iJjT5EdY&t=6m35s * David Swenson https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_F._Swenson * Howard Hong - https://press.princeton.edu/our-authors/hong-howard-v * Edna Hong. - https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/14192591.Edna_H_Hong * Hong Kierkegaard Library https://www.instagram.com/hklstolaf/?hl=en * Jon Stewart https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Stewart_(philosopher) * J.K Hyde https://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22J.+K.+Hyde%22 https://www.reddit.com/r/kierkegaard/comments/16ptrmm/fear_and_trembling_shouldnt_be_read_by_people_who/k1vwbap/ * Maro Bellou “The only thing that repeated itself was that no repetition was possible” (vs "What would life be without repetition") Søren Kierkegaard Maro Bellou presented her talk, ‘From Kierkegaard to Lacan: Repetition?’ to the Lacan Circle in December 2022 https://twitter.com/lacancircle/status/1711966513106915497 * Mark A. Tietjen (also Merold Westphal & Cyril O'Regan?) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebaU-2x0wbc&t=58s * * * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://www.reddit.com/r/Kierkegaard | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Lacan Experts | * Moustafa Safouan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moustafa_Safouan * Lacan biographer Elisabeth Roudinesco * Nathalie Jaudel (wrote polemical book on Roudinesco/Lacan) * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Land Experts | * James Ellis * ?? * ?? * ?? * ?? * ?? | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/NickLand/about/edit/ https://new.reddit.com/r/NickLand/?styling=true https://www.facebook.com/groups/2190218511036744/ | OTHER: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Levinas Experts | * Alphonso Lingis' "Six Problems in Levinas's Philosophy" https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/ouz4o2/critiques_of_levinas/ * Salomon Malka - https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/212899.Salomon_Malka https://twitter.com/librosraesccs/status/1673050110702370818 * Simon Critchley "Five Problems in Levinas's View of Politics" * Marie-Anne Lescourret - https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie-Anne_Lescourret * Kieran Setiya - engages with Levinas in this paper http://www.ksetiya.net/uploads/2/4/5/2/24528408/other_people.pdf * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/Levinas/ OTHER: Kieran Setiya, Other People In: Rethinking the Value of Humanity. Edited by: Sarah Buss and L. Nandi Theunissen, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539361.003.0014 13 Other People Kieran Setiya Do you believe in love at !rst sight? Maybe you do and maybe you don’t. Perhaps you will refuse to say, complaining that the question is obscure. I sympathize with that response. In a way, it is the subject of this essay, though I hope to show that there is more at stake. I begin with the prediction that, whatever you make of love at !rst sight, you do not believe in “love at de!nite description.” You may know on general grounds that there is a shortest spy, but you cannot love the shortest spy if you have not met them and know nothing more about them.1 You could, I suppose, become invested in the prospects of the shortest spy, whoever that is, preferring outcomes that will bene!t them to ones that bene!t other people, striving to ensure that the shortest spy survives and "ourishes. But this would not be love, and absent further context, it would not be rational. #ere may be descriptions that do su$ce for love, like “the woman who saved my life” or “the brother I never knew.” Special concern for individuals so described may be intelligible. Likewise, perhaps, if the description evokes, in richly textured detail, an attractive human being. Personal acquaintance may not be required for love. But the mere fact that one has a description that identi!es an individual, as in “the shortest spy,” is not enough. “Personal acquaintance,” here, is a placeholder for the relation to another human being that justi!es love at !rst sight, if there is any such thing; it is the minimal cognitive contact that makes sense of love. #is chapter explores the nature of this relation and its place in moral philosophy. As I will argue, personal acquaintance plays a role not just in love but in concern for individuals, as such. Section 1 is about the connections between personal acquaintance, love, and moral standing. It maps some puzzling features of personal acquaintance that set parameters for any attempt to comprehend it. #e task is to account for the ethical signi!cance of this relation. In Section 2, we !nd a similar structure in concern for others of the sort that is morally required. #is structure comes out in recent treatments of contractualism, aggregation, and the trolley problem. Section 3 turns to the work of Emmanuel Levinas as a source of insight into personal acquaintance, tracing the di$culties with his view and the prospects for revision. We are le% with a question not just about love but about the basis of human values and the value of human life. Other People 315 1. In “Love and the Value of a Life,” I argued that it is rational for any one of us to love any other human being, whatever their merits, without the need for any past relationship (Setiya 2014, §1). In rejecting the need for virtues or common histories as grounds for love, I agree with David Velleman. Like Velleman, I believe that the subjects of full moral standing, who deserve respect, coincide with those it is rational to love in the distinctive way that we love other people. In his formulation: “[R]espect and love [are] the required minimum and optional maximum responses to one and the same value” (Velleman 1999, 366). By “full moral standing,” I mean the kind of signi!cance shared by human beings but not by other animals, at least not the sort we encounter on Earth. Our interests count for more than theirs, and we have rights against each other they do not possess. (We will return to this assumption at the end.) I di/er from Velleman on three counts. First, I do not share his Kantian conception of the basis of moral standing, on which it turns on our rational nature. In my view, human beings who lack reason, or the potential for it, are morally equal to us. Second, I am less resistant than Velleman to the idea that, in its primary forms, love involves a disproportionate concern for the interests of the beloved, concern that goes beyond what is required by moral standing.2 While there are di/erent varieties of love—erotic, parental, and so on—this is a de!ning feature of the sort of love that interests me. Finally, while I doubt the need for past relationships as reasons for love, I do not deny that friendship, parenthood, and other relationships provide such reasons.3 #e permissive view of love is no doubt controversial. My arguments for it turn on the rationality of love in the face of radical change, retrograde amnesia (in which you forget your past relationship), and skeptical delusion (as when you learn that you came into existence an hour ago and that the “memories” of your relationship are false).4 I won’t repeat those arguments here, but I will make two observations. First, although it is natural to illustrate the view by appeal to love at !rst sight, this is potentially misleading. #e sort of love involved is not essentially romantic. We could point instead to the love I might instantly feel for an infant abandoned on my doorstep, knowing right away that I would take care of the child even at considerable cost. Second, love need not be as deep or devoted as romantic or parental love, and it need not involve a strong desire for interaction. #ink of my attitude to old friends who I have not seen and may not have thought about for years. I still love them in a meaningful way: if they were in need, I would do much more for them than I would for an arbitrary stranger. Our topic is not the plausibility of the permissive view but a question neglected by its advocates, about love at de!nite description.5 Even on the most liberal conception of love, on which it does not turn on particular merits or 316 Rethinking the Value of Humanity past relationships, you cannot love the shortest spy if that description is all you have. What is possible, and rational, is love at !rst sight. So the position must be quali!ed. It is rational to love any human being with whom you are personally acquainted, not any human being, full stop. But then we have to ask: What is personal acquaintance, and how does it justify love? Both the interest and the enigma of personal acquaintance come into focus if I am right about the implications of the permissive view. #e most dramatic consequence speaks to the moral signi!cance of numbers. Consider a case in which you can save the lives of three strangers drowning over to the le% or a single stranger, M, who is drowning on the right.6 #e circumstance is otherwise unexceptional. You have no special obligation to any given stranger, and their survival would have no unusual consequences, good or ill. On the view that I defend, it would be rational for you to love M, even though you have never met before: this would be love at !rst sight. I argue further that, in loving M, it is rational to give more weight to her needs than to those of other people. Acting on this concern, it would be rational to save her life instead of saving three. It follows that you could rationally decide to save a single drowning stranger when you could save more. We thus arrive at a version of John Taurek’s (1977) startling claim that, in cases of this kind, the numbers do not count; at least, they are not rationally decisive. I don’t expect this thumbnail sketch to be convincing; more argument is required.7 But it shows how doubts about aggregation "ow from the permissive view of love, assuming love can involve a disproportionate concern for someone’s needs. Now for the puzzle. When I !rst drew these connections, I did not stress the role of personal acquaintance. What is arguably rational is to save M at the cost of three lives when you are confronted with M herself: when you look into her eyes and respond with love. #at claim is contentious enough. I do not think it would be rational to save the person on the right when you know them only by that description. In what we may call the “anonymous” case, you have no contact with the drowning strangers. You are merely told what is happening and must decide where to send the rescue mission. It is irrational to give priority to the needs of one in the anonymous case. You are not in a position to love the person on the right. #at takes personal acquaintance. #e nature of personal acquaintance matters, on the permissive view of love, not just because it makes love rational but because it makes a di/erence to questions of life and death. #is brings out a pivotal constraint on how we conceive the relation of personal acquaintance. When you stand in this relation to M, it is rational to save her life, moved by the urgency of her needs, instead of the lives of the other three. When you lack this relation to M, when you know her only as “the one who is drowning on the right,” it is irrational to save her life. Personal acquaintance is ethically signi!cant. At the same time, it is utterly Other People 317 minimal, requiring no history of interaction, as we know from love at !rst sight. What can this relation be? We may turn for help to philosophical discussions of “knowing who”: to be personally acquainted with M is to know who she is. But accounts of “knowing who” in the philosophy of language only compound the mystery. On the minimal view, you know who someone is when you know an answer to the question “Who is. . . ?” #e answer need not even be a de!nite description. David Braun (2006, 24) begins his essay in defense of this conception with the sentence “Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall,” adding boldly, “[N]ow you know who Hong Oak Yun is.” In whatever sense, if any, this is true, it is not one that matters to moral philosophy or makes love rational. On a more orthodox view, to know who someone is to know a contextually relevant answer to the question “Who is. . . ?” that takes the form of a definite description.8 But this does not amount to progress. At best, it frames our problem: Which answers to the question “Who is. . . ?” are ethically relevant? What do you need to know about someone in order to be personally acquainted with them, and why does it matter? In fact, the situation is worse. In love at !rst sight, you know very little about the person you love apart from their relation to you. Knowing that they are the person with these properties is like knowing that they are the shortest spy. It does not count as knowing who they are in an ethically relevant sense. #e most plausible candidates for a description that matters, morally speaking, will be ones that cite your relationship to them. Why not then conclude that this relation matters, not the further relation involved in knowing about it? #e appeal to “knowing who” is a distraction. It is perhaps more promising to invoke objectual knowledge, as in “knowing M.” We can know people, places, and things, as well as knowing who, where, and what. When you know someone, it makes sense to love them, even if you don’t know much about them. But I doubt that the expression “knowing M” will bear much weight. Unlike personal acquaintance, knowing someone comes by degree: you can know them better or worse.9 How well you need to know M in order to count as “knowing M” varies by context. Where does personal acquaintance fall? We might identify personal acquaintance with knowing M to the minimal degree that counts as “knowing M.” But even this is doubtful. Knowing M is usually thought to be reciprocal: you can’t know M unless M knows you (see Lauer 2014; Benton 2017). Personal acquaintance is not like that. You can love someone who doesn’t know you exist. Given its contextual "exibility, “knowing M” might be used to refer to personal acquaintance. But this does not illuminate our topic. Hoping for insight, we may turn instead to the concepts with which we think of others. Personal acquaintance involves the possession of a concept that essentially denotes a particular individual, as in “rigid designation.” Is the problem 318 Rethinking the Value of Humanity with “loving” the shortest spy or the person who is drowning on the right that their identity is not involved in one’s response? #ey are picked out by properties they could lack. According to Philip Pettit (1997, 158–159), “when an agent displays a commitment to a beloved by acting out of love, the reason that moves the agent has to be rigidly individualized in favour of the beloved. It has to be a reason in which the beloved !gures as an essential component.” But again, this is not the point. Love at de!nite description remains irrational, or impossible, when the description is rigidi!ed. It makes no sense to love the actual shortest spy or the person who is actually drowning on the right, picked out in those terms. Nor does the shi% to naming change this. Being told that the shortest spy is Ortcutt, or the drowning woman, Pat, is not su$cient to justify love. #e argument so far is that personal acquaintance is a mystery. It does not correspond to “knowing who” or objectual knowledge or rigidi!ed description. And yet it is ethically signi!cant. It is personal acquaintance that explains why it is rational to love someone you have only just met but irrational, perhaps impossible, to love “the shortest spy.” It justi!es saving one stranger when you could save three; its absence explains why it would be wrong to do so in the anonymous case. Before we try to untangle the mystery of personal acquaintance, I will suggest that it runs deeper. For personal acquaintance is su$cient, all by itself, to justify love. Nothing further is required. How could personal acquaintance fail to justify love? #e idea would have to be that rational love depends not just on personal acquaintance, but on beliefs about the object of love. On the permissive view of love, these cannot be beliefs about their speci!c merits or about your past relationship. Nor can we plausibly appeal to beliefs about the relation of personal acquaintance. As before, it is the relation that counts, not knowledge of it. Must you believe that the object of love is a “person” in the philosophers’ sense, a rational subject? No: you can love human beings who lack reason or the potential for it. Must you believe that the object of love is another human being? I am doubtful. While it may be irrational to love a goat in the way that you love another person, as in the play by Edward Albee (2003), I don’t believe that love depends on conjectured species or form of life. #at the man across the room is a human being, not a rational Martian, is too theoretical a ground for love at !rst sight. Finally, we can ask if you must believe that the object of love has full moral standing. #ere is a sense in which you treat them as if they do, but you need not have beliefs about how they should be treated in order to be rational in loving them. In principle, there might be other beliefs that justify love, other properties to which we must appeal. #ere is room for a disjunctive view, on which various beliefs will do. It is not easy to exhaust the options. But if we already know that personal acquaintance matters, that it is morally signi!cant, why keep looking? Why not conclude instead that, given its ethical weight, personal acquaintance is Other People 319 su$cient to justify love, all by itself.10 As its name suggests, personal acquaintance is a relation we can bear only to those it is rational to love in the way that we love other people, only to those who have full moral standing. You cannot be personally acquainted with a goat, though you might believe you are. It is not a belief about someone that makes them available for love but the relation of personal acquaintance. In Wittgenstein’s (1953, 178) words: “My attitude to him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.” If this is right, personal acquaintance is ethically signi!cant in two ways. First, because its absence in the anonymous case explains why you cannot save one instead of three; its presence explains why you can. Second, because it is a relation we can have only to those with full moral standing. Each mode of signi!cance constrains what personal acquaintance can be. 2. Do these issues pertain only to curious views about the nature and justi!cation of love? I don’t believe they do. Personal acquaintance plays a tacit but essential role in recent debates about contractualism and social risk.11 #e puzzle for contractualists comes out in the following cases, described by Johann Frick (2015). In Mass Vaccination (Known Victims), a million children face certain death unless they are treated with a vaccine, administered to all. Vaccine A prevents the fatal illness but will leave the children with a paralyzed limb. Vaccine B prevents the disease without paralysis but “because of a known particularity in their genotype, [it] is certain to be completely ine/ective for 1,000 identi!ed children” (183). #ese children will die. For contractualists, an act is permissible only if it can be justi!ed to each of those a/ected, in that it is licensed by a principle none of them could reasonably reject. We are not allowed to aggregate claims. #us, in Mass Vaccination (Known Victims), we compare the harm of losing one’s life to the harm of a paralyzed limb. Since no one can be asked to bear the former in order to save someone from the latter, we must choose Vaccine A. Now consider Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims). Here a million children face certain death unless they are treated with a vaccine. Vaccine A is available, but there is also Vaccine C, which prevents the fatal disease without paralysis in 99.9% of cases; in 0.1% of cases, it is utterly ine/ective. (#e probabilities here are epistemic; they re"ect our evidence in making the decision.) #e challenge for contractualism is to distinguish the second case from the !rst, given that the outcome of choosing Vaccine C is virtually certain to involve the death of at least one child, and very likely to involve the death of about 1,000.12 According to Frick (2015, 185): 320 Rethinking the Value of Humanity [In] real life, we o%en impose social risks that closely resemble that of choosing [Vaccine C] in Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims). #us, it is commonly deemed morally unproblematic to systematically inoculate young children against certain serious but nonfatal childhood diseases where there is a remote chance of fatal side e/ects from the inoculation itself. Can contractualists explain why it is permissible to impose this kind of social risk while maintaining that it is impermissible to do so when the victims are identi!ed in advance? Frick’s (2015, 187–188) solution takes the form of “ex ante contractualism,” according to which we should evaluate Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims) not by considering how individuals fare in the possible outcomes but by considering how our policies a/ect their prospects now. #e claim is that Vaccine C improves the ex ante prospects of each individual child, by our evidential lights. It gives them a 99.9% chance of perfect health with a 0.1% chance of failure, which is arguably better than the assurance of paralysis with Vaccine A. #at is how a policy of using Vaccine C can be justi!ed to all. (If you believe that the imposition of a 0.1% chance of death on a given individual cannot be justi!ed as the alternative to paralysis, reduce the risk until you agree. #e general point remains.) Ex ante contractualists thus permit the imposition of social risk while resisting the imposition of harms when the victims are known, or knowable, in advance.13 It is important to stress that the dividing factor is not the chanciness of Vaccine C or the possibility that no one dies. It is about identi!cation. Consider a third case, Mass Vaccination (Unknown but De!nite Victims), which is just like Mass Vaccination (Known Victims) except that there is no way to guess who has the distinctive genotype. Vaccine A prevents the fatal illness but leaves each child with a paralyzed limb. Vaccine B prevents the disease without paralysis except for 1,000 unidenti!ed children. For the ex ante contractualist, this case is like Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims): Vaccine B improves the prospects of each child, by our evidential lights. No individual should object to our choosing Vaccine B even though, as in Mass Vaccination (Known Victims), 1,000 children are sure to die.14 Some will resist this verdict, assimilating victims who are de!nite but unknown to those who are known in advance. #ey will need to square their resistance with a plausible view of social risk. Why refuse to employ Vaccine B in Mass Vaccination (Unknown but De!nite Victims) when it improves the prospects of each individual as much as Vaccine C? Imagine administering the vaccine to each child in succession. On our evidence, it is preferable to administer Vaccine B rather than Vaccine A, just as it was preferable to go with Vaccine C in Mass Vaccination (Unknown Victims). Shouldn’t we choose Vaccine B? But if we should do it for each child, we should do it for all.15 I won’t pursue this reasoning Other People 321 here. I want instead to trace the implications of ex ante contractualism, drawing out an ethical idea that turns on personal acquaintance. In doing so, I will assume, for the sake of argument, that Frick’s analysis is right. #e basic question for ex ante contractualists is what distinguishes Mass Vaccination (Known Victims) from Mass Vaccination (Unknown but De!nite Victims), given that the objective probabilities of the various outcomes are the same. #e terminology tells us that the di/erence is whether the victims are identi!ed or known. But what exactly does that mean? It had better not su$ce for a victim to be identi!ed that we can pick them out by de!nite description. A%er all, we could “identify” the unknown victims by some irrelevant feature, like height: “the shortest child who has the gene”; “the second shortest child who has the gene”; and so on. We know that these children will not be saved by Vaccine B in Mass Vaccination (Unknown but De!nite Victims). If that makes them “known victims,” the alleged distinction will collapse. Suppose instead that we are given a list of names: these are the children who have the distinctive gene. We have no other way to determine who they are. Again, this is not enough. We knew all along that the children had names; knowing what they are is not suf- !cient to identify them, not in the sense that matters here. In contrast, I would urge, personal acquaintance must su$ce for a victim to be identi!ed or known, to transform the circumstance into Mass Vaccination (Known Victims), and so preclude the use of Vaccine B. What guides the ex ante contractualist is the idea of “personal concern”: a concern for others directed at them as individuals, made possible, and rational, by personal acquaintance. #is leaves some di$cult questions. Presumably, it is not required that we in fact identify the victims or that we know who they are. For the ex ante contractualist, the question is what personal concern would motivate if we were personally acquainted with those involved, given what we know, or what is knowable, about them (again, see Frick 2015, 191–193). In Mass Vaccination (Known Victims), concern of this kind does not speak with a single voice; for those who have the gene, it favors Vaccine A; for those who do not, Vaccine B. Where the victims are unknown, personal concern is arguably unanimous: it favors Vaccine B on behalf of each. #at is why it is permissible to choose Vaccine B. #e idea, then, is not that you should be more concerned with personal acquaintances than anyone else, or that it is rational to give their interests greater weight. #e idea is that, when you aim to justify a policy to each of those a/ected, their prospects on your evidence will depend on how you pick them out. In Mass Vaccination (Unknown but De!nite Victims), the prospects of the shortest child with the gene are very bad if she is given Vaccine B. But if you meet a random child, her prospects on your evidence look better with Vaccine B than Vaccine A. For the ex ante contractualist, the !rst way of picking children out, by de!nite description, is irrelevant: that is not how you should think of individuals when 322 Rethinking the Value of Humanity you ask whether a policy can be justi!ed to each. In contrast, the second way of picking children out, by personal acquaintance, is morally apt. Whatever you make of contractualism as a theory of right and wrong, the idea of personal concern, concern that is mediated by personal acquaintance, is ethically compelling. It is like love, as described in Section 1, except that it is not disproportionate, and like respect but unlike love, it is a response to others we are required to have. It is a form of impartial concern for individuals that personal acquaintance demands. Arguably, such concern is akin to love in that its justi- !cation does not turn on further beliefs about the object of concern. Personal acquaintance is again signi!cant in two ways. First, because it justi!es a kind of concern that has ethical weight in decisions that bene!t others, a weight that is not shared by concern for the person, whoever it is, that meets a given description. Second, because it is a relation we can have only to those with full moral standing. Each mode of signi!cance constrains what personal acquaintance can be. I have argued that ex ante contractualists share the puzzle of personal acquaintance: the task of explaining its character in a way that meets these ethical constraints. But the idea of personal concern appears elsewhere. Perhaps the most self-conscious invocation of personal concern in recent moral philosophy is due to Caspar Hare (2016, §3). Hare begins with the standard Footbridge case, introduced by Judith #omson (1976): you can push a button to drop one person from a bridge into the path of a speeding trolley that will otherwise kill !ve. Most believe that doing so would be wrong. Hare contrasts the original case with what we can call “Opaque Footbridge”: six acquaintances are caught up in the trolley case, !ve on the track, one on the bridge, but you do not and cannot know where in particular they are. As Hare contends, there is a powerful argument that concern for each of those involved counts in favor of pushing the button. If we give them alphabetical names, we can see that, by your lights, pushing the button will improve A’s prospects from a 5/6 chance of death to just 1/6. It is true that pushing the button will change the potential cause of death, from being hit by a runaway trolley to falling from a bridge as a result of your intervention. But from A’s perspective, why care? Why should it matter whether you die on the tracks or falling from a bridge to save the !ve? #e upshot is that, in Opaque Footbridge, concern for A alone, not weighing her interests against those of others or aggregating claims, should lead you to push the button. #e same is true of concern for B, C, and all the rest. Benevolence speaks with a single voice. As Hare (2016, 466) insists, this argument does not apply in the original Footbridge case. Again, suppose you know the six involved, from A to F. If you know that F is on the bridge, concern for each is not unanimous. #ere is no way to argue that you ought to push the button without comparing or combining claims. Benevolent concern is simply divided. Concern for F speaks against Other People 323 pushing the button; concern for the others speak in favor. #is con"ict cannot be ignored. Hare gives further arguments, but we need not go into them.16 Nor need we accept his conclusion that, in Opaque Footbridge, you ought to push the button.17 What matters is that, regardless of this conclusion, Hare’s argument taps an ethical idea that has real force. He seems right to insist that in Opaque Footbridge, concern for the interests of those involved speaks unanimously for pushing the button. If there is a moral objection to doing so, it does not "ow from benevolent concern but from a di/erent and potentially con"icting source: a respect for rights that is not grounded in and may diverge from people’s interests. As with ex ante contractualism, this reasoning appeals to personal concern: concern for individuals that rests on personal acquaintance. We can see this by asking what explains the contrast between Footbridge and Opaque Footbridge. #e answer is that, in Opaque Footbridge, you do not know who will die if you push the button, whereas in Footbridge, you do: the victim is identi!ed or known. As before, it had better not su$ce for identi!cation that you locate someone by description, since you can “identify” the victim in Opaque Footbridge as “the one who is on the bridge.” If that makes them an identi!ed victim, the contrast we are tracking disappears. Nor do names su$ce. #e verdict of benevolence does not change when you are told that the person on the bridge is Jim—unless you know Jim in some other way. In what meaningful sense, then, do you know who the victim is in Footbridge but not in its opaque counterpart?18 Confronted with this question, Hare contends that the sort of “knowing who” that makes a di/erence is knowing facts about what matters in the lives of those involved, about their friends and families, hobbies and careers. What blocks the argument for pushing the button is the plurality of values realized by these diverse activities: values that are incommensurable (Hare 2016, §6). But this cannot be the right account. It would not a/ect the ethics of Footbridge if the people involved were perfect duplicates of one another, identical sextuplets who lead identical, solitary lives. Nor would it matter if they were people you just met, about whom you know nothing at all. What counts is personal acquaintance, not biographical knowledge. In Footbridge, personal concern for the one who is on the bridge restrains you from pushing the button. In Opaque Footbridge, personal concern—concern for individuals that turns on personal acquaintance—speaks in favor. Concern for the person on the bridge, described as such, can be ignored. Again, the moral of the story is that personal concern has ethical weight. It is not that you should be more concerned with personal acquaintances than anyone else, or that it is rational to give their interests greater weight. #e idea is rather that concern mediated by personal acquaintance has an ethical signi!cance that is not shared by concern for the person, whoever it is, that meets a given description. 324 Rethinking the Value of Humanity When you care about people’s interests, their prospects, given your evidence, depend on how you pick them out. In Opaque Footbridge, the prospects of the person on the bridge are bleak if you push the button. But the prospects of A to F, picked out by personal acquaintance, all improve. It is the second fact that counts. Concern for F has ethical weight that concern for the person on the bridge, whoever it is, does not. In order to make sense of this, to see the contrast between Footbridge and Opaque Footbridge, we must appeal to a form of concern that attaches to individuals not by name or description but by personal acquaintance. Such concern resembles love, except that it is not disproportionate and is not merely rational but required. It is tempting to add, once more, that the justi!cation for personal concern does not depend upon beliefs about its object: personal acquaintance is enough. It is a relation we can have only to those with full moral standing. #ere are thus three routes to the puzzle of personal acquaintance. It follows from the permissive view of love, from ex ante contractualism, and from Hare’s appeal to concern for others in Opaque Footbridge, that personal acquaintance justi!es a kind of concern that makes a di/erence.19 My hope is that, even if you doubt the premise of each argument, you can feel the pull of personal concern as an ethical idea. Nonaggregative, distributed concern for individuals with whom one is personally acquainted: this makes moral sense. Concern that is mediated by de!nite descriptions or the secondhand use of names does not. An account of personal acquaintance should explain why. 3. #e idea of personal concern is easy to misconceive. To repeat what was said before, the suggestion is not that you should give priority to those with whom you are personally acquainted over those with whom you are not. In the versions of Footbridge above, we assumed for simplicity that you were personally acquainted with all of those involved. #e argument was that concern mediated by personal acquaintance has an ethical signi!cance that is not shared by concern for the person, whoever it is, that meets a given description. Concern for F counts against your pushing the button in Footbridge: it has ethical weight. In Opaque Footbridge, concern for the person on the bridge, described as such, does not. It is le% open what this means for cases in which you are not personally acquainted with some or all of those involved. For instance, it does not follow that, if you are personally acquainted with the people on the track and you know where they are, but you are not acquainted with the person on the bridge, you should push the button, saving your acquaintances by killing a stranger. More plausibly, you should act as if you were personally acquainted with everyone, but have no additional knowledge about their locations. Other People 325 #e crucial fact is that when you weigh the e/ects of your actions on the prospects of individuals, it matters how you pick them out, and thus how your concern is directed toward them. F’s prospects may di/er from the prospects of the person on the bridge, going by your evidence, even though, unbeknownst to you, F is the person on the bridge. Which way of picking people out is morally relevant? It is the one involved in personal concern, which runs through personal acquaintance, not concern for the person on the bridge, as such. We can spell this out in terms of thoughts sustained by personal acquaintance. #e relation of personal acquaintance plays a role in determining the object of one’s attitude that is elsewhere played by de!nite descriptions or the secondhand use of names. It is a mode of presentation deployed in thoughts—as for instance, beliefs about the prospects of a given individual—that interact with personal concern. In Fregean terms, personal acquaintance is the basis of distinctive singular concepts; alternatively, it is a guise under which we can think of others. On the Fregean view, we can say that propositions that involve such concepts—that this act will harm F, in particular—count as a reasons in a way that merely descriptive propositions—for instance, that it will harm the person on the bridge— do not. We know that there are reasons of the !rst kind in Opaque Footbridge, but we don’t know what they are. #at is why this case is morally di/erent from Footbridge.20 Similarly, it is personal-acquaintance-based thoughts that justify love at !rst sight and that are absent in relation to the shortest spy. #ese clari!cations help us to say what personal acquaintance is: it is a cognitive relation that individuates its object, sustaining reference. #is relation is the minimal cognitive contact that justi!es love and it is the basis for personal concern. But our account so far is structural. It is about the role that personal acquaintance plays. Can we give a positive account of the relation that plays this role? In the work of Emmanuel Levinas, spanning four decades of the midtwentieth century, we !nd what I think is a profound phenomenology of personal acquaintance.21 Levinas comes back again and again to the face of the other as an ethical address. #is theme is central to his most well-known book, Totality and In!nity (1961). But his argument is sketched in “Freedom and Command,” published in 1953: #e being that expresses itself, that faces me, says no to me by this very expression. #is no is not merely formal, but it is not the no of a hostile force or a threat; it is the impossibility of killing him who presents that face; it is the possibility of encountering a being through an interdiction. #e face is the fact that a being a/ects us not in the indicative, but in the imperative, and is thus outside all categories. . . . #e metaphysical relationship, the relationship with the exterior, is only possible as an ethical relationship. (Levinas [1953] 1998, 21) 326 Rethinking the Value of Humanity Levinas is as much concerned with justice (“#at shalt not kill”) as with benevolence, though he connects the two: From the start, the encounter with the Other is my responsibility for him. #at is the responsibility for my neighbor, which is, no doubt, the harsh name for what we call love of one’s neighbor; love without Eros, charity, love in which the ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without concupiscence. (Levinas [1982b] 1998, 103) Levinas insists on the particularity of our relation to the other, its distributed, nonaggregative character, in ways that resonate with personal concern. I must judge, where before I was to assume responsibilities. Here is the birth of the theoretical; here the concern for justice is born, which is the basis of the theoretical. But it is always starting out from the Face, from the responsibility for the other that justice appears, which calls for judgment and comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, for every being is unique; every other is unique. (Levinas [1982b] 1998, 104)22 For Levinas, our relation to the other is always already ethical: it a/ects us in the imperative, not the indicative. He does not try to justify this relation or explain its basis in other terms. To many philosophers, this will seem like an abdication of responsibility. What grounds the ethical phenomena Levinas describes? What cognitive relation justi!es love at !rst sight and mediates personal concern, a form of concern that structures ethical thought? Since the ethical supervenes on the nonethical, there must be an answer to this question.23 Isn’t that where personal acquaintance comes in? As I read him, however, Levinas does not believe that the gap can be !lled.24 I think he is right to see a di$culty here. It is hard to say what personal acquaintance is in terms that are both extensionally adequate and account for its ethical role. In Section 1, we considered and dismissed some simple views: personal acquaintance is not “knowing who” or objectual knowledge or rigidi!ed description. We did not draw an obvious connection, between personal acquaintance and “acquaintance” as a term of art in the philosophy of mind. For Russell (1910– 1911) and others, acquaintance with particulars is what makes them available as direct objects of thought. Russell’s views about this topic evolved over time, and they are subject to interpretive dispute, but in his early phase, he seems to have believed that we are acquainted only with sense data, universals, and the self. #at idea has not fared well, and many are now skeptical of any role for acquaintance as a condition of “singular thought.”25 For those who are sympathetic to the idea, the paradigm of Other People 327 acquaintance is perceptual contact of the sort that sustains demonstrative reference.26 #is looks promising at !rst. Perceptual contact is present in love at !rst sight and the case in which you see the drowning M; it is absent when you think of the shortest spy or the person who is drowning on the right. Perhaps the singular concepts involved in personal concern and the reasons to which it responds are concepts that were formed on the basis of perception. #e problem is that it is not clear why perceptual contact, past or present, should have the ethical signi!cance that personal acquaintance does. Why should seeing someone, or having seen them in the past, make it rational to give priority to their needs, to save their life at the cost of three? Why should we organize our concern for individuals by perceptual acquaintance, not description? #ere are extensional problems, too. If you are looking at someone but take them to be a statue, you are not personally acquainted with them, though you are in a position to engage in acquaintance-based thought: that looks like a statue to me. Personal acquaintance may involve perceptual contact, but perceptual contact is not enough. What can we add to it in order to explain why personal acquaintance matters? One idea is to look at the facts to which we gain perceptual access. Personal acquaintance might involve perceptual contact of a kind that a/ords perceptual knowledge of properties that matter, morally speaking. For instance, it might allow for knowledge of mental states. When we are personally acquainted with someone, the suggestion runs, we can perceive their joy and su/ering, weal and woe. Whether or not that is true, however, it is doubly unpromising. First, it gets the extension wrong. If we can perceive human su/ering, why not the suffering of nonhuman animals, who lack moral standing of the sort at issue here? Second, it is hard to see why the perception of su/ering, or its possibility, should matter more than knowledge of human su/ering acquired by other means. Why would the su/ering of someone perceptually given to me count for more than the su/ering of the person on the bridge? #e second problem applies to variations of this approach that turn on perceptual access to speci!cally human qualities, to perception of the face or mind or body that brings it under concepts speci!c to human life. Views of this kind fare better extensionally, but they do not explain the moral weight of personal acquaintance. If it is simply a matter of how we know about the other, why should personal acquaintance matter in the ways it does? For Levinas, “[the] encounter with the face is not an act of seeing; it is not perceptual or judgmental” (Morgan 2007, 75; see also 92). What goes missing in the turn to perceptual knowledge is the practical dimension of personal acquaintance. One way to !ll this de!cit is to the stress the role of perceptual contact as a basis for human interaction. Personal acquaintance matters, on this more Kantian approach, because it allows us to act and reason together. For Christine Korsgaard (1993, 298), “the violation of a deontological constraint always involves an agent and a victim, and thus . . . deontological 328 Rethinking the Value of Humanity reasons are always shared reasons. #ey cannot be the personal property of individual agents. Instead, they supervene on the relationships of people who interact with one another. #ey are intersubjective reasons.” #at might explain why personal acquaintance counts. It is in the spirit of Stephen Darwall’s (2006) invocation of the “second-person standpoint,” the point of view from which we make claims on one another, holding each other accountable, you and I. Is personal acquaintance reciprocal recognition or the nexus of rational wills? I don’t believe it is. #e proposal could take various forms, but they share two basic "aws. #e more mundane objection is again extensional. Human beings with whom we cannot interact as agents have full moral standing. #ey are rational objects of love and personal concern. #is is true even when they lack the potential to achieve the relevant forms of reciprocity. I don’t know how to prove that infants with irreparable cognitive disabilities and people in persistent vegetative states are morally equal to us, and I do not think the implications of this fact are clear, but I am quite sure that it is true.27 #e less mundane objection is phenomenological. #ough Darwall cites both Levinas and Martin Buber ([1923] 1970) as precedents for the second-person standpoint, their views are not the same.28 Buber appeals to the reciprocity of the “I-#ou” relation. Levinas emphatically does not. [#e] relationship with the other is not symmetrical, it is not at all as in Martin Buber. When I say "ou to an I, to a me, according to Buber I would always have that me before me as the one who says #ou to me. Consequently, there would be a reciprocal relationship. According to my analysis, on the other hand, in the relation to the Face, it is asymmetry that is a$rmed: at the outset I hardly care what the other is with respect to me, that is his own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible for. (Levinas [1982b] 1998, 105) One of the themes of Totality and In!nity . . . is that the intersubjective relationship is a non-symmetrical relationship. In this sense, I am responsible for the other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his a/air. (Levinas [1982a] 1985, 98; see also Morgan 2007, 62) | OTHEROTHER: On this point, I think Levinas is right. #e phenomenology of personal acquaintance is not mutual or interactive: the demand for personal concern is unilateral. It is about what I owe to you, not what we owe to one another.29 #is ethical reality is obscured by the Kantian focus on the second person. We should not con"ate attention to relational phenomena in ethics—not just personal concern but the relational or bipolar notion of wronging an individual—with appeal to reciprocal recognition.30 #e second person matters, but it is not essential to “directed duty.” Other People 329 #ough it is impossible to survey every option, I hope you can begin to see how hard it is to describe the nature of personal acquaintance itself: to identify a psychological relation we can bear only to those with full moral standing, a relation that justi!es love and necessitates personal concern. It is no accident that Levinas does not describe the basis of the ethical relation; he is not being willfully obscure. #ere is an echo of Wittgenstein (1953, §217) in his refusal: “If I have exhausted the justi!cations I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.” Cora Diamond (1991, 55) takes a similar view of membership in the moral community: #e sense of mystery surrounding our lives, the feeling of solidarity in mysterious origin and uncertain fate: this binds us to each other, and the binding meant includes the dead and the unborn, and those who bear on their faces “a look of blank idiocy,” those who lack all power of speech, those behind whose vacant eyes there lurks “a soul in mute eclipse.” I am not arguing that we have a moral obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with all other human beings because of some natural or supernatural property or group of properties which we all have, contingently or necessarily. I am arguing, though, that there is no need to !nd such a ground. Levinas in fact goes further. My relation to the other is ethical through and through: it lacks any rational-psychological ground. Nor can its content be expressed in words. #is relation is presupposed by communicative speech, which is a condition of language and so of rational thought. (Like many philosophers, Levinas sees a distinction in kind between our mental lives and the “nonconceptual” psychology of nonlinguistic animals.) If thought depends on language, which depends in turn on our ethical relation to the other, this relation is a precondition of openness to the world: “the order of meaning, which seems to me primary, is precisely what comes to us from the interhuman relationship, so that the Face, with all its meaningfulness as brought out by analysis, is the beginning of intelligibility” (Levinas [1982b] 1998, 103). Since the relation is prelinguistic, and thus preconceptual, we cannot express with concepts how it represents the other. #e ethics of the face, of love and personal concern, is the transcendental origin of thought, as such.31 #is is the argument of Totality and In!nity, in brief.32 It is transcendental in two ways. First, the ethical relation is transcendental in that it cannot be conceptualized: it is fundamentally inexpressible. Second, the argument is transcendental in a Kantian sense: it aims to undermine a skeptical threat by showing how the skeptic’s position assumes or implies the very thing she purports to doubt. In this case, the moral skeptic cannot think conceptually without relying on a public language that depends in turn on her ethical acknowledgment of the 330 Rethinking the Value of Humanity other. For Levinas ([1961] 1969, 198), “[to] kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely.” I have sketched this argument not because I accept it but to give a more adequate view of Levinas on the ethical roots of metaphysics, and to explain how the ineluctably ethical character of personal acquaintance or the face might bear on moral philosophy. #ose are topics to pursue elsewhere. I want to return, instead, to the supervenience of the ethical: the pressure to insist that the justi!cation of love and personal concern derives from a relation to the other we can specify in other terms. As we have seen, it is di$cult to meet this pressure, to give a psychological account of personal acquaintance, of the relation that makes love rational and calls for personal concern. Must we concede that, in this respect, morality is groundless? Perhaps there is another way. Suppose, to begin with, that love and personal concern are natural kinds, emotions that play particular, distinctive roles in human life. Suppose, further, that they are regulated by a relation, R, that can be speci!ed in psychological terms. And adopt the conjecture that R is personal acquaintance. Human beings feel love or personal concern for those with whom they are personally acquainted, not those who are known to them merely by name or by minimal description, like “the one on the right” or “the shortest spy.” We should treat this as a generic proposition, a claim about what is characteristic of us that allows for exceptional cases, in which our emotions are misdirected. #e psychological relation we are targeting is one by which they are naturally regulated, though the regulation may be imperfect. Suppose, !nally, that the psychological relation thus described is one that relates human beings only to those with full moral standing: presumably, in the !rst instance, other human beings. We cannot be personally acquainted with inanimate objects or with nonhuman animals of the sort we encounter on Earth. #e discussion so far has asked, in e/ect, why relation R would justify love and necessitate personal concern. It treats our hypothesized emotions as if they were in need of external vindication, holding human nature up to a normative standard independent of us. Could that be a mistake? What if we insist that human nature, and the facts of human life, play a constitutive role in ethics, pursuing a line of thought that descends from Aristotle (see Foot 2001; #ompson 2013)? #at a human response is rational or justi!ed is not independent of the fact that this response, or a$rmation of this response, is functional for us, where the standards of functioning derive from the natural history of human life. We need not read the virtues directly or naïvely from the book of human nature in order to accept some measure of constitutive dependence. In fact, we had better not, unless we believe that human beings are by nature perfectly good. #e devil is in the details.33 But the approach has interest, in part because it is the only way we have seen, thus far, to reconcile the ethics of personal acquaintance with Other People 331 its psychological grounds. On this view, personal acquaintance matters not because it ought to play a certain role in human life, by standards independent of human life, but because of the role it characteristically plays: it is the relation that underlies both love and personal concern. For the neo-Aristotelian, this fact about human life has ethical signi!cance. Personal concern is called for, and love is justi!ed, whenever they are humanly possible. #ere is more to say in defense of these ideas. Because I don’t know how to say it, I want to end, instead, by placing the puzzle of personal acquaintance in a wider context of re"ection on human values. At the beginning of Section 1, I assumed without argument that human beings have an ethical signi!cance that is not shared by other terrestrial animals. Our interests count for more than theirs, and we have rights against each other they do not possess. Positions of this sort have acquired a very bad name. Don’t they re"ect an odious “speciesism”?34 It helps to emphasize their relational character: they are about the signi!cance we have for one another, not about the signi!cance of human beings in some absolute sense, as though we should matter more to rational Martians than they do to themselves. But even with this proviso, the basic challenge remains. How is such “humanism” (as I prefer) morally better than racism or sexism, attributing ethical signi!cance to brute biological di/erence?35 #is question, which casts doubt on the distinctive value of humanity, has less force if human nature is involved in the foundations of ethics. If human beings by nature respond to one another in distinctive ways, as with love or personal concern, and this fact plays a constitutive role in how it is rational to respond, humanism might be true. By contrast, there is no credible theory of ethics on which its foundations appeal to race or sex, nor is there reason to believe that human beings are by nature racist or sexist in ways that might support an Aristotelian defense of such repugnant views.36 #ere is, if not a direct argument from humanism to Aristotelian ethics, at least an a$liation between the two.37 #e ethics of personal acquaintance ampli!es and complicates this connection. It is, to begin with, another instance of moral thinking that is di$cult to sustain if we deny a constitutive role in ethics to the facts of human life. Perhaps we should not hope to sustain these thoughts, but if we do, we will be led, through Levinas, to Aristotle. At the same time, personal acquaintance puts constraints on the nature of moral standing: it has to mesh with human psychology in ways hypothesized above. #is points to a !nal question, o%en raised as an objection to humanism: What about rational Martians? Don’t members of other rational species count for us in the same way other humans do? #e standard response, which I accept, is that humanism does not imply otherwise. What it suggests is not that rational Martians lack full moral standing but that, if they have it, the ground on which they do so is quite di/erent from the ground that applies to you or me. Whether 332 Rethinking the Value of Humanity we should care about the members of another rational species, what rights they have against us: these are open questions. #e answers turn on how they relate to one another and to us. (Bernard Williams [2006, 149–152] makes this vivid by imagining rational predators who come from outer space.) #e idea of personal acquaintance introduces something new. For there is nothing in the psychology of love or personal concern that prevents us from being personally acquainted with nonhuman beings. One thing we learn from unimaginative science !ction, in which the aliens are mostly humanoid, is that love across species boundaries makes sense. #e same is true of personal concern. If it is rational to love the members of another rational species, their moral standing should not be in doubt. #e ethics of personal acquaintance is not humanist in giving special weight to speci!cally human life. It is humanist in treating every human being as a moral equal and, in its Aristotelian form, in giving special weight to human values, values that may be cosmically cosmopolitan. We have traveled far along a speculative path. Let us go back to the start. I have argued that personal acquaintance plays a crucial role in the permissive view of love, and in the idea of personal concern that is brought into focus by ex ante contractualism and Opaque Footbridge. If we want to make sense of these phenomena, we need an ethics of personal acquaintance. But it is hard to say what personal acquaintance is in terms that would explain why it justi!es love and calls for personal concern. We have considered an approach that has some promise, one that draws on Aristotle, echoing Levinas without his quietism. Personal acquaintance is a cognitive relation whose signi!cance for us can be explained by giving an essential role in ethics to the facts of human life. If this is wrong, we are le% with a serious, unsolved puzzle. Can we make sense of love at !rst sight, and of concern for individuals, as such?38 Notes 1. #e example derives from Kaplan 1968, 192–193. 2. Compare Velleman 1999, 353; Setiya 2014, 252–254. 3. Setiya 2014, 258–262, responding to Kolodny 2003. 4. I develop these themes in Setiya 2014, 254–261. 5. #e neglect is partial: I appeal to “singular thought” at several points (Setiya 2014, 260n21, 265–266). Velleman (2008, 269–270) has urged that emotions such as love depend on “acquaintance-based thought,” though he does not develop the point and it is in tension with his earlier remarks about the attachment of adopted children to birth parents they have never met (see 263–264). 6. #e case derives from Anscombe 1967, 17. 7. I provide at least some of it in Setiya 2014. 8. #is is a drastic simpli!cation of the theory proposed in Boër and Lycan 1986. Other People 333 9. On knowing someone well, see Talbert 2015. 10. A case of particular interest is self-love. Surely this does not depend on the belief that you are a person or a human being or have moral standing. Nor, as I have argued elsewhere (Setiya 2015), does it rest on beliefs about who you are. Instead, it turns on personal acquaintance with yourself. 11. Contributions include Scanlon 1998, 208–209; Reibetanz 1998; Ashford 2003; Lenman 2008; Fried 2012; James 2012; Dougherty 2013; Kumar 2015; Frick 2015; Horton 2017. 12. #e likelihood is > 0.99 that 1,000 children ± 100 will die (Frick 2015, 183n14). 13. On the extension from known to knowable victims, see Frick 2015, 191–193. I return to this below. 14. Unfortunately, Frick does not discuss this case, but he considers a variant of Mass Vaccination (Known Victims) in which the genetic test is very costly, and concludes, on ex ante contractualist lines, that it is permissible to choose Vaccine B; see Frick 2015, 193–194. 15. For a similar argument, see Horton 2017, 69–70. 16. His strategy is to decompose your action into six, each of which a/ects only one individual, improving their prospects without a/ecting anyone else. For details, see Hare 2016, §4. 17. I object to it in Setiya 2020. 18. A question raised about a similar case by Elizabeth Harman (2015, 870), in her review of Hare 2013. For related discussion, see Mahtani 2017. 19. As I argue in Setiya (2020), there is a fourth route, too, through the nature of respect for rights. 20. I develop this contrast in Setiya 2020. 21. I am no expert on Levinas, but I have been inspired by his writings. Michael Morgan’s (2007) Discovering Levinas is an invaluable guide; I have also been helped by Perpich 2008. 22. On the particularity of ethics in Levinas, see Morgan 2007, 61, 79–80. 23. I discuss supervenience in Setiya 2012, 8–11. 24. Here I follow Morgan (2007, 46–50); see also Perpich 2008, 51–54, 74–75, 115–117. 25. For a recent critique, see Hawthorne and Manley (2012, chap. 3). On the relation between Russellian acquaintance and knowledge of other people, see Kremer 2015. 26. See, for instance, Dickie 2015, chap. 4. 27. I defend this view in Setiya 2018. 28. On Levinas, see Darwall (2006, 21–22n44); on Buber, see Darwall (2006, 39–40). 29. Levinas ([1982b] 1998, 106, 109) !nds a deeper asymmetry in the ethical relation: “If there were only two of us in the world, there wouldn’t be any problem: it is the other who goes before me. . . . #e only absolute value is the human possibility of giving the other priority over oneself.” I don’t think this is right, either in substance (one is not required to give the other priority over oneself) or in form. Since the ethical relation is re"exive, it cannot involve the priority of an other. We are personally acquainted with ourselves. 334 Rethinking the Value of Humanity 30. #is distortion a/ects even those who resist the Kantian line. In a broadly Aristotelian approach to bipolarity, Michael #ompson (2004, 348, 367–372) assumes that “relations of right” are fundamentally reciprocal: in the paradigm case, they are recognized on both sides, though there may be marginal occasions in which the party who is wronged is unable to recognize the obligation of the other. If I understand him, Levinas would question this assumption. 31. “Preexisting the disclosure of being in general taken as basis of knowledge and as meaning of being is the relation with the existent that expresses himself; preexisting the plane of ontology is the ethical plane” (Levinas [1961] 1965, 201). 32. See, especially, Levinas (1961) 1965, 72–81, 194–219. #e argument is explored by Morgan (2007, 52–55) and Perpich (2008, 132–135, 140–149). An early version appears in Levinas (1953) 1998, 18. 33. If we focus on practical rationality, the simplest view identi!es this trait with the proper functioning of our psychology with respect to practical thought. I !nd it more plausible to begin with ethical judgment as a capacity that regulates human life; practical rationality is what this form of judgment tracks when it is functioning well. I defend this sort of view, under the heading of “Natural Externalism,” in Setiya 2012, chap. 4. 34. #e term was coined by Peter Singer (1975, 6). 35. #is challenge is central to Singer’s (1975) argument; for a more recent discussion, see McMahan 2005, §3. 36. I defend this claim in Setiya 2012, 142–158. 37. I pursue this connection in Setiya 2018. 38. For discussion of this material, I am grateful to Gregory Antill, Marcia Baron, Anastasia Berg, Ian Blecher, Paul Boswell, Matt Boyle, Jason Bridges, Sarah Buss, Alex Byrne, Imogen Dickie, Jimmy Doyle, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Camil Golub, Marah Gubar, Matthias Haase, Caspar Hare, Samia Hesni, Abby Jaques, A. J. 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Frankfurt: Klostermann. #omson, Judith J. 1976. “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.” "e Monist 59: 204–217. Velleman, J. David. 1999. “Love as a Moral Emotion.” Ethics 109: 338–374. Velleman, J. David. 2008. “Persons in Prospect.” Philosophy and Public A#airs 36: 221–288. Williams, B. 2006. “#e Human Prejudice.” In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, edited by A. W. Moore, 135–152. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Gertrude E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Nietzsche Experts | * Barbara Stiegler (wrote dissertation on Nietzsche under Jean-Luc Marion https://twitter.com/orgoneontology/status/1660711127330766850 * Jonas Čeika (aka Cuck Philosophy) * Adrian Iliopoulos / metamorphosis_77 * Anthony Ludovici - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Ludovici Anthony Ludovici was a right-nietzchean? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTBq81xoStw&t=1518s * UberBoyo - https://www.instagram.com/uberboyo * Darryl Cooper https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7104584623841583104/ * Ken Gemes - halkyon / Niederhauser seminar instructor and professor emeritus of philogophy at Birkbeck College in London Nietzsche foresees that liberalism will take on Christian morality and sentiments but without its metaphysical underpinnings and commitments * H. L. Mencken, Menckenian https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H._L._Mencken https://twitter.com/DanielTutt/status/1707833729937187228 * Daniel Tutt * Jan Rehmann's Deconstructing Postmodernist Nietzscheanism * Don Dombowsky, translator of Nietzsche's Political Writings; Ray Brassier who has written extensively on left- Nietzschean thought; John Bellamy Foster who recently wrote a long essay that touches on Nietzsche and imperialism; https://twitter.com/DanielTutt/status/1705184032240042495 * Professors Paul Loeb, Keith Ansell Pearson, Christa Davis Acampora, and Michael Ure https://old.reddit.com/r/Nietzsche/comments/15zbgqa/scholarly_articles/jxgnenz/ * * * * * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/Nietzsche/ | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Schelling Experts | * Xavier Tilliette * Kuno Fischer * Sean McGrath - Sean J. McGrath, Kyla Bruff, and Joseph Carew https://twitter.com/aufgehendeRest/status/1663400731833925632 * Russian Schellingians - Chaadayev;Venevitinov;Solovyov;Belinsky * * * * | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: F. W. J. Schelling and German Idealism https://www.facebook.com/groups/304938653857214/ | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Zizek Experts | * ??? * ??? | QUOTES: * * * * * * * | PAIRWISE/TERNARY COMPARISONS: * * * * * * * | SOCIAL: https://old.reddit.com/r/zizek/ https://old.reddit.com/r/zizek_studies/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/402250916589137 https://www.facebook.com/groups/251215961958007/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/1121396571767429/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/362215295534258/ | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| experts ur-critiquers neurotics obsessionals biographers translators scholars | Other Experts | # Adorno experts * Jensen Suther https://twitter.com/jensensuther, also Samuel Beckett expert? * * * # Aquinas experts (Thomists) * Josef Pieper # Arendt experts * Richard J. Bernstein * Hanna Pitkin * Samantha Rose Hill * * # Derrida Experts * Geoffrey Bennington * Jean-Luc Marion, student of Derrida * Barbara Stiegler, student of Derrida * * * # Fichte experts * Yolanda Estes * Wolfgang Janke * Gabe Gottlieb - x2 Gabe Gottlieb associate professor of philosophy at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. Dr. Gottlieb navigates us through a detailed Presentation on the Life and Philosophy of the German Philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UB3PnH9Xta0 # Foucault experts * Didier Eribon - Michel Foucault by Didier Eribon, translated by Betsy Wing * * * # Guattari experts * Day x of posting Guattari memes!! https://old.reddit.com/user/triste_0nion/submitted * * * # Lyotard Experts * Geoffrey Bennington * * * # Marcuse Experts * Katsiaficas was mentored by Marcuse (Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud) * * * # Popper Experts * Nassim Taleb is just a Popperian? https://twitter.com/search?q=%20Popper%20%40nntaleb&src=typed_query&f=live https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/11hv9uc/question_concerning_nassim_taleb/ * * * * # Spinoza Experts * Spinoza scholars: Edwin Curley * Samuel Shirley # Vattimo experts * Thomas Winn on Vattimo - I’m pleased to announce a recent publication of The Vattimo Dictionary containing a few entries from myself on particular aspects of Gianni Vattimo’s philosophical thought on history and historicity, ideology, and (the end of) modernity. https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-vattimo-dictionary.html https://www.instagram.com/p/CtPLpDEKZEr * * * # Wittgenstein experts * https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/zxg4dm/how_do_i_come_to_understand_wittgensteins/ * Ray Monk * Russell Nieli, Ray Monk, Janik & Toulmin, Paul Engelman gives a continental perspective to Wittgenstein * * * | . | . | . | . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| becoming becoming | become X / becoming X vs X as becoming eg: becoming-Animal: something that is pre-subjectivity before the burden of the law, burden of the No, before we are cognizing sexuality eg: destruction as becoming | * becoming amoeba - https://twitter.com/search?q=%22becoming%20amoeba%22&src=typd&f=live&vertical=news * becoming bat - becoming-tick / becoming-bat are the Deleuzian transformations one experiences when they read Giorgio Agamben's "Umwelt and Tick" and Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat" #TheTick #HarleyQuinn #becomingBecoming #Heidegger https://twitter.com/ManuelDeLanda/status/1693864355870253110 * becoming bug - https://twitter.com/search?q=%22becoming%20bug%22&src=typd&f=live&vertical=news * becoming bumblebee - https://twitter.com/search?q=%22becoming%20bumblebee%22&src=typd&f=live&vertical=news * becoming child - The Net (7): Becoming-Child w/ The Wilhelms, Literary-Structure, Philosophy-Theme, and “And” to “/” ;;; Nietzsche's camel -> lion -> child??? ;;;"Paul Ricoeur has written powerfully about the “second naïveté” that is the mark of true faith. A century earlier, Kierkegaard wrote about “the second immediacy,” the possibility of being a child or youth for the second time. “To become again a child, to become as nothing," * becoming cyborg (see course with same title) * becoming death / become death - Oppenheimer? https://twitter.com/search?q=%22become%20death%22&src=typd&f=live&vertical=news * becoming dog - becoming wolf instead of becoming dog, thousand plateaus https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vO4ztWebQEE&t=34m35s * becoming dynamite - https://twitter.com/uberboyo/status/1705728238796873944 “Why I am a Destiny” - written by Nietzsche in Ecce Homo This piece is littered with infamous quotes: “I am not a man, I am dynamite” “…after coming in contact with a religious man, I always feel that I must wash my hands” But beyond quotes - this contains a surreal “prophecy” by Nietzsche about the 20th Century: “All the old orders of the world will be blasted to pieces—for they are all based on falsehood… there will be wars, the like of which have never been seen before on earth” Of course what came were enormous wars that mobilised the entire world - millions of deaths that sound like something out of ancient mythology - futuristic world ending weapons like nuclear bombs - giant industrial murder camps, factories churning out tanks, and air plane raids that destroyed entire cities These were certainly “like nothing we have ever seen” and these wars had a particular tone to them They were “wars for mans destiny”: Were we to become communist comrades who are shaped by the state into Utopians? Good little Consumers who are fair game to culture capitalists? Racial Brethren under a eugenic council of German Occultists? WW2 was much more than a mere squabble among aristocrats - it was a Total War to decide the future of the world Ever since WW2 it’s been treated as some sort of Mythological defeat of the Titans and their casting down into Tartarus The last line Nietzsche pulls together this epic thinking: “The concept "politics" then becomes elevated entirely to the sphere of spiritual warfare… …Only now that I have lived will politics on a grand scale exist on earth” Here we see the arrival of a dangerous idea… what is grand politics? How can it be “spiritual”? Well, look at the grand political projects of our age: Mass migration is a massive transformation of Western society, it will have the same long lasting effects as Colonialism did What motivates people to “enact” this grand project is a vision of a communal world of tolerance and love This vision of the future is how one creates a beautiful world… a “good” world… an open world …and of course those who resist it see things on an equally “lofty” scale Mass migration represents a existential threat - it is a direct assault upon the West The vision for the West must be exclusive, exceptional, and closed The beauty, goodness, and glory of the West was achieved this way This is a spiritual war… a war over the meaning of whats “Good” Alongside this are many other the grand projects that have similar spiritual undertones: - Climate Change - Affirmative Action - Bitcoin - The pursuit if Ai - The Culture War These all boil under the surface and are set to come out a head at some point There the grand ideas will be hashed out There it will be decided which vision of “good” and “beauty” will be brought to term Our values clash like Gods, vying for domination over reality We are but pawns in this war of the Gods… and this war is not over… another battle is on the horizon * becoming egg - PolymorphousPerversity "rolling around with other eggs" (becoming eggs?) wont help us -Liu;;;Joyce’s protean characters are an example of such metonymic flux. ALP is becoming hen and becoming river, Shem is becoming book and becoming tree, Shaun is becoming rock, Issy is becoming cloud, and HCE (Howth Castle and Environs) is becoming egg, becoming fox, and becoming giant;;;becoming egg Building Metonymic Meaning with Joyce, Deleuze, and Guattari abstract: At moments of contradictory richness, meaning in Finnegans Wake changes even as we try to decipher it. The resulting malleability is not arbitrary, given that it responds to contexts. Nor is a response of the type posited, for instance, by speech-act theory: contextually delineated so as to be discrete and identifiable. Instead we find a plurality in which any statement is on the brink of turning into a different statement. I call this metonymic meaning. Joyce’s protean characters are an example of such metonymic flux. ALP is becoming hen and becoming river, Shem is becoming book and becoming tree, Shaun is becoming rock, Issy is becoming cloud, and HCE is becoming egg, becoming fox, and becoming giant. I link this to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of becoming. They venture, for instance, that Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis in Kafka’s story is not a question of one self-contained entity being transformed into another self-contained entity, but rather of the permeability and simultaneity of entities. They call this the killing of metaphor. Their reading can help us grasp how, in Finnegans Wake, manifestations such as Issy the girl and Issy the cloud are not mutually exclusive avatars, but different compositions exploring the same intensive multiplicity. Luce Irigaray makes a related point when she opposes metonymic fluidity to metaphoric solidity. Her approach reminds us that an effect’s being chaotic, incalculable, and non-discrete does not guarantee its being negligible. This is how I propose to conceive both of the characters of Finnegans Wake and of Joyce’s experimental coinages. Their metonymic sliding makes their manifestations something different from a pure or isolated activation— but this does not reduce their capacity for carrying importance. We have to think metonymic meaning as fragmented and transitory and, at the same time, as possessing rupturing force. Shem’s transgressive mode of writing is another example of this rupturing force. I argue that Shem’s break with neat and polite writing is also a break with neat, metaphorical chunks of meaning. This violation of established forms of meaning illustrates that getting rid of metaphor is not only an aesthetic, but also a political step. Where communities are heterogeneous and/or transforming, they defy descriptions grounded in metaphorical comparison and synthesis (an example of this is the chaos of HCE’s city). Such intensive social pluralities are then more aptly understood as metonymic assemblages. Both in the linguistic realm and the social realm, Finnegans Wake can thus be seen to reject the stable and shared identities of metaphor and to push instead for the rupturing force of metonymic flux. the article is found in: Joyce Studies Annual (December 2018): 122-146 https://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/16qfofi/nature_surprises_us_scientists_in_brazil/k20rc5m/ * Becoming Human - Samuel Loncar's BH podcast https://www.samuelloncar.com/bhpodcast * Becoming Itself by Itself - Spinal Catastrophism.pdf - Accordingly, the problems exposed by the very idea of a form of natural history, a ‘form of development’ (is a Platonic ‘Becoming Itself by Itself’ conceivable?) initiate the ungrounding Moynihan here mines, beginning from the mechanical agony of the ‘bad back’ resulting from the vain reorientation of lithic plains subjected to organic and so impermanent resculpting: of the possible termini of the spinal reorganisation of lithic cycles, the ‘cervical zenith’ is neither absolute nor final, but only the medium from which ‘phylogenetic katabasis’ descends. The ladder of beings does not lead ever upward but attains points of critical reversal, so that its uppermost rungs are bowed to coincide with those preceding their achievement. Will this fall terminate, like that of Icarus, in abrupt confrontation with the earth, or does the Great Circle descend deeper into phylic prehistory? What are the seeds of all becoming, the principles from which it emerges? If neither anabasis (the cervical zenith) nor katabasis (lithic reversion) attain finality of form, what ultimate determinants can the Great Circle have? * becoming mushroom - https://www.instagram.com/becoming.mushroom/ * becoming rat - https://www.instagram.com/p/CxGCJ-NNA25/ https://www.instagram.com/p/Cw1-enJNdTE/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willard_(1971_film) * becoming rhizome - your life in the same safe, preplanned way so many people play music when they pick up an instrument? What happens is your life becomes a blocked rhizome. The possibility of a random root shooting off and making a new exciting connection with another network becomes impossible. The possibility of playing new music with your life becomes impossible. You turn yourself into a tree, rooted in one place, restricted to the same riffs and transitions for the rest of your life, unable to see new possibilities. * becoming tree - Alice Bucknell https://objkt.com/asset/KT1TcZXVW2RxGkUdfpA9azptJGwFbr5XcCgx/4 * becoming troglodyte - Becoming Troglodyte - Itinerant Philosophy - On Alphnso Lingis by Joff P N Bradley https://www.academia.edu/9195688/Becoming_Troglodyte * becoming woman - JA: Other Jouissance and Becoming-Woman https://medium.com/@tatleycody/ja-80d48cae033c https://www.tiktok.com/@cody_without_organs/video/7074202063986593030 * becoming worm Peter Sloterdijk's "You Must Change Your Life" Taking that in mind, consider Benedict of Nursia’s “On Humility” (I found the example via Sloterdijk’s new book ‘You Must Change Your Life’), wherein he writes a “twelve-step de-selfifying course” which is ultimately a [paradoxical] exercise in humility. Around step six we reach the Socratic “I have become nothing and know nothing”… but then something quite bizarre happens. You would think that he would stop there, but this is only the halfway point. The seventh step reads: “I am a worm and not a man” (sum vermis et non homo). I wonder what becoming-worm is like… I’m interested in the fact that Sloterdijk advocates a very specific sort of becoming animal: not becoming animal as such, but becoming worm. There’s something clarifying about the specificity. Becoming lion, tiger, or bear, is a different sort of exercise. Granted, Sloterdijk plays on what he knows is a kind of default sense of human disgust for the worm, when he challenges us to humble ourselves to the worm’s condition https://itself.blog/2013/01/31/we-dance-these-beasts-capitalism-animism-believers-of-the-future/ https://www.instagram.com/p/Cy_yK07M1Ag/ The seventh step sees the monacus entirely infused with the truth to which his lips testified on the sixth. He now says openly: 'I am a worm and not a man' (sum vermis et non homo);;"But I am a worm, and no man; A reproach of men, and despised of the people." Psalm 22:6 - KJV * * * * * * Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Imperceptible https://www.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfTheory/comments/w7cg0p/negative_maps_becominganimal_becomingintense/ * becoming-psychedelic Psyche means Spirit and Mind, Psychosis means to give life to, Delos means Manifesting. Psyche-Delos: Mind/Spirit-Manifesting Psychosis - Animation This becoming-psychedelic can take us straight outta Realism (in the same sense as Capitalist Realism). * becoming becoming - 2derivative? We discuss how this situation produces a source of resentment and general negative emotionality, which is involved in confronting a groundless real (e.g. Death of God), or a gap between the “I” of the understanding and the “it” of the fixed representation. To really reconcile ourselves with this groundless real, we suggest that both the will to power and the eternal recurrence point towards a becoming of becoming itself. * destruction as becoming (becoming destruction? no..) - Sabina Spielrein - DESTRUCTION AS THE CAUSE OF COMING INTO BEING SPIELREIN_1912_Destruction_as_cause_of_coming_into_being.pdf - becoming destruction? - "Trauma, Negativity, and Death in Spielrein, Heidegger, and Buddhist Thought" - Wanyoung Kim, also Julie Reshe and Cheri Hausmann talks about Spielrein * | All becoming is Real and Traumatic, as opposed to Simulacral and Hyperreal | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "Critique of ***" | # Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Critique of" (Kant's Critique of pure reason, Peter Sloterdijk's critique of cynical reason, etc) Sure, here is a list of all the major philosophy works that begin with "Critique of": * Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant (1781) * Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant (1788) * Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant (1790) * Critique of Dialectical Reason by Jean-Paul Sartre (1960) * Critique of Cynical Reason by Peter Sloterdijk (1983) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critique_of_Cynical_Reason * Critique of Violence by Walter Benjamin (1921) * Critique of the Gotha Program by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1875) * Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General by Friedrich Engels (1878) * Critique of Everyday Life by Henri Lefebvre (1947) * Critique of Political Economy by Karl Marx (1859) * Critique of Transcendental Miserablism is Land responding to some of this critique, for anyone interested in following these threads. https://www.reddit.com/r/CriticalTheory/comments/lznb5r/does_anyone_know_what_mark_fisher_and_the_rest_of/ These are just a few examples, and there are many other philosophy works that begin with "Critique of." The term "critique" is used in these works to mean a critical examination or evaluation of a particular subject. In the case of philosophy, these works typically examine and evaluate the foundations of knowledge, morality, and society. | . | . | . | . | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "Tractatus ***" | # Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Tractatus" (eg Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) * Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein * Tractatus Anti-Academicus.pdf: The Illusion of Academic Authority by Joshua Hansen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OqVptJkcDM (also The Treason of the Intellectuals by Benda, Julien and Thomas Sowell (an engineers test is if a bridge stays up, an academic is never tested, market of credentials), "academized", Kindly inquisitors.pdf by Jonathan Rauch, "academic realism", "academic rationalism") WHO IS Raymond Owen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OqVptJkcDM&t=1250s Deirdre McCloskey's "Liberalism Caused the Great Enrichment" * Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza * Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) by Baruch Spinoza, though it is not typically known by this name alone. * Tractatus politicus (Political Treatise) also by Baruch Spinoza. * Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore (Treatises of Laws and God the Lawgiver) by Francisco Suárez. * * * | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "Being and ***" or "*** and ***" | # Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Being and", eg: * Being and Time by Heidegger * Being and Event by Badiou * Being and Nothingness by Sartre * “Being and Timelessness”: Edith Stein's Critique of Heideggerian Temporality by James Orr https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/moth.12056 * * * # Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Being and", eg: * Jean Luc-Marion's "Reduction and Givenness" | . | . | . | . | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "Prolegomena to ***" | Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Prolegomena to", eg: * Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant * Prolegomena to a Theory of Language by Louis Hjelmslev * * * * * | . | . | . | . | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "The Dialectic of ***" | Please list out all the philosophical major works that begin with "Dialectid of ", eg: * "The Dialectic of Dark Enliightenment" Zizek and Liu's article - "https://www.reddit.com/r/CriticalTheory/comments/16gx6no/slavoj_%C5%BEi%C5%BEek_the_dialectic_of_dark_enlightenment/k0ajgfj/?context=3 * "The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology" by Alvin Gouldner * "The Dialectic of Enlightenment" by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno: This influential work, associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theory, explores the relationship between reason, enlightenment, and social domination in modern society. * "The Dialectic of Sex" by Shulamith Firestone: This feminist work examines the historical and contemporary oppression of women through the lens of social and biological factors, aiming for a radical reimagining of gender roles and reproductive technologies. * "The Dialectic of Self and World: Kierkegaard, Marx, and the Making of the Modern Subject" by Ali Aroosi: This book investigates the conceptions of selfhood and subjectivity in the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Marx, analyzing their respective contributions to modern understandings of the individual in relation to society. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| "Anti- / Contra" * | What are some major philosophical works that begin with "Anti-" Or "Contra-"? Examples below: * Nietzsche contra Wagner; Out of the Files of a Psychologist https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nietzsche_contra_Wagner * Engel's Anti-Duhring - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-D%C3%BChring * Julius Caesar's polemic Anti-Cato * Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze's Anti-Oedipus * Augustine of Hippo's Against the Academicians * Origen's Contra Celsum * Thomas Aquinas' Contra Gentiles - Whereas the Summa Theologiæ was written to explain the Christian faith to theology students, the Summa contra Gentiles is more apologetic in tone. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summa_contra_Gentiles * Jean-Paul Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew Book https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Semite_and_Jew * * * * * * |